Logique & Analyse **129-130** (1990), 155-168

MISSING PREMISSES IN PRAGMA-DIALECTICS

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Readers of their earlier work(1) will greet with interest the publication of F.H. van Eemeren's and Rob Grootendorst's book *Argumentation, Communication and Fallacies*, Hillsdale, NJ:Erlbaum 1992. Perhaps the most significant feature of the new work is its substantial (and novel) treatment of fallacies, more lightly touched on in previous writings(2). Fully half this book, and more, is reserved for a detailed expansion of a basic insight: fallacies are best viewed as breaches of rules of critical discussion in contexts of conflict resolution. There is little doubt that the enlarged theory of fallacies will attract a good deal of attention(3), but my purpose in this note lies elsewhere. I propose to examine the authors' treatment of missing premisses. The problem of missing premisses is notorious for its knottiness. That it has endured unsettled, in one form or another, since classical preoccupations with enythememetic argument attests to its allure and its difficulty alike.

The pragma-dialectical approach to missing premisses is directed to contexts of rational conversation in pursuit of the resolution of disagreement. Such conversations are located in an ideal model. The idealizations of the model are designed to suppress or minimize features of the din and swirl of actual conversation in ways that make reconstructed speech amendable to efficient theoretical treatment. The authors have no interest in or time for caprice in the selection of idealizing constraints. What goes on in the ideal model must approximate to what goes on in life and the model must portend, if it does not actually produce, application procedures by virtue of which theory can be said to be seized of practical import. So the idealiza-

(1) For example, F.H. van Eemeren and Rob Grootendorst, @ux(Speech Acts in Argumentative Discussions), Dordrecht: Foris Publications (1984).

(2) See, for example, van Eemeren and Grootendorst, "Fallacies in Pragma-Dialectical Perspective", @ux(Argumentation), 1 (1989), 283- 302.

(3) I myself have offered some reflections on their prior work on fallacies. See Woods, "Pragma-Dialectics: A Radical Departure in Fallacy Theory", *Communication and Cognition*, 24 (1991), 43-54.

tions are intended to be modest and circumspect.

The conditions that are cashed in the ideal model include in a rather central way kith and kin of a broad Principle of Charity. Protagonists and antagonists are assumed to be sincere and serious. What they assert they are held to believe(4), and both are imagined to proceed with conflict-resolution in ways that are timely, relevant, efficient and sober-minded. Of the served conditions which that the model's participants analytically comply with are these two:

R(1): *Honesty*: participants will perform no insincere speech acts.

R(2): *Efficiency*: participants will perform no superfluous or futile speech acts.

Efficiency comprehends two distinct sub-cases. For expository ease it would be well to divide R(2) into R(2(a)), which disenjoins superfluousness, and R(2(b)), which disenjoins futility. Neither superfluous nor futility is defined. But clear examples are available. One could be said to have performed a superfluous speech act in uttering Q if Q is an immediate consequence of a proposition affirmed in that speaker's most immediate predecessor speech act. As for futile speech acts, a paradigm of futility is the forwarding of an argument which is transparently invalid.

It is very much in the spirit of its charity principles that the model's participants not carelessly attribute to one another the employment of or subscription to rotten arguments. When actual speech is reconstructed for its various roles in the ideal model, the principle carries a particular message. To see how the principle works here, it is useful to bear in mind that a premiss can be identified as "missing" in argument A iff (i) it does not

(4) The authors have difficulty with belief. They don't want it to enter their theory in a load-bearing way. Their resistance seems to be a reaction to the privacy of belief. There is much that could be said about such resistance but I shall not say it here. A further point needs drawing out, however. The theory assumes that its interlocuters are sincere. That would seem to mean that among other things, they will not assert what they don't believe. This suggests a certain weakening of the resistance to belief. Suggests perhaps; but the suggestion misses to the mark. The present theory requires that it be assumed that interlocuters refrain from uttering what they disbelieve. It is possible to assume that Jones believes what he says without any proposition about what Jones *does* believe having to be true. It is precisely in this sense that belief makes no direct encroachment upon pragma-dialectical theories of argument.

occur in the surface structure of A and (ii) without it A is invalid on its face, that is, invalid by way of factors attaching to its surface structure alone. It follows that a proposition P counts as a missing premiss for argument A if the addition of P to A's premiss set produces a valid argument.

