SAYING AND BELIEVING

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One of the most difficult problems facing anyone who wants to give a Tarski-type definition of truth for the natural language sentences of a person at a time is that of providing an account of such so-called opaque contexts as sentences about propositional attitudes. Consider, for example, a sentence like (1):

(1) Marcia believes that Zeus is the father of her child.

We are faced in (1) with conflicting intuitions: on one hand, we feel that the part of (1) following 'that' has significant semantic structure; on the other hand, we feel that the expression following 'that' is inferentially inviolate. Further, theory demands that any definition of truth account for and accomodate both of these intuitions. As to the first intuition, theory demands that we have a finite number of semantic primitives, which means we must assign some structure to the expression following 'that' in (1); if we do not, then we will have a virtually infinite number of expressions that will be primitives, i.e., every sentence that can follow 'that' in a sentence like (1). As for the second, one of the empirical tests of adequacy of a theory of truth is that it account for all the inferences that are a matter of form; the reverse side of this coin is that the theory must explain why inferences we don't want to allow cannot be made. Thus, it would seem we cannot assign the usual structure of the contained sentence to it in (1), or we would have to allow all the usual inferences made using the contained sentence to go through. But that, of course, would conflict with the first demand of theory.

The problem, however, is more complicated than that of

accomodating merely these apparently conflicting intuitions and demands. It is usually taken as obvious that from (1) we cannot infer (2) ([1]).

(2) Zeus is believed by Marcia to be the father of her child.

Yet consider the following pair of sentences, which my intuitions tell me allow the inference that is blocked between (1) and (2).

(3) Marcia believes that that blind man is a thief.

(4) That blind man is believed by Marcia to be a thief.

Further, between these two cases we have what is apparently a third sort of case, about which there is disagreement as to whether the inference goes through or not. This case is exemplified by (5) and (6).

(5) Marcia believes John is unfaithful.

(6) John is believed by Marcia to be unfaithful.

What makes this range of cases a problem is that while each of (1), (3), and (5) seem to have the same form, i.e., each intuitively strikes us as semantiaclly parallel, each will support different inferences, so they appear to have different truth conditions. Again, we are faced with an apparent conflict of intuitions: on one hand, we want to say (1), (3), and (5) are semantically similar; on the other, we want to say (1), (3), and (5) have different truth conditions, so must be semantically different. Again, theory demands that we resolve this conflict. For part of the empirical evidence for assigning a given logical form to a sentence is the perception by speakers of the language of which sentences have a similar structure; one rather

([1]) One might have approached this problem by suggesting that while from (1) and the appropriate identity sentence we cannot infer 'Marcia believes the king of the gods in Greek mythology is the father of her child', we can from (3) and the appropriate identity infer 'Marcia believes that that man with the red jacket is a thief'. It seems to me that these are merely the opposite sides of the same coin, i.e., that if we can give an account of when and where we are allowed exportation we will have an account of when and where we are allowed substitution. I have chosen to work with exportation because it seems to me that the sentences that are the result of exportation provide a clearer case than those that result from substitution of what I want to claim is common to both.

weak bit of such evidence is an apparent syntactic parallel. However, theory cannot assign to sentences which support different inferences the same semantic structure. (2)

One usual answer to these difficulties is to appeal to different senses of the verbs which create opaque contexts and/or appeal to intentional entities such as propositions, attributes, etc. Thus, for example, it might be claimed that (1) expresses a dyadic relation between a person and a proposition while (2) expresses a triadic relation among two persons and an attribute. While this move apparently accounts for the failure of the inference from (1) to (2) (and that from (5) to (6) if it fails), it leads to the unsatisfying claim that (3) is grossly syntactically misleading, as it appears syntactically the same as (1) and (5) yet must be assigned the semantic structure of (2) and (6) to allow the inference we want to (4). But then, one wants to ask, what is to account for such a difference, i.e., why can we express something like (4) using a sentence that apparently parallels (1) but can do more inferential work than (1) ? Well, it might be that we have a demonstrative element in (3) that is lacking in (1) and (5), the expression 'that blind man'. Again, this is unsatisfying since most of us want to say that proper names (usually) have a demonstrative element or are used (most of the time) demonstratively. We are perhaps not too shaken in the case of (1) because we know there is no Zeus, but what are we to do about poor innocent John plagued as he already is by the suspicious Marcia ? Perhaps, one might say, it is just the fact that John exists that leads to conflicting intuitions about the inference from (5) to (6). Clearly, the sort of line followed so far will lead to saying that (5) does in fact imply (6), although (1) doesn't imply (2), because John exists and Zeus does not. Yet this is unsatisfying in that we must

