THE CONVERGENT VIEWS OF KRIPKE AND KANT OF THE CONCEPT OF NECESSITY

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Both Kant and Kripke treat necessity with the utmost seriousness, yet their accounts of this notion are quite disparate. Kant binds necessity to his concept of the *a priori*, that which is independent of experience; for what is independent of experience is claimed to be universally valid for all experience and no experience can allegedly fault that which is independent of it. He tells us that necessity and universality are alternate descriptions of the same situations, the reason for choosing one term rather than other being solely pragmatic. ([1])

Kripke's concept of necessity is not epistemological but metaphysical, and is taken to mean that which is true and could not have been otherwise. In the metaphor of possible worlds, necessity is identified woth that which is true in all possible worlds. ([2]) Kant does not enter into the question of possible worlds or counterfactual situations, and the only alternative to the necessity of phenomena which he raises is that of putative knowledge of noumena, and which he hastily rejects, whether necessary or contingent.

Despite the disparity between the *a priori* and what we may call, the metaphysically necessary, Kripke reminds us that these have often been identified, and warns us that this would be careless: ([3])

> '... about the notions of a prioricity and necessity. Very often these are held to be synonyms. (Many philosophers should not be described as holding them to be synonyms; they simply use them interchangeably.) I wish to distinguish them.'

The confusion is hardly surprising since Kant in no way hints that there might be any concept of necessity besides the *a priori* concept thereof. However, had Kripke's concept of possible worlds been presented to him he would no doubt have vigorously denied any common notion of necessity with Kripke.

Kripkeans and Kantians appear to concur, there is nothing to compare in their respective concepts of necessity. However, it would appear that this is not the end of the matter, for it is not clear that the lack of comparison is simply a question of equivocality of the term 'necessity' or whether each side is actually denying any meaningfulness to the term 'necessity' as applied by the other party to the debate.

Kripke has pointed to some connections or absence of these between knowability and the metaphysically necessary, without going into any account of necessity as usually associated with the *a priori*. I shall not pursue this issue here. Instead this paper will focus on formal features of necessity that Kant has attributed to the *a priori*. Kant's *a priori* will be investigated in the light of contemporary treatments of modality. One of the essential claims that will be advocated here is that 'necessity' is multifaceted even within the Kripkean framework, and that careful examination of some of the issues generated by the transworld identity debate, and the distinction between attributive and referential uses of descriptions, bring up the possibility of alternative approaches to the concept of 'necessity'.

In order to avoid equivocality it will be claimed that there are sufficient features common both to necessity as applied to the *a priori* as well as applied to metaphysics.

1. *Grounds Offered to Distinguish the A Priori and the Necessary*

Kant's concept of the *a priori* displaces the radically rationalist concept of innate ideas. No act of reflection on the part of the understanding will yield knowledge. The *a priori*, although independent of all particular experiences, must apply to experience. Experience is the occasion of employment of the *a priori*. This is what Strawson has termed Kant's *principle of significance*. ([4]) Empiricism denies that there is any necessary knowledge which holds of all experience: Kant maintains that this is erroneous. It is not the purpose of this paper do deal directly with this issue, but rather to investigate whether there is any meaningful use of 'necessity' in the realm of experience, even if it might turn out that nothing can fulfill the conditions of such necessity. It will be crucial not to regress, in

this exposition of Kant, to a purely analytic treatment of experience, for in that case the *a priori* will coalesce with the analytic.

A priori judgments or propositions are true of phenomena in the *actual* world. They are true of *all phenomena* in the actual world, but the scope of such propositions is limited to the actual world of phenomena. They are not applicable to the world-in-itself nor are they applicable to other possible worlds. Transcendence is, for Kant, conceptual trespassing.

Whereas *a priori* propositions are about one single world, Kripke's necessary truths are about all *possible* worlds. Without the horizon of other possible worlds the sense of 'necessity' seems to evaporate. Kripke has emphasised that we ought not take the metaphor of 'possible worlds' too seriously and preferably the expression 'counterfactual situations' should be employed.([5]) Possible worlds are not some other worlds just awaiting us, to be peeked and poked into. The accessibility relation between possible worlds, which alters from one modal logic to another, is not an empirical relationship to be discovered in any way. It is defined in purely formal terms of reflexivity, symmetry and transitivity, in various combinations. The different accessibility relations opted for provide different relations between iterative modalities. Counterfactual situations assert changes in properties without changes in things in so far as things exist in any chosen possible world. President Nixon and King Nixon differ not as Nixon but as president and king. The counterfactual situation in which Nixon is king speaks of the same Nixon as in the actual situation where he is president.

