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ANSELM'S ARGUMENT — ONCE AGAIN

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Abstract

The kernel of Anselm's famous argument in chapter II of his *Proslogion* consists of a few lines. Thousands of pages have been written about them, but nevertheless they have resisted final clarification, though the literature about them still grows.

Most of what has allegedly been written about Anselm's argument is concerned more with phantasies than with Anselm's original text. In fact most authors take Anselm's argument as an excuse for doing quite different things and developing their own ideas.

Anselm's brilliant text does not deserve such a treatment. Accordingly I will focus on Anselm's own words and will display the ingenuity of his argument as well as where it fails.

1. *The textual basis of my analysis*

In this paper I restrict myself to the argument Anselm presented in chapter II of his *Proslogion*; I do not deal with his argument in chapter III. The kernel is in the following lines of the original Latin text; to facilitate identifying certain parts of the text I insert numbers at appropriate places.

> "(1) Et certe id quo maius cogitari nequit, non potest esse in solo intellectu. (2) Si enim (2.1) vel in solo intellectu est, (2.2) potest cogitari esse et in re; (3) quod maius est. (4) Si ergo (4.1) id quo maius cogitari non potest, est in solo intellectu: (4.2) id ipsum quo maius cogitari non potest, est quo maius cogitari potest. (5) Sed certe hoc esse non potest. (6) Existit ergo procul dubio aliquid quo maius cogitari non valet, et in intellectu et in re."[1]

[1] Anselm (1962), p.84, (^{2}1984), pp.101-102.

Most "official" English translations of this text are deficient in different ways. My own translation[2] reads as follow:

> "(1) And surely that than which something greater cannot be thought cannot be solely in the understanding. (2) For if (2.1) it is solely in the understanding, (2.2) it can be thought to be in reality also; (3) which is greater. (4) If, therefore, (4.1) that than which something greater cannot be thought is solely in the understanding, then (4.2) that same thing than which something greater cannot be thought is something[3] than which something greater can be thought. (5) But this surely cannot be the case. (6) Therefore something than which something greater cannot be thought exists beyond doubt in the understanding and in reality."

As read with the naked mind two features of the argument become quite obvious: the essential occurrence of definite descriptions in it and its structure of a *reductio ad absurdum*. Because both features —despite their explicitness— are not commonly accepted by the experts, I will address a few words in the next two sections to these features of Anselm's text.

2. *Definite descriptions*

In the text quoted in section 1, Anselm makes essential use of definite descriptions or rather of a single definite description, namely *the* definite description 'that than which something greater cannot be thought'. The mere occurrence of definite descriptions in a text does not automatically imply, of course, that also the *logic* of definite descriptions is used in the text in a substantial way. This, however, I will show later. But it has also been argued that a definite description occurs in the text only in a super-

[2]It comes closest to the translation in Pegis (1949) except for the mistake mentioned in footnote 3.

[3]About half of the "official" English translations of Anselm's text have 'that' instead of 'something' which is a clear error of translation. The Latin text has no word at all at this place because Latin grammar allows one to skip the word 'aliquid' (i.e., 'something') which must be supplied in the translation whereas Latin grammar will not allow one to add 'id' (i.e., 'that'). The following translations miss this point: Charlesworth (1965), p.117, Fairweather (1956), p.74, Pegis (1949), p.209, whereas the following translations get it correct: Deane (^{2}1992), p.54, Hick & McGill (1968), p.6, Maginnis (1851), p.538, and Webb (1903), p.13.

ficial way. One might argue, for example[4], that we do not have to worry about the logic of definite descriptions for the following reason: "If I say 'That which is red is not green' I might just mean 'Whatever is red is not green,' neither implying nor presupposing that at least or at most one thing is red. Similarly, we can construe Anselm's 'that, than which nothing greater can be conceived' not as a definite description but rather as an idiom of universal quantification." This kind of argument shows that its author must have missed a Latin class in high school where you learn that the Latin word 'id' —unlike the English 'that'— does not indicate universal quantification. Moreover the argument displays an insensitivity to natural language in general because from the mere fact that one word (like 'that') is a correct translation of another one (like 'id') you should not infer that it also has all of its grammatical functions.

So one cannot get rid of definite descriptions in Anselm's text by explaining them away as indicating universal quantification.