(2) This is not strictly correct, for sometimes the truth theory will assign the same structure to sentences that support different inferences, as in the case, e.g., of 'John knows that the door is unlocked' and 'John believes that the door is unlocked'. However, while it is plausible to claim that in the latter case the different inferences turn on the difference between 'know' and 'believe', there is no such plausible appeal in the case of (1), (3), and (5), since the «operative» words seem the same in each case.

claim that a proper name loses its demonstrative element when its bearer ceases to exist. What most of us are inclined to think, however, is that the demonstrative element remains with the proper name, but we simply cannot use it demonstratively until some other thing is appropriately dubbed. In addition to this morass of frustration, there is the rather unsettling problem of providing non-trivial and non-circular identity conditions for the intentional entitites that are the relata of our putative relations.

I would like to argue that we can give an account of the logical form of our problem sentences which avoids the difficulties of the putative account of the previous paragraph and also provides a satisfying solution to the conflicts, or apparent conflicts, of intuitions about the problem sentences. The account I would like to present takes off from Davidson's account of indirect discourse in [3]. However, Davidson's account, even made clear, is limited at best to those sentences like (1) which create wholly opaque contexts; my view will both provide an account of sentences like (3) and settle the apparently conflicting intuitions about the inferential characteristics of (5) as well as providing an account of such sentences as (2), (4), and (6) which Davidson does not consider. Because my account takes off from Davidson's, it seems appropriate to start with his account, particularly since it seems to me that a number of the criticisms that have been made of it are not well-founded.

II

The first step in Davidson's account is the claim that sentences involving indirect discourse and those involving propositional attitudes have very similar logical forms, i.e. they are to be assigned in our truth theory the same, or similar, semantic structure. If Davidson is right about this similarity, then a heuristically important step has been made. For, if we concentrate upon belief, desire, hope, itc., it is very easy for us to be led into thinking about such things as the intentional

«objects» of these attitudes, particularly if we are struck by the «fact» that these «objects» need not be part of the (ordinary) furniture of the world. It seems to me that Davidson's claim about the similarity between sentences of indirect discourse and propositional attitudes is well taken. Consider, for example, the following pairs of sentences, which show the same inferential patterns as (1) - (6):

(7) Marcia says that Zeus is the father of her child;
(8) Zeus is said by Marcia to be the father of her child;
(9) Marcia says that that blind man is a thief;
(10) That blind man is said by Marcia to be a thief;
(11) Marcia says that John is unfaithful;
(12) John is said by Marcia to be unfaithful.

Further, each of (7) - (12) allow inference to (13), which has an analogue that is a consequence of (1) - (6).

(13) Marcia said something.

Again, (7) and (14),

(14) John denies that Zeus is the father of Marcia's child,

are sufficient to infer (15),

(15) Marcia says something which John denies.

(1) with the belief analogue of (14) not surprisingly implies the belief analogue of (15). Further, it seems that the same constraints (whatever they are) upon substitution of co-referential expressions apply to saying and believing. Thus, for example, from (7) and (16).

(16) Zeus = the king of the gods in Greek mythology,

we cannot infer (17),

(17) Marcia says that the king of the gods in Greek mythology is the father of her child.

The situation is notoriously the same for sentences such as (1). The situation that these similarities in inference pattern will show up through almost any case one looks at. The only exceptions might be where we have inferences based not on logical form but on the particular words involved; compare the different consequences of sentences which differ only in the occurence of 'know' in one and 'believe' in the other. It would seem, then, that if we can give an account of indirect

discourse sentences we would be well on the way to an account of propositional attitudes.

What, then, happens when I report another's saying in indirect discourse? The usual move here by those of nominalistic bent is to appeal in one way or another to direct quotation and attempt to explain indirect discourse in terms of direct discourse. However, this is not usually a particularly helpful move, for it is an attempt to illuminate the unclear by appeal to the obscure since we have no particularly appealing theoretical account of direct discourse. Because appeal to quotation usually presents us with a unit that is either semantically inert or one with too much semantic articulation, we are left either not being able to make the inferences we want, as on Quine's account, or with unwanted inferences, as on Scheffler's (See Davidson, [3, 139]). The usual nominalistic moves have in common that they represent indirect discourse as merely ascribing what someone else has said to that person. Davidson suggests a rather different move: in indirect discourse, we say and make ourselves *samesayers* with another. When I utter (7), for example, according to Davidson, I both make myself and Marcia samesayers and say that we are samesayers. That is, in uttering (7) I say something like (19),

(19) ExEy (Marcia's utterance x and my utterance y make us samesayers).