Supposedly then, *a prioricity* and the metaphysically necessary are well-distinguished. Not all *a priori* truths are metaphysically necessary and perhaps not all metaphysically necessary truths are *a priori*. Other possible worlds may lack temporality, although this seems to be a feature of the actual worlds. Thus all necessary truths about time in the actual world are not true of all possible worlds. Thus not all *a priori* truths are metaphysically necessary.

But what of the converse? Are all metaphysically necessary truths *a priori*? Once again it must be emphasised that we are not enquiring here into knowability and not even into provability, as Kripke has done, but rather into any meaning we can attribute to 'necessity' within the realm of experience. If the *a priori* was synonymous with

the expression 'what is always true in the actual world' then by one of the basic axioms of modal logic all metaphysically necessary truths would be *a priori*, since the necessary always implies the actual. ($\vdash \Box p \supset p$).

But the *a priori* is not confined to the concept of actuality. Its scope is broader. It is not simply a modal category, but rather an epistemological one. It applies firstly to experience and not to the actual world as such. The *a priori* is true of all experience. Kant associated the actual world of phenomena with the world given in experience, and thus it may be thought that the *a priori* be defined in terms of the actual world. Yet the association of the actual world with the world of experience is not immediate.

Our question must be rephrased? Are all metaphysically necessary truths, truths of all possible experience? Kant probably would have denied this at least on the grounds that such an implication would amount to dogmatic metaphysics, for we would be inferring from possible worlds to the actual world. Knowledge is not attainable through the discursiveness of the Understanding nor through the speculations of Reason. This however would be an argument too strong for our own purposes for it does not deny the *inference* from the metaphysically necessary to the *a priori*. It denies the meaningfulness of the metaphysically necessary altogether.

What would Kant say of the examples brought by Kripke to illustrate metaphysical necessity? Kant has nowhere directly dealt with identity, and it is not clear how he would have treated an example such as 'Hesperus=Phosphorous'. Kant has no theory of proper names even though he has distinguished individual judgments from universal ones in his table of judgments. Transcendental idealism might construe the possibility of other-world identity as one of the faculty of the mind whereby we come by such knowledge; whereas we possess faculties which grant knowledge of the actual world it is not clear what faculty might give us knowledge of other possible worlds. We might muse on possible worlds in our mind's eye, but such musing is no new sense giving us knowledge of some world. In his Paralogisms Kant has offered us an argument against using the indexical 'I' to refer to the same individual in different situations, and if his arguments against the recurrent use of the 'I' are applicable to proper names (he is not concerned with context-dependency, but

cases in which there is normally agreement about individual conti-
nuity), then we might be able to elicit a quasi-Kantian argument on the
following lines: different names for a single object can arise in two
circumstances, at the same time or at different times. If at the same
time then necessity is granted, but this is not true of all possible
worlds, and if at different times then identity is a question of
continuity, and this can also differ from world to world.

These are speculations of how Kant might have dealt with Kripke's
examples of necessary identity and we cannot attribute them to Kant
himself. The interesting question that must be answered by anyone
vindicating Kant's *a priori*, and which Kripke's discussions of neces-
sity have brought out very pointedly, is how we can give an account of
necessity which does not degenerate into analyticity. If Kant's notion
of the *a priori* is just part of a conceptual analysis of the concept of
experience, and that anything of worth which he has to say in the
Critique is merely analytic but unobvious, then there is no use for his
concept of the *a priori*; what is necessary of experience would only be
necessary in virtue of the meaning of the term 'experience'.

Kripke's notion of *non-analytic necessity* has reopened the Critique
to new interpretations. If the *a priori* is limited as an appendaged
concept to experience as a whole then little use will be found for it.
Before seeking for some new clue to interpreting the *a priori* it is
worth noting that Kripke's concept of necessity, although about all
possible worlds, does not guarantee fulfillment because all possible
worlds are brought before the mind's eye *sub specie aeternitatis*. On
the contrary, the assertion of any particular necessity is in terms of an
individual case *within* some possible world. This is Kripke's safeguard
against transforming necessity into analyticity.

We shall return to enquire whether in the Kantian system there is
room for explicating necessity in terms of some intramundane parti-
cular situation. Before we do this it is worth bringing into sharper
focus the type of controversy that seems to exist between Kant and
Kripke, or at least between the views we may attribute to them. Since
the controversy appears at first sight to be polarised, I have called this
the 'Antinomy of Necessity'.

2. *The Antinomy of Necessity*

The polarisation between a Kantian position and a Kripkean position is well-illustrated by trying to *translate* Kripke's examples of necessary identity into Kantian language. For Kripke all identity between rigid designators is necessary, whether such rigid designators are proper names or natural kind terms. If we claim 'water = H_2O' then we are claiming that in all possible worlds water *must* be H_2O (if water exists in such a world). Putnam[6] has shown how we would react if we were to discover something which appeared to have all the phenomenal properties of water on Twin Earth but was actually composed of elements XYZ. Our response would be to deny that this was water. It is not my intention to judge these examples at this stage but to accept them at face-value and to try and translate them into Kant's language.