3. *Reductio ad absurdum*

The way Anselm formulated his argument suggests that he had in mind a *reductio ad absurdum* or an indirect proof. For such a form of argument sentence (5) is quite typical which states that the preceding sentence (4.2) cannot be true, i.e., expresses an impossibility or absurdity. For a complete *reductio ad absurdum*, however, Anselm's text lacks the assumption which he has not explicitly stated and which must be supplemented in order to complete the indirect proof. The assumption to be supplemented is, of course, the antecedent of sentence (2), i.e., (2.1). In order to avoid this slight deviation from Anselm's text we could also take it as a "normal" argument where the metalinguistic sentence (5) is replaced by its counterpart in the object language, namely by the negation of sentence (4.2). In this case the inference rule to be applied is *modus tollens* instead of *modus ponens* which is used if the argument is construed as an indirect proof. This is the strategy in the following reconstruction.

4. *Identifying the parts of the reductio*

If one has decided to construe Anselm's argument as a *reductio* one has to identify the role of its sentences within such a *reductio*. Sentence (1) obviously plays the role of the conclusion of the whole argument, and so does

[4]And David Lewis has in fact: Lewis (1970), p.176, Lewis (1983), p.11.

sentence (6) which repeats (1) in a weakened form: whereas (1) states the existence of *that*, (6) merely states the existence of *something* than which something greater cannot be thought. If Anselm's argument were sound the conclusion would follow in its stronger form (1). We, therefore, can with justice treat (1) as the conclusion of the argument. Since Anselm at this point has already argued for, and, therefore, is sure that that than which something greater cannot be thought exists at least in the understanding, we can read the *conclusion of the reductio argument* without any loss of information as: *that than which something greater cannot be thought exists* (i.e., it exists in reality and not solely in the understanding). By fixing the conclusion of a *reductio* we also have automatically determined its assumption which is the negation of its conclusion. In Anselm's text sentence (2.1) functions as *assumption of the reductio* which we can formulate in accordance with the conclusion as follows: *It is not the case that that than which something greater cannot be thought exists* (i.e., exists in reality, which means that it exists solely in the understanding). The third essential of a *reductio ad absurdum* is the sentence which is supposed to be absurd or contradictory. Anselm himself makes quite clear in his comment (5) to which sentence he attributes this role: it is sentence (4.2) which he himself already formulates in such a precise form that we can adapt it without change. The alleged *absurdity* or *contradiction* of the argument therefore reads: *That than which something greater cannot be thought is something than which something greater can be thought.*

The question is, however, whether this sentence *really* is absurd or contradictory.

5. *The absurdity in the reductio*

This is exactly the point —and it is the only point!— where the logic of definite descriptions enters into Anselm's argument because the rest of the argument's logic is plain propositional logic; nothing but *reductio* and *modus ponens* is needed. Many scholars dealing with Anselm's argument and taking it as a *reductio ad absurdum* needlessly substitute a classical contradiction of the form '*A* and not-*A*'. In doing so they deviate from Anselm's text and water down its point.

Sentence (4.2)'s being absurd or contradictory, however, depends clearly on the logic of descriptions. Unfortunately, there are many different logics of descriptions which result in classifying quite different classes of sentences as valid or invalid, as logical truths or contradictions. As good luck —or rather Anselm's logical instinct and ingenuity— would have it, sentence (4.2) in Anselm's argument is of a form which is quite uncontroversial at least according to the logic of descriptions as developed in *Principia*

Mathematica. In addition the sentence displays its logical form as clearly as a sentence of natural language ever can: it is obviously a sentence of the form 'the x which is not so-and-so is so-and-so', i.e., in *Principia Mathematica* notation, '$\phi(\iota x)(\sim\phi x)$'. This is one of the very few clear cases of formulas which are self-contradictory according to *Principia Mathematica's* logic of descriptions. Other candidates —like '$\sim\phi(\iota x)(\phi x)$' or also like '$(\iota x)(\phi x) \neq (\iota x)(\phi x)$'— are much less uncontroversial because of their being ambiguous with respect to scope.[5]

To conclude: with admirable logical sensitivity Anselm picked out the right sentence as contradiction of his *reductio* and displayed its logical form as clearly as natural language allows.

6. *The pivots of Anselm's argument and their translation into a symbolic language*

We are now in a position to identify clearly the basic sentences in Anselm's argument.