The crucial problem here is to provide some means for me to make us samesayers, i.e., to provide some way of replacing 'y' with an expression referring to that utterance of mine which makes us, Marcia and me, samesayers. The way I usually do this is to utter some sentence that stands in the relation of samesaying to some utterance of Marcia's and find an expression which refers to my own utterance. It is instructive, I think, to notice that *I* need not be the one that produces the utterance that makes Marcia a samesayer with someone — although I must if I want to make Marcia and me samesayers — in order to report a samesaying. Consider, for example, the following exchange:

A: «John is being unfaithful to Marcia.»

B: «So I heard. Marcia said that too.»

Here what has happened is that B has said that Marcia and A are samesayers, but has not made it so. This possibility is instructive because it shows that our partial truth definition must take account of two distinct *doings*: first, the saying that two people are samesayers; second, the making of two people samesayers. Davidson's suggestion is that something like the following happens. I present an utterance and say of that same utterance that it is a samesaying with some utterance of another (or another utterance of my own). The representation Davidson gives for, e.g., (7), is this:

(20) Zeus is the father of Marcia's child.
Ex(Marcia's utterance x and my last utterance make us samesayers).

It seems to me that in an important way (20) is somewhat misleading ([3]). The way in which (20) is misleading is in suggesting that the initial sentence is to be treated semantically in the same way as the second, i.e., that each of these has, so to say, the same semantic status within the utterance of (7). If this were what Davidson meant, then it would seem we ought to be able to infer 'Zeus is the father of Marcia's child and there is an utterance of Marcia's such that it and my last one make us samesayers' from (7). This is surely unacceptable, if only because we have lost the referent, or purported referent of the expression 'my last utterance'. But, and this is crucial to Davidson's account, the initial sentence is to be taken as *presented* by the speaker, while the second is *said* by him. How, then, are we to capture this difference between presenting a sentence and saying a sentence? I think that we can by using the account of sentences (of a person at a time) containing demonstrative elements suggested by Burge [1; 2]. In-

([3]) I would argue that the criticism of Davidson's account by Lycan [5] and some of those by Haack [4] are based upon the misleading character of (20). I believe that these criticisms would not have been made had Davidson presented his analysis in the somewhat more pedantic, but surely clearer, way I suggest below.

stead of the usual sort of partial truth definitions, i.e., sentences of the form "S' as uttered by p at t is true iff S', Burge suggests we provide what might be called hypothetical partial truth definitions for sentences involving demonstrative elements. Suppose we have some sentence 'Fd' uttered by p at t containing the demonstrative expression 'd'. Burge suggests something like the following as the form of the partial truth definition for 'Fd', 'Ee (Reference (p, 'd', a, e) → ('F' as uttered by by p at t is true ↔ Fa)', where 'a' is a canonical name for whatever it is that p refers to. This might be read in somewhat convoluted English as: «If there is an act of reference by p using 'd' to a then 'Fd' uttered by p at t it is true if and only if Fa». In other words, the sentence has its straight-forward truth conditions in case the speaker of the sentence has successfully carried out an act of reference; nothing at all is said about what happens if the speaker fails in his attempt in any of the ways speakers are capable of so failing. Burge's suggestion of what to do with demonstratives is helpful because it allows us to make explicit for sentences like (7) both that a demonstrative reference is being made and what the reference is being made to. Following this lead, I would suggest the following as the partial truth definition for (7):

(21) Ee_1Ee_2 ((Utterance (p,e_1) & Reference (p, 'that', e_1,e_2) → ('Marcia says that Zeus is the father of her child' as uttered by p at t is true ↔ Ee_3 (Utterance (Marcia, e_3) & Samesaying (e_1, e_3)))).

(In what follows, I shall use 'U', 'R', and 'S' respectively where I have here used 'Utterance', 'Reference', and 'Samesaying'.) (21) may be read, again straining English a bit, as «if there is an utterance of p such that it is referred to by p using 'that', then 'Marcia says that Zeus is the father of her child' uttered by p at t is true if and only if there is an utterance of Marcia's which is a samesaying with the utterance referred to by p'.