The difficulty for Kant is that these identites are expressed by propositions which are necessary and *a posteriori*. For Kant this is self-contradictory. The *a priori* is necessary and the *a posteriori* is contingent. Thus for Kant, Kripke would be taken to be asserting a contingent necessity. Kripke's use of 'necessity' seems to undermine Kant's use and seems to have no place in knowledge and experience. If Kant nonetheless wished to make room for asserting necessities within experience which allow for identity, then it seems that this could only be in terms of the meaning of the terms involved. This would be to deny the *a posteriority* of the examples, and the *a priori* would be necessary in virtue of analyticity. However, even if there is some sense in saying that the relation between natural kind terms in analytic, there is no way of claiming that the relation between two proper names is analytic unless we are disputing the genuineness of proper names.

Kant's *a priori-a posteriori* distinction is supposedly a methodological distinction. Yet it is odd that on solely methodological grounds we have predetermined which propositions we are prepared to analyse. We have not tried to vindicare Kripke's theory but merely to try and give an account of it in Kantian language prior to treating the issues raised. This premature step is ruled out on methodological grounds! Kant's language is not rich enough to deal with necessary identities. Kant used a nontranslatability argument against Leibniz

when he advocated his argument of spatially incongruent counterparts. ([7])

It is obvious that no solution is possible to this dilemma of translation by trying to treat necessary identities as synthetic *a priori* propositions. Such judgments are never individual but always general. They concern a domain as a whole and not particular entities or events in the domain.

Kant, on the issue of form alone, has denied the appearance of any material necessities. He has excluded anything noncontingent from being given in experience. 'Experience' is defined in part by 'contingency' since everything that is given *in* experience is contingent. What is necessary and yet attributed to experience, pertains to the framework of experience, what can be said *about* experience but not to what is given in experience by virtue of its being particular. We cannot experience necessities. That something could be otherwise is a result of us being able to experience it otherwise and not a result of us being able to imagine it otherwise.

One last alternative seems available if we insist on the translatability of necessary identities into Kantian language. These may be taken to be analytic *a posteriori* propositions. Kant denied the existence of such propositions for truths of meaning could not be empirically discoverable. But even allowing for some such deviant possibility, these would be in total contrast to necessary identities, for their truth would turn on the analysis of concepts ultimately, and would not depend on the facts. Necessary identities are not truths of meaning. *Sinn* is not Kripke's explanation of *Bedeutung*.

The pivot of disagreement is in the propositions admitted into the domain of explanation. If we take the propositions as our starting point we can add a fifth antinomy to Kant's initial four antinomies:

The fifth Antinomy of Necessity

Thesis (Kantian)	Antithesis (Kripkean)
There are necessary general propositions whose necessity is bound to the single, actual world.	There are necessary particular propositions whose necessity is meaningful only in terms of worlds besides the actual world
Demonstration	*Demonstration*

Common Premise: Either the Thesis is true *or* the Antithesis is true.

Assume that there are necessary particular propositions whose necessity is only meaningful in terms of possible worlds besides the actual world. *Either* such propositions are analytic or synthetic. If they are analytic then they are true in virtue of meaning and no other worlds are required to make their necessity meaningful.

Or if they are synthetic then they are given through experience. However then their necessity can never be confirmed because other possible worlds are unexperiencable.

ergo: By the logical law of disjunctive syllogism the thesis is correct.

Assume that there are necessary general propositions whose necessity is bound to one possible world, the actual world. What sense are we to make of speaking of such propositions as 'necessary'? If *de dicto* necessity then these propositions are analytic, and the necessity is one of logic or meaning but not of experience. The synthetic *a priori* would be analytic *a priori*. If we are referring to *de re* necessity then Kant has not given any reasons why necessity should be bound to one possible world, nor how we can conceive of *de re* necessity as belonging to the framework of the possible world rather than to particular constituents.

ergo: By the logical law of disjunctive syllogism the antithesis is correct

Rapprochement between the thesis and the antithesis does not seem to be available. Kant though, has tried to show that antinomies, unlike paradoxes, are resolved either by dissolution or by disappearance. If the contradiction is only apparent, as in the antinomy of freedom and determinism, then the antinomy is resolved by dissolution, for both sides are true. The resolution by disappearance occurs if both or either side maintains a false position.