The *assumption* of Anselm's *reductio* is sentence (2.1) which in my reconstruction reads as follows:

(A) It is not the case that that than which something greater cannot be thought exists.

The *contradiction* of Anselm's *reductio* is sentence (4.2) which in my reconstruction reads as follows:

(C) That than which something greater cannot be thought is something than which something greater can be thought.

And finally the *conclusion* of Anselm's *reductio* is sentence (1) which in my reconstruction reads as follows:

(S) That than which something greater cannot be thought exists.

In order to translate these sentences and the rest of the argument into symbolic language we will employ the notation of *Principia Mathematica* and

[5]In his proof in chapter III of *Proslogion* Anselm uses a sentence of the form '$(\iota x)(\phi x) \neq (\iota x)(\phi x)$' as his contradiction which becomes evident from the occurrence of a second 'id' ('that') in this sentence, an expression which is clearly lacking in chapter II.

supplement it by a logical, and several extra-logical, symbols: '$\sim$' is used for negation ('it is not the case that') and '$\supset$' for material implication ('if-then'); '$\exists$' will be used for the existential quantifier where '$(\exists x)(\phi x)$' reads as 'there is (or there exists) an x such that ϕx'; the inverted iota ('ι') will be used for definite descriptions where '$(\iota x)(\phi x)$' reads as 'the x such that ϕx'; and finally 'E!' will be used for existence with respect to objects described by definite descriptions so that '$E!(\iota x)(\phi x)$' will be read as 'the x such that ϕx exists'.

In addition to these symbols of *Principia Mathematica* I will use also (for reasons explained later) a lambda operator 'λ' as introduced, e.g., by Carnap in his *Introduction to Symbolic Logic*, for the construction of complex predicates. '$(\lambda x)(\phi x)y$' will be read as 'y is an object x such that ϕx' which, in standard predicate logic with identity, is logically equivalent with 'ϕy' itself as long as ϕ contains nothing but simple predicates (predicate letters), connectives and quantifiers.

Beyond these logical symbols we also need two extra-logical constants in order to translate Anselm's argument into a symbolic language: let 'xGy' abbreviate 'x is greater than y', and let 'Tp' abbreviate 'it can be thought that p' where 'G' is or represents a two-place predicate and 'T' is a one-place sentential operator turning a sentential function (i.e., an open or closed formula) into another one. A few words concerning the operator 'T' are in order.

Whether or not 'T' is primitive does not affect the soundness of Anselm's argument. I will therefore leave this question open. Whoever prefers to define the operator 'T' can replace it in what follows by its appropriate definiens throughout. Such a definition may reduce the operator 'T' to another one-place operator 'T'' (for 'it is thought that') or to a two-place operator 'T''' (for 'thinks that') plus logical symbols (especially '$\Diamond$' for 'it is possible that') along the following lines:

$$Tp := \Diamond T'p \qquad \text{or} \qquad Tp := \Diamond(\exists x)(xT''p)$$

The question of whether and how to define the operator 'T', however, is not the really difficult problem. The major problem is whether we should represent Anselm's 'can be thought' as a normal predicate rather than as a sentential operator. Even if we cannot expect a decisive argument in such a delicate matter there are good reasons (syntactical and semantical) for translating Anselm's 'it can be thought' as a sentential operator rather than a regular predicate:

(i) Grammatical reasons: in Anselm's standard formulation 'that than which something greater cannot be thought' the phrase 'cannot be thought' seems to be applied to a general name ('something greater', 'maius' in

Latin). This general name or rather the particle 'something' (in Latin the word 'aliquid', which for grammatical reasons is suppressed and remains unexpressed) is a clear indication of existential generalization. To be sure, from a merely grammatical point of view, this can be handled by taking 'can(not) be thought' as a predicate as well as by taking it as a sentential operator. (If, for the moment, we switch to a semantical consideration, then taking the existential quantification just mentioned as lying within the scope of 'can be thought' —which is only possible if we render it as a sentential operator!— makes Anselm's definite description of God much more acceptable than otherwise.) There is also a grammatical feature in Anselm's text which clearly directs us towards taking 'can be thought' as a sentential operator: in sentence (2.2) Anselm himself applies it without doubt to a sentential construction. Whoever prefers to render 'can be thought' as a normal predicate has to show how to translate sentence (2.2) in a natural way. The grammatical argument for taking 'can(not) be thought' as a sentential operator rather than as a predicate then is that in doing so we can translate *all* occurrences of this phrase in Anselm's argument (including sentence (2.2)) in a quite natural and uniform way.