There are a couple of important points of clarification that should by made about (21). It might appear that, on the anal-

ysis of (7) given by (21), the «content» sentence of indirect discourse has no semantic effect on the sentence which contains it. Consider for a moment the following situation. Suppose I am asked what I want to eat, and, pointing to an orange, I say «I want that». What would happen to the truth value of my utterance had I pointed to an apple instead of an orange ? Of course, we cannot tell what would have happened, because we don't know if I wanted an apple, even if we know that as a matter of fact I did want an orange in the first situation. That is, changing the referent of a demonstrative in a sentence containing that demonstrative has no systematic or predictable effect upon the truth value of the sentence. Similarly, had p uttered «Marcia says that the king of the gods in Greek mythology is the father of her child» instead of (7), there would be no way we could predict the truth value of p's utterance of the former from our knowledge of the truth value of (7) as uttered by p. Thus, the content sentence in indirect discourse has an effect upon the truth value, i.e., a semantic effect, of the containing sentence; the effect it has is simply not that which the same words occuring in a different context would have. The important thing to note is that the lack of a systematic effect here is not due to any such mysterious entity as a proposition or meaning but is due to the wholly familiar change in the referent of a demonstrative. Again, it might appear in (21) that there is no guarantee that the utterance by p that makes p and Marcia samesayers is the one we want, i.e., p's utterance of «Zeus is the father of her child» at t. However, this can be readily taken care of by supplying the time references for p's utterance event in (21), a feature of the analysis that is suppressed as a complication in (21) and will be in what follows. Since the expression 't' in (21) is to cover the duration and time of the whole utterance of (7), we have merely to add to the antecedent of (21) the duration and time of the utterance of the content sentence in terms of t.

The most important thing to notice about (21) as an analysis of (7) is that it resolves the first of the two conflicts we started with, that is, the conflict between the need to provide semantic articulation of the content sentence and the need to

keep that sentence inferentially inviolate. As noted previously, we cannot change the content sentence and *preserve* truth value in (21) because we will have changed the referent of a demonstrative; this amounts to saying that the content sentence is inferentially inviolate. However, the content sentence can be given its usual interpretation independent of its occurence within (7). For the theory of truth is to apply to the sentences of a person at a time, i.e., to utterances; as such, it will cover the referent of the demonstrative in (21). However, it is not necessary to give an analysis of the content sentence in giving an analysis of the containing sentence, because the content sentence, from the point of view of the containing sentence, is an inert unit, even though from another point of view it is not. There is an appearance of paradox here, perhaps, but that is merely because the object of reference is the same sort of thing as that which does the referring, since both are utterance events. It would seem then that (21) provides an adequate analysis of (7), and shows the way to dealing with all other sentences like (7).

While (21) seems to provide an adequate analysis of (7), it surely does not show us how to deal with *de re* saying sentences like (8), (10), and (12). Also, it is not obvious how we are to extend the Davidsonian analysis to cover propositional attitude sentences. However, as I shall try to show in the next section, Davidson's analysis of indirect discourse does provide a reasonable base for dealing with both the *de re* and the *de dicto* sentences. There is also a need to say something about the crucial samesaying relation. I shall consider this briefly in the last section, because I am least sure what to say about it.

III

There are at least two different moves we could make in extending the analysis of indirect discourse in (21) to propositional attitudes. The first is to follow Haack's suggestion in [4], and give an analysis such as the following for, e.g., (1):

(22) $Ee_1Ee_2((U(p,e_1)$ & R(p, 'that', $e_1,e_2)) \rightarrow$ ('Marcia believes that Zeus is the father of her child' as uttered by p at t is true $\leftrightarrow Ee_3(e_3$ is a possible utterance of Marcia & e_3 expressed a belief of Marcia & $S(e_3,e_1))))$.

This might be read as: «If there is an utterance event by p that is the object of a reference by p using 'that', then 'Marcia believes that Zeus is the father of her child' as uttered by p at t is true if and only if there is a possible utterance by Marcia by which she would have expressed a belief and which is a samesaying with p's utterance which p referred to». But this proposal has an important difficulty: again we find an appeal to the obscure to illuminate the unclear. For (22) uses the subjunctive or the notion of possibility in an attempt to explicate propositional attitudes, but the former is at least as problematic as the latter, particularly the *de re* possibility used in (22). Because of this difficulty, I prefer as a candidate for the partial truth definition for (1) the following:

(23) $Ee_1Ee_2((U(p,e_1)$ & R(p, 'that', $e_1,e_2)) \rightarrow$ ('Marcia believes that Zeus is the father of her child' as uttered by p at t is true $\leftrightarrow Ee_3$(Belief(Marcia,e_3) & $S(e_1,e_3))))$.