The Fifth Antinomy will be resolved by dissolution and not by disappearance, after the arguments of both sides have been carefully scrutinised. Neither side has brought forward strong enough arguments to show that the views of the other side are untenable. The

Kantian side has not shown that metaphysical necessity is meaningless but neither has the Kripkean side shown that necessity within a possible world is meaningless.

3. *Some Putative Refutations Refuted*

Kripke's concept of necessity does not allow for being defined as a verifiable property. 'Necessity' is a term whose meaning does not depend on evidence of any sort. If we discover an identity between two rigid designators in the actual world then we project this identity into all possible worlds. 'If', as Kripke says, 'the table is not made of ice, it is necessarily not made of ice.'([8]) There remains no empirical residue in an identity proposition awaiting empirical confirmation in other possible worlds. Possible worlds are not epistemologically accessible. Accessibility between possible worlds is a metaphysical relation and not an epistemological one. In other worlds projection displaces what is discovery in the actual world. 'Saul K. = S. Kripke' cannot be disconfirmed by any 'facts' in another possible world, for if true in this world, then it is necessarily true in all possible worlds. (Given that Saul Kripke exists in that possible world).

If we are to elicit any nonanalytic notion of necessity in this world then we shall have to show that there is some way we can project necessity *within* this, the actual world. Are there any other projectible properties within this world? If we were to be able to show that there are other such properties we would at least have made leeway for necessity to have some meaning within the actual world. It is apparent, though, that there are properties which are quite obviously projectible in the actual world. It is common to distinguish sentence types into two sorts, tensed and tenseless. Quine has called such indicative sentences 'occasion sentences' and 'standing sentences'.([9]) Tensedness and tenselessness are projectible because these properties are attributed to sentences in advance of all further evidence that might turn up. We dont't discover that sentences are tensed or tenseless in any future circumstances. Given some particular circumstance, we assert the tense status for all other circumstances in the actual world. This at least seems to be a projectible property in the actual world without any recourse to other possible worlds.

It might be objected that speaking of this world at other times is just another way of speaking of possible worlds. If this line is taken then it is not clear what sense we are to give to tenseless sentences. These are definitely not co-extensive with necessary sentences (or propositions), and why should certain possible worlds be selected to establish some property of certain sentences which does not extend to all possible worlds? If the actual world at different times is broken down into possible worlds, then some of the semi-projectible properties like tense and tenselessness require explanation. Modal logic does not offer select status to any special set of possible worlds.

So if tensedness and tenselessness are projectible within this actual world without recourse to other possible worlds, we shall have to enquire whether any such similar account might be given of necessity. The antithesis has not refuted the thesis.

But has the thesis refuted the antithesis? The argument given was epistemological, namely, that other possible worlds are unexperiencable. This, though, is a misconstrual of the concept of possible worlds. Possible worlds, as counterfactual situations, are counterfactual to something in the actual world. Necessary identities are derived from discovered identities, identities discovered in the actual world and not in the other possible worlds. We cannot discover a possible identity and from it infer an actual identity in the actual world. Although Kripke holds the following inference to be true:

$$x = y \supset \Box x = y$$

nowhere is it claimed that the same holds of any possible necessity. We must *reject* the following:

$$\Diamond x = y \supset \Box x = y$$

Kant has not given a theory of proper names which excludes their interpretation as rigid designators, and the claim that possible worlds must be experiencable to be meaningful has not been borne out. It would seem that Kant's own dichotomy of intuitions and concepts allows for the pre-designation of spatio-temporal particulars apart from any conceptualisation of them. His pre-Critical objections to the principle of the identity of indiscernibles leads one to conclude that he rejects the identification of an object with its properties. Thus there at least seem to be historical grounds for compatibility between Kant and Kripke.

4. *A Kripkean Puzzle and its Solution*

Not all identities are necessary for Kripke. Only identities between rigid designators are necessary. Contingent identities can hold between definite descriptions if these are not rigid. Donnellan has shown that definite descriptions can be used both rigidly for reference and nonrigidly for attribution.([10]) Any identity between two definite descriptions used attributively is contingent. If it is true that 'The inventor of modal logic is the author of *Mind and the World Order*', then this is only true contingently, for in some other possible world it might not have been C.I. Lewis who wrote *Mind and the World Order* even though he had invented modal logic. Genuine proper names do not have the flexibility of definite descriptions used attributively. That is why the identity expressed by them is necessary.

The claim for contingent identities leads to a puzzle with some interesting consequences. Examine once again the example which we gave:

(1) The inventor of modal logic is the author of *Mind and the World Order*.

This is supposed to be contingently true because it might not be true in some other possible world. So if it is true because it is true in this world then we are entitled to claim that:

(2) In the actual world the inventor of modal logic is the author of *Mind and the World Order*.