Everyone who writes about missing premisses seems ready to acquiesce in the idea that some arguments are bad beyond the fact that they miss a premiss, and some arguments are bad arguments on a mere technicality —where the technicality is just that they miss a premiss. If the purported distinction between the two kinds of case held up, then we could venture an allied distinction between remediable and irremediable arguments. Remediable arguments would be those whose invalidity is removed just by adding a missing premiss (one or more, as needed). Irremediable arguments would be those whose invalidity is not removed just by adding missing premiss(es). With that distinction in hand, our present principle drops out. It, too, is a charity principle.

R(3): *Minimization of Stupidity Assumptions*: participants will restrict their accusations of invalidity to irremediable arguments.

R(3) gives a corollary of some interest.

COR: In reconstructing an opponent's argument for representation in the ideal model, if it is invalid on its face, find a missing premiss, if you can, and thus validate it. In such cases, arguments are represented in the ideal model as valid.

Of course it won't work. In what has become the classical bug-a-boo of deductivism, it is notorious that every invalid argument is remediable. For every argument has its corresponding conditional, that is, a conditional sentence whose antecedent is the conjunction of the argument's premisses and whose consequent is the argument's conclusion. By the prior specification of "missing", the corresponding conditional of any invalid argument qualifies as a premiss missed by the argument and, so, as one the addition of which wholly rehabilitates the original argument *sub specie validitates*. Our distinction of late, between remediable and irremediable arguments, is now seen to implode, thanks to the emptiness of its second term. That said, COR now bids us never to attribute invalidity in the ideal model. But if in the ideal model no one ever forwards an invalid argument or takes another as having advanced one, an earlier caution is ransacked. For we said that

the van Eemeren-Grootendorst idealizations were held to conditions of modesty, circumspection and ease of empirical re-entry. COR encumbers the ideal model with far too much logical optimism for serious theoretical belief. So COR needs to be abandoned or refurbished. That task is a central preoccupation of the deductivist research programme, concerning which it can fairly be said that the jury has yet to return a verdict. Whatever the verdict will eventually be —and whatever we chance to think of it —it will turn on an appraisal of attempts to re-define the notion of missing premiss in ways that avert the promiscuous levels of validity vouchsafed by the present definition of it([5]).

It must be said with some emphasis that van Eemeren and Grootendorst are aware of these difficulties. In saying that they propose no solution to them, there is no risk that the absent solutions are for problems that van Eemeren and Grootendorst fail or refuse to recognize. On the face of it, this wrecks their programme — certainly that part of it having to do with the problem. Once the distinction between valid and invalid arguments collapses in the ideal model, the ideal model ceases to justify our having an interest in it, except negatively.

Though it has its evident attractions, the objection is too harsh. It overlooks an alternative which, while far from perfect, it is well worth reflecting on. It is this: Take it as *fait accompli* that the distinction between remediable and irremediable arguments has found the welcome of effective and convincing analytical management under which it does not implode. For present purposes we need not press for details. It is assumed, *pro term* and pending further effort, that the class of remediable arguments is both well-specified and presented to us as a theoretical given. It is a lavish gift, to be sure. But it still presents the theorist with challenges which he will have difficulty in meeting. It is to these challenges that I wish to direct my attention and to which I shall turn after a final preliminary word.

The preliminary word is about validity. Van Eemeren and Grootendorst know well the folly of holding all good arguments to the requirement that

([5]) Readers interested in the current fortunes of deductivism should consult two papers of the same name, "Enythememtic Arguments", by David Hitchcock. One appears in *Informal Logic*, 7 (1985), 83-97; the other appears in F.H. van Eemeren et al. (eds.), *Argumentation: Across the Lines of Discipline*, Dordrecht and Providence: Foris Publications (1987), 289-298. Also of interest is that author's "The Validity of Conductive Arguments", forthcoming in J.A. Blair and R.H. Johnson (eds.), *Theories of Informal Logic*, Windsor: ON.: Informal Logic Press.

they be deductively valid, that is, that their premisses conjoined entail their conclusions. Evidently theirs would be an approach, if only they had contrived it, in which the validity of good arguments is made to answer to a certain criterial multiplicity. There are more ways than one for an argument to be valid, and some of these ways are pairwise disjoint. No such account of validity is produced in *Argumentation, Communication and Fallacies*. It is an issue not overlooked, but foregone or postponed. The authors say that they do not want to take a specific and definitive stance on the question [of] exactly what kind of logical validity is preferred.

Here is another place, then, in which there is room for severe judgement. By prior (and generous) stipulation, theory is presented with a subclass of invalid arguments made distinctive by the fact that they both can and deserve to be reconstructed as valid. But forebearing to tell us what validity *is*, the authors conceptually destabilize the whole project of rehabilitation.