(In what follows, I shall use 'B' where I have used 'Belief' in (23).) (23) is, of course, to be read in an analogous way to the English reading given for (21).

There are a couple of comments that ought to be made about (23), centering on the expression 'Ee(B(Marcia, e)' and its apparent English reading: 'EeB(Marcia, e)' would, on analogy to 'Ee (Marcia,e)', be read 'There is an event which is a believing by Marcia'. At first glance, this seems patently implausible, for there seem to be fairly clear cases of unconscious beliefs and/or beliefs that are as a mere matter of fact unexpressed even to the believer by himself; surely these sorts of beliefs cannot be called events. Again, what about the usual distinction between dispositional and occurent beliefs? One reply to this, a reply of which I am not overly confident, but which I find not grossly implausible, makes use of the fact

that, except perhaps for the unusual case of innate beliefs, if a person has a belief it must have been the case that at one time he did not have the belief. That is, there has been some change in the person; at one time he did not have a belief, at another he did. If there has been a change, there would seem to have also been an event, namely the change itself. This may be a bit implausible in the face of the claim that while it is true that there must have been such an event, a relationship between a person and this event is not what we ascribe when we ascribe a belief to a person. It might also be claimed that such a move is to confuse a necessary condition for having a belief with what it is to have a belief. Another reply, one to which I am more sympathetic, involves appeal to the character of the enterprise in which I am engaged. One of the points of giving a truth theory is to provide an invarient true-true, false-false, pairing between sentences of the object language and sentences of the metalanguage. One way we can test proposed pairings is by seeing if a sentence in the metalanguage has as consequences sentences which are correlated by the theory with object language sentences which are consequences of the object language sentence correlated to the original metalanguage sentence. For example, suppose object language sentence 0_1 is correlated with metalanguage sentence M_1, and another pairing is 0_2 and M_2. If M_1 implies M_2 on grounds of the deduction rules for the metalanguage, and 0_1 implies 0_2 on grounds of what speakers of the object language claim about their own language, then we have some evidence that our pairing is correct. In other words, if a given pairing works in the appropriate way, fine, even if the pairings strike us as grotesque, peculiar, or counter-intuitive. And (23) seems to work; it seems to provide us with just the inferential characteristics we want from an analysis of (1). Again, if we accept (23) as our analysis of (1), then it appears that (1) will entail that there are two events in the relation of samesaying; this might at first be somewhat disturbing. However, it is clear that there are at least two different ways an ascription of a given attitude can go wrong: first if the «object» is right but the attitude is wrong (cf., «He doesn't *believe* that»); second,

if the attitude is right but the «object» is wrong (cf., «He doesn't believe *that*»). It seems to me that (23) captures these distinct ways of going wrong, so what at first seemed a disadvantage of the analysis may well turn out to be an advantage.

In considering what analyses should be given to the transparent and «translucent» *de dicto* sentences and the *de re* sentences. ([4]) I shall consider only the belief sentences, as I believe that analogous analyses can be given to the parallel sentences of indirect discourse. Because of the central place that the relationship between *de dicto* and *de re* belief sentences has taken in my setting out of the problems of the analysis of propositional attitude sentences, I shall not include analyses of other no less interesting sorts of belief sentences; however, I believe that the sort of account I will suggest, suitably supplemented, can be given for other belief sentences. Finally, I shall start in a way that may at first seem backwards, i.e., with the analyses of the *de re* sentences, because I believe seeing the transparent and translucent *de dicto* sentences clearly will be easier once the *de re* sentences have been accounted for.

The first thing that it is important to notice about the examples of *de re* belief and saying sentences I have used so far is that they are all in the passive voice. I would suggest it is this fact that has made them seem far more different from *de dicto* belief and saying sentences than they really are. So far as the theory of truth is concerned, sentences that differ only in that one is in the active voice and the other in the passive differ not at all. That is, exactly the same truth theoretic analysis, or right hand side to the partial truth definition for the

([4]) It should be clear that I have taken some liberties with the traditional terminology here. By '*de re* sentences' I mean those of the surface syntactic form of (2), (4), (6), etc., and their syntactic (but not semantic) varients; by '*de dicto* sentences' I mean those of the surface syntactic form of (1), (3), (5), etc. I reserve 'opaque', 'transparent', and 'translucent' for specifying the apparent inferential and semantic characteristics of sentences despite their surface syntactic form.

two sentences, should be given for both the active and the passive voice. This, of course, is due to the fact that sentences that differ only in voice have the same truth conditions. The following, then, are the active voice equivalents of (2), (4), and (6); it is these upon with I shall concentrate.