This proposition no longer seems to be contingent but *necessary* ! By a mere turn of phrase we seem to have converted a contingent identity into a necessary identity. Words seem to have conjured something out of nothing. Yet *de re* necessity is not a question of words, let alone of wording. Yuval Lurie has pointed out an even more devastating consequence of this slight alteration. If by adding the phrase 'in the actual world' to any contingent identity we convert it into a necessary identity, then we would eliminate *all* contingent identities, even in the actual world.([11])

Why is (2) necessary? We asserted this above without argument, and it might be contested that this is in fact necessary. Yet could we ask whether in the *actual* world the inventor of modal logic might not

have been the author of *Mind and the World Order*. This could only be
the case if the individual who fits the description of being the inventor
of modal logic and having written *Mind and the World Order* had not
fitted this description. But assume for a moment that no one fulfilled
both conditions of the description. Then we would no longer be
talking of this possible world, the actual world, but of *another* possible
world simply because the facts pertaining to some individual no longer
pertained to that individual. A consequence of the theory of rigid
designation is that the names of possible worlds themselves be rigid
designators! Most informal treatments of modality have no names for
possible worlds but in the models constructed for modal logics these
are designated by some subscripted letter. Given some world w_7 say,
if we assert '$w_7 = w_7$', this is not a contingent identity but a necessary
identity. This assertion is problematic for we can not add the phrase
'in all possible worlds' for the universe of discourse when speaking
about the possible worlds themselves cannot be those possible
worlds, just as the universe of discourse, when speaking of indivi-
duals, is not a domain of individuals but of the worlds in which those
individuals appear.

Does this lead to determinism? Does rigid designation imply rigid
determinism? The answer to this question depends on another issue
which we have not treated, namely, the fact whether any contingent
identity *must* be actualised in one possible world rather than in
another. If posed in this fashion it would seem that possible worlds are
determined by the individuals which appear in them. If the inventor of
modal logic had not been the author of *Mind and the World Order* then
the actual world would have been different from this world, and this
world would have been relegated to the realm of the purely possible,
even if it had retained its self-identity. So it is not individual identities
which are actualised but total possible worlds. To ask if the actual
world could have remained the same barring some single contingent
identity, is self-contradictory. Without the said identity it is no longer
the *same* possible world. Another world would then have been
actualised, identical to the current actual world but differing by a
single contingent identity. It is not a necessary truth that some
possible world be the actual world.

Contingent actuality of a possible world goes hand in glove with
contingent identity. If the actual world were necessarily actual then

things could not have been other than the way they were. But there is nothing in the possibility of a world that makes it actual. The relation we are advocating here between possible worlds might be called 'dynamic' for there seems to be constant shifts as to which possible world turns out to be actual, and this in turn depends on which facts turn out to the case. Leibnizians are prone to introduce a beneficient God to choose as actual the best amongst all possible worlds but Voltaire has warned us of the hazards of such a theological principle.

We have not converted contingency into necessity simply by the addition of words. There are no deterministic consequences of adding the expression 'in the actual world', or the more general expression 'in world w_i' for some given i, to a proposition of contingent identity. Although the actual world cannot but be as it is, this does not imply that it is necessarily actual.

We now seem to have caused a cleavage in the term 'necessity'. In adding the expression 'in the actual world' we are stating the identity conditions not of the particular identity but of the possible world in question, in this case of the actual world! To say that a contingent identity holds necessarily in some possible world is to say that that possible world would not be the possible world in question if the identity did not belong to it.

We can introduce two concepts of necessity here to deal with the two types of necessity. The one concept of necessity we could call 'extramundane necessity' and this is Kripke's metaphysical necessity, the other could be called 'intramudane necessity' in accordance with the concept of necessity we have been treating above. These may be defined more formally as follows:

> 'p' is *extramundanely necessary*, iff, for all worlds i, 'p' is true in w_i.
> 'p' is *intramundanely necessary* in world w_α, iff, 'p is true in w_α' is true in virtue of the meaning of w_α.

The relation between a possible world and its members is necessary. Even if the actual world is not necessarily actual each possible world is necessarily possible. Intramundane necessity is a necessity of meaning whereas extramundane necessity is a necessity of things.

The Kripkean puzzle has been unravelled, but in its place we now have a Kripkean dilemma, for if such democratic equality exists

between all possible worlds, why should any be treated as superior, as actual? Nothing about the possibility of a world can be grounds for deducing its actuality. It would indeed be miraculous if, given the meaning alone of a certain possible world, we were able to infer that that world exists. No possible world has, as part of its modal structure, anything that gives it priority over other possible worlds in the struggle for actuality. Nothing about the meaning of a possible world leads to any knowledge of its actuality.