(ii) Semantical reasons: the general semantical reasons in favour of the operator-analysis of 'can(not) be thought' are stronger than the merely grammatical reasons. That Anselm's argument sounds so convincing depends in a substantial way on the silently underlying logic of 'can be thought', the essential feature of which is that something can be thought even if nobody believes it, indeed, even if it is completely absurd. This feature can easily be captured by a sentential operator like our 'T' but not by a predicate —let us use 'H'— as long as we remain with standard elementary logic.

Now let me explain the difference between using 'Tp' (i.e., 'it can be thought that p') and 'Hx' (i.e., 'x can be thought') by means of several examples:

(1) Something can be thought to be F

which —using 'T'— is translated either into

(1a) $(\exists x)T(Fx)$ or (1a') $T(\exists x)(Fx)$

or —using 'H'— into

(1b) $(\exists x)(Fx \wedge Hx)$ (where '$\wedge$' is used for conjunction)

From (1) it obviously should not follow that there is an F, which is preserved in the case of (1a) but not in the case of (1b) —from which '$(\exists x)(Fx)$' follows via simple rules of elementary logic.

The same holds for

(2) Some F can be thought

which is either

(2a) $T(\exists x)(Fx)$

or again

(2b) $(\exists x)(Fx \wedge Hx)$

Similarly with

(3) a can be thought to be F

which is

(3a) $T(Fa)$

or —if translatable at all—

(3b) $Fa \wedge Ha$

Sentences like

(4) a can be thought to be F and not F

and

(5) a can be thought to be F but it is not F

which are clearly non-self-contradictory keep this feature as

(4a) $T(Fa \wedge \sim Fa)$

and

(5a) $T(Fa) \wedge \sim Fa$

but they lose it, become self-contradictory and both collapse into

(4b) = (5b) $Ha \wedge Fa \wedge \sim Fa$

if translated by means of a predicate.

To avoid such problems in using 'can be thought' as a predicate one would have to deviate from standard logic in one or another respect. This is a price, however, which is too high for a result which can easily be obtained without incurring such costs, by taking 'can be thought' as a sentential operator, as Anselm himself does anyway.

The truth of a sentence of the form 'it can be thought that *p*' or (in our symbolic abbreviation) '*Tp*' is quite independent of the truth or falsity of the sentence we insert in the place of the letter '*p*'. In fact, any sentence of the form '*Tp*' is or comes at least very close to a so-called performatively analytic sentence, each utterance of which is self-verifying: if a sentence of the form '*Tp*' is uttered consciously also the sentence which is inserted in place of the letter '*p*' must be uttered consciously; if this is done, however, then in a certain sense it has been thought and, therefore, it also can be thought that *p*, which is just what the sentence '*Tp*' states. This, of course, is not part of Anselm's argument or of its reconstruction; it merely serves the purpose of explaining why the first premiss of the argument sounds so convincing.

On the other hand, a sentence of the form '*Tp*' seems to be incapable of becoming self-contradictory. When it comes to the contradiction of Anselm's *reductio* we must therefore make quite clear that it is not a mere sentence of the form '*Tp*' but an instance of '$\phi(\iota x)(\sim\phi x)$' which will be displayed by using the lambda notation.

We are now in a position to write the assumption (*A*), the contradiction (*C*) and the conclusion (*S*) of Anselm's argument with the help of our symbolic notation. Anselm's definite description of God which is present in each of these sentences will be read in our regimented language as 'the *x* such that it is not the case that it can be thought that there is a *y* such that *y* is greater than *x*'. This regimented phrase renders into our symbolic notation as '$(\iota x)(\sim T(\exists y)(yGx))$'. Let us now turn to the three basic sentences of the argument:

(*A**) $\sim E!(\iota x)(\sim T(\exists y)(yGx))$
(*C**) $(\lambda x)(T(\exists y)(yGx))(\iota x)(\sim T(\exists y)(yGx))$
(*S**) $E!(\iota x)(\sim T(\exists y)(yGx))$

Given that (C^*) is an instance of '$\phi(\iota x)(\sim\phi x)$', and given that this formula is self-contradictory[6], the only question left open is whether and how it is derivable from assumption (A^*).