(24) Marcia believes of Zeus that he is the father of her child.

(25) Marcia believes of that blind man that he is a thief.

(26) Marcia believes of John that he is unfaithful.

Now, if one can give a plausible analysis of each of (24) - (26), one will thereby have a plausible analysis of (2), (4), and (6).

If we concentrate upon (24) - (26) rather than on their passive equivalents, there is one important feature of such sentences that becomes obvious, as well as a second feature that is quite obvious in the passive form and which is retained in the active form. The latter is simply that the utterer of a sentence such as (24) - (26), or its passive equivalent, standardly refers to two different entities. First, of course, is the person that is said to have the belief; the second is the person or thing that the belief is said to be «about». For example, a person who utters (25) refers to two different persons, namely Marcia and some particular blind man; the person who utters (24) refers to Marcia and at least attempts to refer to Zeus. The feature that is importantly brought out by use of the active voice forms is that the person who utters, e.g., (24), says something that is very similar to what the utterer of a sentence like (1) says: what he does is essentially to utter a sentence in indirect discourse, and, of course, something more which is captured in the first feature. It would seem, then, that all that has to be done to give an account of *de re* belief sentences is to take account of the reference to a second object that is lacking in the analysis of opaque *de dicto* sentences. So, it would seem that our analysis of (2) should be:

(27) $Ee_1Ee_2Ee_3$ ((U)s, e_1) & R(s, 'that', e_1,e_2) & R(s, 'Zeus', Zeus, e_3)) → ('Marcia believes of Zeus that he is the father of her child' as uttered by s at t is true ↔ Ee_4(B(Marcia, e_4) & S(e_1,e_4))).

Now, (27) is, I think, initially somewhat plausible, but there is an important difficulty with it. We surely want (2) to imply 'Marcia believes of someone that he is the father of her child', which would apparently come to the same as (27) except that the third conjunct of the antecedent would be 'ExR(s, 'someone', x,e_3)' instead of 'R(s, 'Zeus', Zeus,e_3)'; there is apparently no way we could get from (27) to the analogous account of 'Marcia believes of someone...', so we would apparently lose an inference we surely want to keep. Now, there is at least one course that we might take that would allow us to preserve the inference that we want to preserve. However, that move does not come free; there is the cost of an addition to our ontology. This move involves us in having a triadic belief predicate in the metalanguage instead of the dyadic predicate I have used this far. Here instead of (27) we would have (28):

(28) $Ee_1Ee_2Ee_3((U(s,e_1)$ & R(s, 'that', $e_1,e_2)$ & R(s, 'Zeus', Zeus, e_3)) → ('Marcia believes of Zeus that he is the father of her child' as uttered by s at t is true ↔ Ee_4(B(Marcia, Zeus, e_4) & S(e_1, e_4)))).

However, (28) itself is not quite right, since we would apparently have to have a tetradic belief predicate in the metalanguage to take care of such sentences as «Marcia believe of John and Mary that he loves her'. The obvious device here would be to fill the second argument place not with names of persons or things but with names of sequences, so that the relevant expression in (28) would be 'B(Marcia, <Zeus>, e_4)'. We could then, of course, move to reduce the belief predicates in the metalanguage to a single one by using the triadic predicate for the opaque *de dicto* sentences with the second argument place filled by the expression for the empty sequence. For example, instead of having 'B(Marcia, e_3)' in (23), we would have 'B(Marcia, <—>, e_3)'. Thus, we would preserve a certain elegance in our metalanguage .Further, Wallace, in [6], has argued that there are good reasons for us to take a relational sense of belief as basic and related to the «non-relational» sense of belief as satisfaction is related to truth, i.e.,

the «non-relational» sense of belief is a special case of the relational sense of belief. However, this move does have the disadvantage of adding sequences to our ontology.

This ontological cost becomes apparent when we consider what we are to do about 'Marcia believes of someone...' For this sentence, the first conjunct of the expression on the right of the biconditional would be 'ExB(Marcia,x,e_4)', which is simply the existential quantification of the expression 'B(Marcia, <Zeus>, e_4)'. One final thing we would have to do to make it possible to get the inference directly would be to drop the final conjunct of the antecedent for the sentence 'Marcia believes of someone...'; this does have the advantage that we no longer have the very implausible notion in our analysis of this sentence that one refers to some particular individual when he uses the word 'someone'. All things considered, it does not seem to me that the ontological cost is exorbitant; in fact, it seems to me that we are getting away cheap.