If we were to attribute actuality to a possible world through its possibility we would be offering an *Ontological Proof of Actuality*. We would be inferring actuality from possibility. Existence would be predicated of a world as part of its possibility. However following Kant's remarks about the Ontological Proof of God, we may ask what is added to the concept of a possible world by the predicate of existence, if this be a predicate at all?

Even if we employ a benevolent, or even malevolent, God to solve this dilemma, this in no way grants us any internal criterion for deciding if a particular possible world is actual. The epistemological access to a world is internal and even if God had been predisposed towards any particular world, we would be precluded from knowing which choice he had made, unless we were each endowed with divine revelation.

5. *Kant's World of Experience*

Kant is possessed by the world of experience. In terms of the dilemma we have just outlined we may say that Kant deals exclusively with the internality of the world, not its externality. We cannot take Kant to be offering a proof of why the experiential world is actual, for this would be committing the fallacy of the Ontological Proof of Actuality. Kant is describing a certain sort of possible world, a world of a certain structure in which he wants to attribute meaning to the term 'necessity' without recourse to other possible worlds. If the term is not be wholly ambiguous it has to share a core of meaning with Kripke's use of 'necessity'. Can such a meaning be produced by Kant?

This brings us back to previous issue, for we discovered that

'necessity' must be a projective term for Kripke, and we shall have to guarantee such projectivity for Kant's use as well. This seems somewhat self-contradictory on the face of the matter, for how could we allow for alternate possibilities in the actual world, if as we have already claimed, the actual world is rigidly determined? Yet we have seen that no possible world is necessarily actual, so the possibility we are seeking should not be associated with the actual world.

Kant comes to our aid here, for his possibility relates not directly to the actual world but to experience. He tells us that: ([12])

> 'it is possible to show that pure *a priori* principles
> are indispensable for the possibility of experience'

On many of the usual interpretations 'the possibility of experience' has been taken to be a reference to the presuppositions underlying our knowledge of experience. Kant's transcendental proofs have been understood as regresses to such presuppositions.

The interpretation given by Kripke to modal logic suggests an alternative approach. Instead of treating the possibility of experience as part of the language of explanation in Kant's Critique we may allocate its position to that of the domain of explanation, as part of the *model structure* which Kant's language is supposed to reflect. The expression 'possibility of experience' is pregnant with different meanings. It is being suggested here that we take this expression to mean *possible experiences*. A priori propositions, which are in thought or language, are to be interpreted on the domain of possible experiences. We are not to seek synonymy relations or relations of implication between the *a priori* and the possibility of experience since no linguistic relations exist between a language and its objects. Words may refer to things but they cannot be synonymous with, or imply, things.

With such a definition of the 'possibility of experience' in hand we can now define the '*a priori*' as that which is true in all possible experiences. The '*a posteriori*' will thus be defined as that which is true in some possible experience.

Whether these definitions are in any way enlightening depends on whether we can find some *de re* analogues to the usual *de re* necessity. To begin with it is noteworthy that introducing possible experiences we at least make room for a nonanalytic interpretation of *a priori*

necessity. As long as our discussion of necessity in experience was phrased in terms of experience as a whole there was always the surreptious danger that the *a priori* might just be a term for obscure conceptual analysis. Instead, if we find useful instances of truths *within* all possible experiences, then the '*a priori*' would be invested with a novel meaning, analogous to Kripke's necessity, while at the same time not degenerating into analyticity.

Although necessity is defined for all possible worlds, we are able to discover particular necessities in the actual world. If there had not been particular instances of necessity there would have been little use for modal logic. Can we find comparable analogical cases within experience? Are there truths of particular experiences which are true for all experience?

Plantinga([13]) has illustrated a temporal analogy to Kripke's possible world identities in trying to offer justifications for accepting transworld identity instead of counterpart identity. Interestingly, Plantinga does not discuss the issue of how we can talk of transtemporal identity within a single world. It may be thought that identity in the world of experience is no different from identity in different possible worlds.

This is misleading. There is a particular nuance to identity in the single world of experience which is absent from identity in different possible worlds, and which is reason enough not to treat transtemporal identity in precisely the same way as transworld identity.