7. *How to derive contradiction (C) from assumption (A)*

To derive contradiction (C) from assumption (A) Anselm introduces —depending on the analysis of his text— at least two and at most three additional premisses.

The first additional premiss is the conditional number (2) in Anselm's text with (2.1) as antecedent and (2.2) as consequent. In our regimented language this sentence reads:

(2) *If it is not the case that that than which something greater cannot be thought exists, then it can be thought that that than which something greater cannot be thought exists.*

Anselm adds immediately: ...which is greater. This is shorthand for a subsequent conditional whose suppressed antecedent is just the consequent of the former conditional. In our regimented language it can be stated as follows:

(3) *If it can be thought that that than which something greater cannot be thought exists, then it can be thought that there is (or there exists) something (which is) greater than that than which something greater cannot be thought.*

It is obvious how to translate these two sentences into our symbolism:

(2*) $\sim E!(\iota x)(\sim T(\exists y)(yGx)) \supset T(E!(\iota x)(\sim T(\exists y)(yGx)))$
(3*) $T(E!(\iota x)(\sim T(\exists y)(yGx))) \supset T(\exists y)(yG(\iota x)(\sim T(\exists y)(yGx)))$

The elliptic way in which Anselm expressed sentence (3) could be mirrored by contracting (2) and (3) to:

(2/3*) $\sim E!(\iota x)(\sim T(\exists y)(yGx)) \supset T(\exists y)(yG(\iota x)(\sim T(\exists y)(yGx)))$

[6] And we know it would yield a contradiction in Russell's theory of descriptions but not in Frege's.

In this case Anselm's argument is shortened by one premiss while its logic remains unchanged because (2/3*) follows logically from (2) and (3) by *hypothetical syllogism*.

Now the main problem in representing Anselm's argument arises: his sentence (4). It is again a conditional sentence, but Anselm introduces it by an 'ergo' (i.e., 'therefore'). This shows that Anselm himself did not take (4) as a separate, additional premiss of his argument but rather as a summary or consequence of the preceding sentences (2) and (3). Indeed, sentence (4) is a kind of short-cut of (2) and (3) via *hypothetical syllogism* insofar as its antecedent is that of (2), i.e. (2.1) or assumption (A), and its consequent is, or at least comes very close to, the consequent of (3). What Anselm suggests in sentence (4) is something we can symbolically express as follows:

1. A (i.e., assumption of *reductio*)
2. If A, then B_1 (i.e., sentence (2) with antecedent (2.1) = A and consequent (2.2) = B_1)
3. If B_1, then B_2 (i.e., sentence (3))
4. Therefore, if A, then B_2

But instead of literally taking B_2 as the consequent of (4), Anselm switches to a variant which deviates only slightly in its wording from B_2. This variant of B_2 is none other than our contradiction (C). What Anselm in fact presents as his sentence (4) is:

4. Therefore, if A, then C

This, however, follows from (2) and (3), as the "therefore" at the beginning suggests, only if (C) is a mere stylistic variation of B_2 and nothing else, i.e. if it is logically equivalent or at least follows logically from B_2. What is needed from (4) for the sake of the argument is therefore nothing more than the conditional 'if B_2, then C', which Anselm obviously took to be trivial because for him B_2 and C are at least logically equivalent if not synonymous. My main point will be that they are not and that this ultimately accounts for the failure of Anselm's argument. In representing this argument, however, we need (4) at least in its weakened form, which is no deviation from Anselm because his logical conscience led him to mention it (even in its stronger form) although he took it to be superfluous. Adding it to our representation cannot be detrimental to his argument if it really is redundant. So we will add sentence (4) to our representation in its weakened form as follows:

(4) *If it can be thought that there is something (which is) greater than that than which something greater cannot be thought then that than which something greater cannot be thought is something than which something greater can be thought.*

Given the way B_2 and C have been represented within our symbolism, (4) simply turns into:

$$(4^*)\quad T(\exists y)(yG(\iota x)(\sim T(\exists y)(yGx))) \supset \\ \supset (\lambda x)(T(\exists y)(yGx))(\iota x)(\sim T(\exists y)(yGx))$$

In our symbolism, Anselm's argument finally takes on the following appearance (where 'A.P.' abbreviates 'Additional Premiss'):