This, too, is over-severe. Or, at a minimum, the authors see it coming and have an answer for it.

Just for the sake of simplicity, they say, we shall restrict ourselves in our present expose [of] unexpressed premisses to making use of the well-known and ready-made instruments of propositional logic and first-order predicate logic.

At first blush the proposal is not very impressive, but it can be lived with, or so I believe. Van Eemeren and Grootendorst are saying, in effect, that even if there were a good way of specifying remediable arguments and even if, contrary to fact, the validity required by the goodness of any good argument just were first order validity, there would still be difficulties in solving the problem of missing premisses. Moreover, these are important difficulties, and important enough to justify our trying to deal with them even under the dubious and costly assumptions lately discussed. This, anyhow, is the spirit in which chapter six of *Argumentation, Communication and Fallacies* needs to be read and I, for one, am prepared to enter into that spirit.

We begin, thus, with an assumed class of arguments invalid on their face and remediable by way of a choice of premisses which the argument misses. The target is the remediation of such arguments, the reconstructing of them in ways that make them valid. And "for simplicity" validity is first-order validity, plain and simple.

What, we might ask, goes on when someone makes a transparently invalid argument? Van Eemeren and Grootendorst think that the argument is made under conditions that seem to violate rule R(2(b)) — the futility rule. Making a transparently invalid argument is a paradigm of futility. It also

appears, they say, that R(1) — the honesty rule — may have been breached. For how can one sincerely propose an argument that is transparently invalid, that is, sincerely advance as valid an argument that is transparently not valid?

Because the ideal model is governed by strong charity presumptions, it must be supposed that in the model participants comply with these rules, not breach them. Accordingly, the apparently offensive argument needs to be reconstructed into regulatory compliance. It needs to be made out to be valid. This is done by postulating a validating missing premiss, one or more. One way of doing this is to identify as the missing premiss the argument's corresponding conditional. It is not only *a* way of proceeding, it is mandatory. In so doing, the argument's reconstruction furnishes what van Eemeren and Grootendorst call the "logical minimum". A further rule emerges.

R(4): *The Logical Minimum Rule*: In reconstructing a target invalid argument it is mandatory to add to its premiss set its corresponding conditional.

It is advisable to be clear. We have already seen that any invalid argument is validated by the premissory argumentation of its corresponding conditional. It is not to be tolerated that an R(4)-manoeuvre extinguishes the class of "genuinely" that is, irremediably, invalid arguments. We have spoken of a class of arguments whose invalidity derives from nothing but a technicality —the fact that it leaves a missing premiss unexpressed. Nothing I have said here establishes that the class is non-empty. I have only assumed that it is and the assumption, contrary to fact or to possibility as it might be, is made with those risks identified and assumed. It is precisely this class, taken now to be non-empty, that contains all and only the "target" arguments of R(4). R(4) is relativized to that class of target arguments and this spares us the embarrassment of having to concede that no argument whatever is genuinely invalid, namely, the untargeted ones.

Mandatory though it is to supply the logical minimum for reconstructions of target arguments, R(4) produces an unwelcome result. It appears to offend against R(2(a)), the superfluousness rule. A speaker is convicted of superfluousness in affirming an immediate logical consequence of something he has committed himself to at the nearest predecessor stage of the discussion. If at a given point, our speaker proclaims

(O): P1. Angie is a real woman.
C. Therefore, Angie is nosy(6).

and if, in the next breath, he proclaims

(LM): P1. Angie is a real woman.
P2. If Angie is a real woman then Angie is nosy.
C. Therefore, Angie is nosy.

his assertion of P2 is an immediate consequence of his prior proclamation of (O), an instance nearly enough of the Deduction Theorem:

(DT): $A \vdash B \rightarrow \vdash (A \supset B)$

So R(2(a)) is breached.

This is troublesome. It visits the pragma-dialectician with a dilemma. R(2(a)) and R(4) are mandatory rules, but there is no way of complying with R(4) that doesn't violate R(2(a)).

In what is arguably the most interesting and imaginative feature of the pragma-dialectical treatment of the missing premiss problem, van Eemeren and Grootendorst seek to evade the dilemma by stipulating a further rule.

(5): *The Pragmatic Optimum Rule*: In reconstructing a target argument, it is mandatory to furnish as a premiss some proposition P the denial of which would be pragmatically inconsistent with espousal of the target argument prior to premissory argumentation.