The possible world issue of identity is whether genuine proper names referring to the same individual are necessarily identical with one another. Yet in the single world of experience the issue is not of different proper names but of a single name, since we often feel there is a query as to whether the same name used at different times refers to the same individual. On purely Kripkean grounds it seem that there are two alternatives available here: either names refer rigidly irrespective of things, in which case we might say that Socrates the young is not Socrates the old, since this is just an ambiguous use of the proper name 'Socrates'. Alternatively it might be suggested that we are actually using two names to refer to the same individual and perhaps names should be dated in some way, say Socrates 449 B.C. and Socrates 405 B.C. and the whole question of identity is resolvable through possible world analysis. Neither of these answers are satis-

factory, for it is patently clear that in some cases we wish to refer to the same thing by the same name and not to two different things. As to the second case, it is unclear how we are to associate names with any extra-linguistic entity such as a date, when we might be ignorant as to the date and the temporal circumstances of the use of a name. Both these solutions seem to miss the problem, since it is not the identity of the name that is in question here but *the identity of the thing*. Why should the younger and the older Socrates be identical? This is the nuance in the issue of identity in the single world of experience. The possible worlds are no help in solving this issue. To add that 'Socrates' designates rigidly within the world of experience is of no use, since experience demands that we be able to know when we are speaking of the same Socrates and when not. Rigid designation gives no answer to this query. It only tells us that if it is the same Socrates we speak of in two different circumstances then we have used the name 'Socrates' rigidly, and if not the same Socrates then we have actually used two names rigidly, but which unfortunately are written and spelled exactly alike. In neither case have I any reasons for inferring if the same Socrates is referred to by recurrent uses of the world 'Socrates'.

If we were to transplant the issue of transworld versus counterpart identity into the realm of experience, it seems that we would intuitively opt for transexperiential identity rather than counterpart experiences. It is difficult to imagine that Socrates the old is a mere counterpart to Socrates the young. Plantinga has objected to counterpart identity in what we have called 'experience'. The problem, though, is not one of two individuals whom we wish to identify as the same individual. The counterpart theory seems inappropriate to the circumstances. Trying to identify Socrates the old with Socrates the young, as different counterparts, would require that we adopt an event ontology of Socrates-being-young and Socrates-being-old and attempting to identify two such events. Treating proper names in the experiential world as names of things solely at the time of a given experience, limits the status of individuals to single times. Some might risk an event ontology here. However, how can one go on to apply identity at all now for *qua* event, if there is nothing to identify between different events? Socrates-drinking-hemlock is incomparable to Socrates-questioning-Meno. Counterpart identity, when translated into

the experiential idiom, yields an event ontology in which there is no place for identity, for no two events are identical however similar they may be. No clock that strikes midnight twice, strikes at the middle of the same night, even if the two strikings are indistinguishable in every way.

Transexperiental identity is the identity of objects and not the identity of events; the identity of the same object in different experiences. We must add that it is not due to time alone that we are able to identify things at different times. Time itself is not efficacious, and it cannot guarantee or even yield the identity of something at different times. Only what is given *in* time can have identity-features at all. Times are notoriously nonidentical, unlike the things which appear in time. If we bind things to particular times then we are faced with precisely the same nonidentity that we have for times. Things bound to particular times are events, and no question of identity arises for these. Using proper names to rigidly refer to time-bound things, to events, eliminates any question of identity at the outset.

It is the same Socrates that drinks hemlock who previously ins-tructed Meno (if we are to believe Plato's account). The sameness of Socrates is not because we use the same name to refer to him. It is the converse that is true: we use the same name because it is the same Socrates. Proper names may always be rigidly identical, but this is not sufficient to enable us to know if we are picking out the same individual by using the same name. The identity of an entity is not guaranteed by the identity of reference. More is required.

This is where Kant presents us with his fundamental insight. One further necessary condition for the same name to be able to pick out the same object on two occasions is that the object be *continuous* over time. Reidentification requires continuity. Another necessary condi-tion advocated by Kant is the notion that events be treated as complexes of a relation between substances and properties. Conti-nuity is the continuity of the bearer of the proper name, and not continuity of a property. Events are derivative from objects. This view of Kant's is compressed into his first analogy, where the first edition correctly states that: ([14])

> 'All appearances contain the permanent (substance) as the object itself, and the transitory as its mere determination, that is, as a way in which the object exists.'

It may be argued that these conditions are not sufficient. This will not be the issue treated here and it seems that Kant was well aware of the difficulties associated with personal identity.([15]) For our purposes we can note that identity in the world of experience requires at least three conditions if we wish to maintain not only nominal identity:

(a) Rigid designation of proper names
(b) Continuity of an object
(c) An object-ontology reflected in the subject-predicate distinction in language.

If we take the condition of continuity we can see that this is projectible just as necessity was projectible for Kripke. We may discover that Socrates who is drinking hemlock is the same Socrates who taught Meno, but if Socrates is continuous throughout these two occasions, then he is necessarily so continuous. There could not be possible *experiences* which refute this continuity. Within the world of experience either it is the self-same Socrates or it is not. There is no experiential circumstances in which Socrates' continuity can be refuted. Gershwin erred in his lyric when he composed 'A Woman is a Sometime Thing'. Afro-American English affords us a deep insight into experience with this expression. Socrates is not a sometime thing, he is an always thing!