1.	$\sim E!(\iota x)(\sim T(\exists y)(yGx))$	Assumption of *reductio*
2.	$\sim E!(\iota x)(\sim T(\exists y)(yGx)) \supset T(E!(\iota x)(\sim T(\exists y)(yGx)))$	A.P.
3.	$T(E!(\iota x)(\sim T(\exists y)(yGx))) \supset T(\exists y)(yG(\iota x)(\sim T(\exists y)(yGx)))$	A.P.
4.	$T(\exists y)(yG(\iota x)(\sim T(\exists y)(yGx))) \supset$ $\supset (\lambda x)(T(\exists y)(yGx))(\iota x)(\sim T(\exists y)(yGx))$	A.P.
5.	$(\lambda x)(T(\exists y)(yGx))(\iota x)(\sim T(\exists y)(yGx))$	Contradiction of *reductio*
6.	$E!(\iota x)(\sim T(\exists y)(yGx))$	Conclusion of *reductio*

The inference steps of the argument are logically justified as follows: sentence (5) follows from (1), (2), (3) and (4) by *modus ponens*, applied 3 times; sentence (6) follows from (1)–(5) by *reductio*.

8. *Evaluation of Anselm's argument*

Evaluating an argument means evaluating its logic and evaluating its premisses. As to its logic Anselm's argument uses simple principles of elementary logic like *reductio ad absurdum* and *modus ponens*. The argument is evidently valid —provided that (C) is really self-contradictory, which depends on the logic of definite descriptions. To be self-contradictory, according to Russell's logic of definite descriptions, (C) must be of the appropriate form as displayed by means of the lambda operator in (C^*).

As far as the premisses are concerned we have to keep in mind the logic of the 'T'-operator, i.e., the truth-conditions for sentences governed by the 'T'-operator: they are performatively analytic. The same holds of course of each conditional sentence the consequent of which is such a 'T'-sentence like premisses (2) and (3) in Anselm's argument. Nothing can therefore be said against these two premisses.

The soundness of Anselms's argument depends ultimately solely on the acceptability of premiss (4), the gist of which is represented in (4*).

9. *Where Anselm's argument fails*

Anselm himself took (4) to be redundant because he felt that he was "merely" reorganizing or restructuring a sentence by turning B_2 into C. In our representation the antecedent of (4*) also seems to be the same sentence as its consequent —only organized and structured in a different way. In fact the two sentences are logically equivalent according to the law that a sentence of the form '$(\lambda x)(\phi x)y$' is logically equivalent to 'ϕy' —provided that the context ϕ contains nothing but predicate symbols, connectives and quantifiers. The formula following the lambda operator in the consequent of (4*), i.e., in (C), however, contains also the operator 'T' and therefore the two sentences need *not* be equivalent. In fact, the antecedent of (4*) is a 'T'-sentence, i.e., a quite trivial sentence without any logical "punch", whereas its consequent has all the logical power available —it is a contradiction. The only reason why Anselm could adhere to the illusion that a sentence like (4*) or his sentence (4) is acceptable at all was that he gained it by a "mere" grammatical reorganization of a quite trivial sentence. He must have overseen the fact that such a grammatical reorganization is not always trivial.

10. *The wit and the trick of Anselm's argument*

Anselm's *logical wit* consists in his recognizing that sentence C, in order to be self-contradictory, requires a certain predicative form. His *logical trick* consists in carving this logical form out of a quite trivial sentence by a mere grammatical transformation which normally (i.e., if it does not include non-extensional operators) is quite harmless. My reconstruction (4*) reveals this logical trick by using the lambda operator notation. But this is not something alien to Anselm that I have wished onto his argument. In his argument, Anselm stated (4) explicitly and he exercised the grammatical reorganization I mentioned as clearly as it ever can be done in a natural language like Latin. The whole procedure is only mirrored in the reconstruction with the help of the lambda operator.

When I called premiss (4*) Anselm's *trick* I wanted neither to suggest that this trick was cheap nor that it was dishonest. It was not a cheap trick, but rather an ingenious one which required high logical competence and instinct and which therefore shows his logical brilliance. Nor was it a dishonest trick he wanted to play on us in order to deceive us on purpose.

If he intentionally tried to dupe somebody or something, it was not us but rather logic itself. And if he did really outsmart somebody by his trick, it was himself: he obviously believed in it and did not recognize it as a trick. That was his failure, and that is where and why his argument ultimately fails.[7]

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