Here is what R(5) attempts to codify. Suppose a speaker espoused (O) and there went on to deny that real women are nosy. That, say van Eemeren and Grootendorst, would land the speaker in a "pragmatic inconsistency". R(5) requires that the denied proposition be added as a premiss. Thus

(LMPO): P1. Angie is a real woman.
P2. Real women are nosy.
P3. If Angie is a real woman then Angie is nosy.

(6) Some readers, sensitive to issues of gender-specificity, my regret the present example, never mind that there is no reason to think that the authors take it as a serious sociological claim.

C. Therefore, Angie is nosy.

Van Eemeren and Grootendorst leave the notion of pragmatic inconsistency undefined. That is regrettable for so load-bearing an idea. I myself am prepared to concede that there is something decidedly odd about saying "Angie is a real woman, so Angie is nosy, but it's not the case that real women are nosy". The issue is tangled by a couple of factors. One is whether "Real women are nosy" is to be taken as a full-blown generalization, that is, as a universally quantified conditional, or as a generic claim. Another is, if a universally quantified conditional, whether the denial of it by an (O)-espouser convicts him of anything seriously deserving of the name of pragmatic inconsistency. I shall recur to these points, but for now I want to concede that the inconsistency is pragmatic in some reasonably intelligible sense, and to attend to how our dilemma is thought to be slipped.

Our trouble arose if "If Angie is a real woman then Angie is nosy" were added as a premiss as an immediate consequence of (O). This is the situation represented by (LM). The preferred solution is to apply R(5) first, which in the case at hand gives us premiss 2 of (LMPO), that is, "Real women are nosy". If the statement *is* a universally quantified conditional, then premiss 3, that is, "If Angie is a real woman then Angie is nosy", comes by way of immediate inference from *it*, not from the original argument (O); in fact it comes to us by the device known as universal instantiation. Even so, premiss 3 we do have and, with it, fulfilment of R(4), the logical minimum rule. Given that R(5) and R(4) are invoked sequentially, and in just that order, it is possible to say that P3 of (LMPO) does *not* arise by immediate inference from (O) and hence that there is no transition from (O) to P3 that qualifies as a violation of the superfluousness rule. Moreover, since the negation of P2 is not logically inconsistent with the espousal of (O), but only *pragmatically* inconsistent with it, it cannot be said that P2 arises from (O) as an immediate (logical) consequence of it, and so the transition from (O) to P2 fails to qualify as a violation of the superfluousness rule. The dilemma is escaped, apparently.

It now becomes necessary to deal with the status of P2 — "Real women are nosy". If it is a universally quantified conditional, then P3 is indeed an immediate consequence of it, as we have just seen. This presents us with two further difficulties. One is that since P3 arises from P2 by immediate consequence, and if P3 is asserted on that basis, then although the assertion of P3 is no longer a superfluous move from (O) itself, it is nevertheless a superfluous assertion from P2; and since P2 and P3 are essential premisses

of (LMPO) and (LMPO) is the mandatory reconstruction of (O), the reconstruction of (O) inescapably involves a superfluous speech act, in violation of R(2(a)). Our dilemma now is repositioned, not averted. The other difficulty with construing P2 as a universally quantified conditional, is that intuitive damage is done to the notion of pragmatic inconsistency, which is indispensable in furnishing the pragmatic optimum. Recall that the pragmatically optimal premiss is any proposition whose denial is pragmatically inconsistent with the espousal of the original target-argument. In the case at hand, we selected as premiss 2 the statement "Real women are nosy", because we were prepared to concede that the espousal of (O) and the denial of P2 was sufficiently odd to qualify as pragmatically inconsistent. Of course, this was largely stipulation: it's odd, so let's bite the analytical bullet and *call* it pragmatic inconsistency.

But if, as we are presently supposing, P2 is to be taken as "For all x, if x is a real woman then x is nosy", then I, for one, quickly begin to lose my former confidence that *its* denial is pragmatically inconsistent with (O). Let me say it again: "pragmatic inconsistency" was a term stipulated for a kind of intuitive oddness. Neither the inconsistency nor the oddness was specified, but the basic idea was clear. A speaker has no business espousing (O) unless he is also ready to accept P2. With P2 bearing its present construal, we would have to be satisfied that unless a speaker were prepared to assert that every real woman whatsoever and without exception is nosy, he has no business saying that Angie is nosy, since she is a real woman. My intuitions gib at this. Couldn't there be just one real woman who managed not to be nosy (she took a course in curiosity-suppression at the YWCA), without depriving a speaker of entitlement to say this of Angie (who obviously didn't take the course) ? Those who share my unease have dealt the reconstruction of (O) a further blow, for P2 is no longer available to us as a premiss that satisfies pragmatic optimality. And with P2 gone, so is P3 in our reconstruction of (O) as (LMPO).