Let us now consider sentences I have called transparent *de dicto* sentences, e.g., (3). The clue to the analysis of (3) and others of its sort is the occurrence of the demonstrative expression in the «content» sentence. What occurs in such a sentence, it seems to me, is that the speaker of the sentence refers to the referent of the demonstrative expression even though the demonstrative expression occurs within what might appear to be an opaque context. If this is the case, then the speaker of (3) will be doing at least two things in his utterance of the content sentence; first, he is presenting an utterance that will stand in the samesaying relation to some other event; second, he is using an expression within that presented sentence to refer to something. Thus, it would seem that we should give an analysis of (3) that parallels that which we gave for (2), since the same sorts of things seem to be happening in each case. If we do, the analysis of (3) will be:

(29) $Ee_1Ee_2Ee_3((U(s,e_1)$ & R(s, 'that', $e_1,e_2)$ & R(s, 'that blind man', a,e_3)) → ('Marcia believes that that blind man is a thief' as uttered by s at t is true ↔ Ee_4(B(Marcia, <a>,e_4) & $S(e_1,e_4)$))),

where 'a' is a canonical name for the hopefully ill-used gentleman in question. Since we would follow the lead of (28) as revised in giving an account of (4), i.e., we would give the same analysis of (4) as I have given here for (3), it is clear that (3) will entail (4) according to the theory. It is also clear that (4) will entail (3). I do not find this disturbing; in fact, it accords with at least my linguistic and inferential intuitions.

What I have called the translucent *de dicto* sentences are as I said in first talking about them, somewhat controversial. That is, there has been disagreement about whether such sentences do or do not entail their *de re* mates. I would like to suggest that both sides of the disagreement are correct, that under certain conditions such sentences do entail their *de re* mates, under others they do not. However, this should not be interpreted as meaning that there is no structure to the conditions under which the entailments in question do or do not hold or that there are a set of unsystematic «pragmatic» conditions that must be taken into account in deciding whether the entailments hold. I would suggest the conditions, actually, the condition, is simply whether or not the utterer of the sentence refers, e.g., to John in uttering (5). In other words, I am suggesting that sentences such as (5) are to be given *two* analyses, that they have *two* sets of truth conditions, depending upon which of the two possible antecedents of the hypothetical partial truth defioitinn is fulfilled. Thus, it seems to me that (5) should be given one analysis following that given (1) and another following that given (3). In fact, I want to go further than this. In giving partial truth definitions of sentences, it is very important that we attempt, in so far as possible to avoid ascribing to a sentence some characetristic that is based not upon the logical character of the sentence but upon our own knowledge of the world. I suspect that is exactly what was done in ascribing only one set of truth conditions to (1); since we all know that Zeus does not exist, there can be no question of our carrying out an (ordinary) reference to king of the Greek gods. However, our language is ignorant of that fact, and should not be made to seem more knowledgable than it is. Thus, it seems to me that if we are to give two sets

of truth conditions to (5) we ought also give two sets to (1). But we are still not finished drawing out the consequences of being willing to ascribe to (5) two sets of truth conditions. The reason I want to ascribe two sets of truth conditions to (5) is that expressions like 'John' can be used demonstratively, but need not be; there seem to be some cases in which proper names are used in a purely predicative way, e.g., in 'There were three Georges at the party last night'. Similarly, as Donellan and others have pointed out, definite descriptions can be used demonstratively or predicatively. However, demonstrative expressions such as *'that* blind man' cannot be used non-demonstratively; thus, only one set of truth conditions should be given for (3). If this difference is as crucial as I have taken it to be, then, we will have to ascribe more than one set of truth conditions to any *de dicto* sentence in which there occurs a proper name or a definite description. I say 'more than one' here advisedly, for consider what will happen if more than one proper name and/or definite description occurs in the content sentence. If there are two such expressions, there are four possibilities of reference by the speaker: using neither expression to refer; using only one; using only the other; or using both. In general ,there will be 2^n possibilities of reference, where n is the number of proper names and definite descriptions available for referring in the content sentence. If this is so, then there will correspondingly be 2^n different sets of truth conditions for each *de dicto* sentence in which there occur proper names or definite descriptions in the content sentence. That we have such a proliferation of truth conditions is not so strange as it might first appear. For, if we accept Donellan's distinction between ascriptive and referential uses of definite descriptions, we will also have 2^n sets of truth conditions for any sentence which contains definite descriptions, where n is the number of definite descriptions in the sentence. The reason we have many sets of truth conditions for the sentences I have been considering is simple, namely, that the different possible uses of expressions within a sentence have different effects upon the truth conditions of the sentence. The important thing to note about these proliferating sets of truth conditions,