The continuity of Socrates is projectible. Given Socrates in one experience we propose in advance under what conditions we would be willing to assent to the use of 'Socrates' to refer to the same person in any other experience. Any re-use of the name 'Socrates' asserts necessary continuity, even if such continuity is empirically discoverable! Possible continuity makes as little sense as possible identity.

There is a standard objection to this view which stems from the theory of the block universe. In the spatio-temporal continuum the events linked by world-lines are in a sense arbitrary determined by our specific interest in some scientific process. Yet the block universe theory seems to be totally at odds with experience over this issue. The account we have given has not meant to be a refutation of the block universe theory, nor even a vindication of experience. It has only meant to show what considerations enter into the modality of experience. The arguments from a block universe theory are equally devastating to essentialism, and this issue must be addressed separately.

6. *Postscript*

We have found the parallel that we previously sought. Within the Kantian framework we have discovered particular necessary propositions, whose necessity is *nonanalytic*. If Socrates the teacher of Meno turns out to be Socrates who drinks the hemlock, this discovery is necessary since within experience continuity cannot be just possible. The *a priori* has not degenerated into the analytic. Necessity is that which is true in all possible experiences. If Socrates is continuous in two different experiences then nothing can be given as evidence from any other experience that he is not continuous in the two experiences mentioned. If he is continuous, then he is necessarily continuous. It is essential to remember that 'necessary' is being used here nonmodally within experience. Of course it is modally possible that Socrates is sometimes continuous and sometimes not. Socrates may skip some possible worlds which even may be considered as worlds in a time-like relation. Given transworld identity rather than counterpart identity, this would not be considered a modal reason for rejecting Socrates' self-identity throughout the possible worlds in which he exists. Continuity is not a modal concept. We must be careful to distinguish experiential necessity from modal necessity; truth in all possible experiences is not equivalent to truth in all possible worlds. It is now clear why the world of experience must be distinguished from the actual world. The truths of one do not necessarily go over as the truths of the other.

The fifth antinomy has been resolved by dissolution. Kant has offered no grounds for refuting necessity in all possible worlds and Kripke has offered none for refuting necessity in all possible experiences. Kant's synthetic *a priori* propositions do not degenerate into analyticity. However, their validity has less to do with the form of experience than with its content. The generality of the necessity is empirically discoverable, even though its definition employs the whole domain of experience. The use of 'necessity' is not ambiguous since there are analoguous structures in which necessity describes a set-theoretic structure common to both.

The semantics of possible experiences needs much filling in. The various logics that can be generated are worthy of consideration. Different accessibility relations between the different possible expe-

riences will give different nuances to the notion of the *a priori* in experience. The formalities of experience and the model structure of the semantics of experience can contribute to a fuller exposition of the *a priori*. The constraints on the term 'experience' as distinct from 'world' seem to offer new vistas to metaphysics.

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[1] Critique of Pure Reason, B4-B5. Henceforth the '*Critique*'.
      Kemp-Smith's translation is used here throughout, with the usual A and B to denote first and second editions respectively. I have employed the term 'proposition' for Kant's term 'judgment' as a middle ground between Kant's term and Kripke's 'statement'.
[2] Saul Kripke, 'Identity and Necessity', *in* Naming, Necessity and Natural Kinds, *ed.* Stephen P. Schwartz, Cornell University Press, p. 84.
[3] op. cit.
[4] P.F. Strawson, The Bounds of Sense, Methuen and Co. Ltd, p. 16.
[5] ibid., p. 82.
[6] Hilary-Putnam, 'Meaning and Reference', *in* Naming, Necessity and Natural Kinds, (see ftnt. 2), p. 121.
[7] Immanuel Kant, 'Concerning the Ultimate Foundations of The Differentiation of Regions of Space', *trl. in* Kant's Precritical Writings, tr. G.B. Kerferd and D.E. Walford, Manchester University Press, (1968), 1768.
[8] ibid. p. 88.
[9] W.V. Quine, Philosophy of Logic, Prentice-Hall, 1970, p. 30.
[10] Keith S. Donnellan, 'Reference and Definite Descriptions', *in* Naming, Necessity and Natural Kinds (see ftnt. 2).
[11] I would like to thank Yuval Lurie for this important criticism, in personal comments he conveyed to me about this paper. He in no way can be held responsible for the view developed here, to which he takes exception.
[12] ibid., B5.
[13] Alvin Plantinga, The Nature of Necessity, Clarendon Press, 1974, p. 94 ff.
[14] ibid., A182.
[15] e.g. ibid. B423 ftnt.