No doubt it will occur to the reader that these difficulties call for a different construal of P2, that it not be taken as a universally quantified conditional. An alternative presents itself: Construe P2 as a generic statement. Generic statements make *characteristic* assertions. If "Real women are nosy", like "Tigers have four legs", counts as a generic statement then it is as general as may be, short of universal quantification. Counter-examples are tolerated by generic statements, whereas universally quantified sentences are toppled by them. The use of generic statements is linked to what Marvin

Minsky calls a frame-system([7]).

> A frame-system is intended to be a structured piece of knowledge about some *typical* entity or state of affairs. It contains variables onto which go specific values...([8]).

If I am thinking generically about tigers and a tiger which I am inspecting is three-legged, then the variable NUMBER-OF-LEGS will take the value THREE ([9]). But in the absence of such information, the frame-system will specify the characteristic value FOUR. FOUR is said to be the "default value" for this variable. What then, is a characteristic property of a thing or event? It is a default value with regard to a given variable furnished by its frame-system in the absence of contrary information. The notion of a frame-system in a partial elucidation of a *prototype*; for a prototype of something just is a frame-system in which all default values are specified. The notion of default values gives rise to the kindred notion of default reasoning. If, for example, G is a generic sentence, one is allowed to infer its instances except where excluded or over-ridden by specific information to the contrary. A rule comes to mind, the default reasoning rule as we might say.

DR: If G is a generic statement then so long as the speaker takes it to be true, apply UI (i.e., universal instantiation) unlimitedly, unless contra-indicated by specific information.

Like generic assertion itself, generic or default reasoning is defeasible. In those cases in which instantiation to a generic statement's default value is contra-indicated, the inference must be corrected, but that fact does not falsify the generic statement, it falsifies only that particular default instance. It is a nice question, of course, as to what *does* falsify a generic claim. A

([7]) Marvin Minsky, "Frame-System Theory", in P.N. Johnson-Laird and P.C. Wason, *Thinking: Readings in Cognitive Science*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (1977), 355-376.

([8]) P.N. Johnson-Laird, "How is Meaning Mentally Represented.", in Umberto Ecco et al. (eds.), *Meaning and Mental Representation*, Indianapolis: Indiana University Press (1988), 99-118; p. 107.

([9]) I draw the example from Hilary Putnam, *Philosophical Papers*, vol. 2, 215-271; pp. 249-251.

further rule comes to mind, vague though it surely is; it is a rule of generic falsification.

GF: a generic claim is falsified when its default instantiations are false in sufficient numbers to defeat the presumption that the default value in question is *characteristic* of the subject of the generic claim.

We now have the means to revive the van Eemeren-Grootendorst notion of pragmatic inconsistency. Let (O) be, as before, our original argument; and let P2 be its *genericization*, that is, its corresponding generic claim. Then it is pragmatically inconsistent to allow (O) and yet to deny P2, its genericization. And the rule for finding the pragmatically optimal premiss in the reconstruction of (O) is

PO@+(G): Where A is the original argument, the missing pragmatically optimal premiss is the genericization of A.

Notice, then, that if we decided to introduce P2 by way of rule PO@+(G), P3 would not arise from P2 by unqualified universal instantiation. It would arise by *default* instantiation and, so, would not be an immediate logical consequence of it. This, it might be said, is a sufficient weakening of the consequence relation to justify our thinking that superfluousness is now evaded. My own view is that this is a promising enough possibility with the generic treatment of P2. What makes it promising is precisely the weakening of the consequence relation. "Real women are nosy" could be true even where "If Angie is a real woman than Angie is nosy" is false. And yet the default reasoning from the former to the latter is still all right for any reasoner not in possession of the relevant contra-indicating information.

Further problems also find solution. One is the problem of the non-uniqueness of an argument's optimal premiss. Certainly our earlier rule that *any* proposition whose denial would be pragmatically inconsistent with (O) was ludicrously permissive. For one thing, it admits as our pragmatic optimal the premiss "But I don't believe it". Van Eemeren and Grootendorst suggest (and then abandon) a syntactic rule for specifying pragmatic optimality. The pragmatically optimal premiss of an original argument is the universal generalization of its logical minimum. But, since this requires us to construe P2 as a universally quantified conditional, it revives our earlier dilemma. Better, perhaps, to amend the syntactic rule and have it call for

the *genericization* of the argument's logical minimum.

It won't work. The present course presupposes the prior availability of P3 — (O)'s logical minimum — and that lands us back in superfluousness. But a corrective is now at hand, as we have lately seen. Let, instead, the rule for the specification of (O)'s pragmatic optimum call for the genericization of (O) itself. Of course, this requires the prior availability of (*O*), but since without (O) we would have nothing to reconstruct in the first place, it can hardly be supposed that genericizing (O) catapults us into superfluousness.

Within the generous and problematic constraints that the pragma-dialectical approach imposes on the treatment of missing premisses, it is possible to reconstruct the reasoning of chapter six in the following way. The principal virtue of *this* reconstruction is that it solves or makes some headway with solving problems that arise even under those liberal constraints. So, in reconstructing an original target argument, *first* genericize the argument. Since espousing the argument would be pragmatically inconsistent with denying its genericization, and since genericization affords a syntactic criterion of it, call the genericization the pragmatically optimal premiss in the reconstruction of the target argument. Since the generic premiss is not an immediate logical consequence of the original argument, superfluousness is avoided.

Second, apply the default-reasoning rule DR to our generic statement and default-derive the further premiss which, as it happens, is the corresponding conditional of the original argument. This further premiss satisfies the syntactic criterion of logical minimality. Though it is an immediate consequence of the original argument it is not immediately inferred from it. It is not immediately inferred from anything. It is, rather, default-inferred from the pragmatically optimal premiss, P2. Once again superfluousness is evaded. At the same time, the requirement of validity is met. For P3 surely does validate (O).

There is a great deal to be dissatisfied with in this account. Various of its constraints are over-generous and unrealistic; others are over-severe. Key concepts are vague and unanalyzed. The present treatment will work only for certain classes of arguments, for example, those whose imbedded syntac-

tic structures will tolerate the operation of genericization([10]). Even so, limited in several ways though it is, the present account does solve some problems in an imaginative and credible way. The same cannot be said for all treatments of the missing premisses issue. Van Eemeren and Grootendorst leave us with an open question and a challenge. Can we build on and refine the present account in ways that tolerate the removal of its more

([10]) There are arguments galore, ones with premisses obviously omitted, which either resist the genericization-test of pragmatic optimality or whose genericization no one would be ready to commit to. The later case can be illustrated by the argument

(A): It's raining.
So Eveline won't be driving to Calgary.

Assuming as its genericization "People don't drive in the rain", two points require attention. One is that the generic statement is untrue; the other is that it doesn't fulfill the same syntactic criterion for genericity as does "Real women are nosy". Perhaps a different syntactic criterion could be supplied for "People don't drive in the rain". But now the problem is that selection of pragmatically optimal premisses is subject to multiply-syntactic criteria, and the multiplicity is left unspecified.

The former kind of case is suggest by the argument

(A*): Fred is President.
So, it is Fred who will be in Denver on Friday.

Concerning (A*) it is doubtful that anything like "Presidents are in Denver on Friday" even counts as a generic statement. The implied generality, qualified though it would be by the inputed genericity, seems entirely specious. Generic statements thrive in contexts giving appropriate purchase to factors of typicality; they thrive, that is to say, in contexts of nomicity, of natural kinds, of counterfactual instantiation. No such context is available for (A*). The missing premiss which most interpreters would furnish is surely, "The President will be in Denver on Friday"; genericity does no work here at all. That said, there is room to regret the Angie example on grounds other than rudeness to women. For there is reason to think that the "genericization" of (O) — "Real women are nosy" is specious, for it lacks that factor of nomicity.

unrealistic assumptions? It is a good question and an engaging challenge.([11])

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([11]) Research for this paper was supported by a Fellowship-in-Residence at the Netherlands Institute for Advanced Study in the first half of 1990, and was subsequently assisted by a Research Grant from The Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Cannada. I am greatly indebted to NIAS and to SSHRC for this support. Frans Van Eemeren and Rob Grootendorst kindly made available to me pre-publication typescript of *Argumentation, Communication and Fallacies*, and proved themselves generous and helpful critics. I wish especially to thank Eveline Feteris for her patient guidance into subtleties of the pragma-dialectical approach to argument, when she was Visiting Assistant Professor at the University of Lethbridge in the Fall Term of 1991.