however, is that they are always structured; for each reference clause in the antecedent of the hypothetical partial truth definition after the first there will be one more member of the sequence argument of the metalinguistic belief predicate. If all of this is correct, it would seem that although it is not the case that every *sentence* has a definite sense, i.e., one and only one set of truth conditions, it is the case that each *utterance* of (at least) the sentences I have been considering has a definite sense.

IV

As it obvious by now, the samesaying relation is central to the account of indirect discourse and propositional attitudes I have proposed. In order to make the account thoroughly plausible, one would have to give a full account of the samesaying relation, a task which I am not able to complete at this point. However, I do want to present arguments that will, I believe, forestall some criticism of my central use of the notion of samesaying.

One might argue that samesaying is no particular improvement over, for example, Carnap's notion of intensional isomorphism or the notion of synonomy. ([5]) I think both of these alternatives, as well as others of the same sort, suffer from more difficulty than does samesaying, although the latter is indeed plagued with one of the apparent problems of synonomy. Consider first the notion of intensional isomophism. Samesaying does not seem that much of an improvement over intensional isomorphism, since we can use the latter notion for, e.g. indirect discourse:

(30) 'S said that p' as uttered by s at t is true if and only if s's sentence p in L_1 is intensionally isomorphic with some sentence in L_2 uttered by A.

([5]) Haack, in [4], in fact argues that the relation of samesaying is no better off than either synonomy or intensional isomorphism.

After all, we have an adequate theoretical account of the relation of intensional isomorphism, at least for formal languages, while we haven't the same for samesaying .But there are serious problems with the putative account given in (30). Initially, there is the relativisation of the account to languages; thanks to Quine, we are all aware of the difficulty of individuating languages, which we must be able to do if we are to take (3) seriously. Again, and rather more importantly, intentional isomorphism requires intensions as entities. If we are sympathetic to the claims of indeterminacy of translation, we have the difficulty of reconciling the sharpness questions of meaning have if we accept intensions as entities with the lack of sharpness of such questions forced upon us by indeterminacy. Well, then, why is samesaying not infected by the same disease as synonomy, the bane of indeterminacy ? The answer is that it is, but the illness is not fatal, neither for synonomy nor for samesaying. Quine's claims of indeterminacy seem to me to come to saying that, with respect to the question 'Are 'a' and 'b' synonomous ?', there is no one right answer. But, and this is crucial, Quine does not, I believe, want to claim that because there is no one right answer all answers are equally good. We can and do often make reasonable judgements of synonomy, and of samesaying; what Quine has shown is that these judgements are not as cut and dried as philosophers are sometimes wont to think. So it would seem that samesaying and synonomy are in the same condition, which is not critical, due to the supposed infection. However, samesaying does have one thing in its favor that synonomy lacks. To see this, consider what we would have as an analysis of indirect discourse if we appealed to synonomy rather than samesaying. I would suggest that if we appealed to synonomy, we would also be forced to use direct quotation in our partial truth definition. As I suggested above, and as Davidson has argued, appeal to direct quotation is no help at all in dealing with indirect quotation, and, if I am right, in dealing with propositional attitudes either. Because synonomy must appeal to the unacceptable drect quotation and samesaying need not, being a relation between events, it would seem that samesay-

ing is in better shape than synonomy. ([6]) It would seem then that this kind of attack on the account I have proposed does not have the force it might initially appear to have.

One might also argue that one would have need of at least two different samesaying relations: one for cases like (3) in which the speaker refers; one for cases like (1) (in its opaque reading) where the speaker does not refer ([7]). For example, the speaker of (1) in its opaque reading must, if he is to be successful in samesaying, use a referring expression where 'Zeus' occurs that is at very least known by the original speaker to be capable of being used to pick out the entity picked out in fact by the original speaker. Thus, the speaker of (1) would not have been successful in samesaying had he used 'the seducer of Leda instead of 'Zeus' if Marcia was unaware of that particular rumored exploit of the lecherous god. On the other hand, the speaker of (3) may use the expression 'that blind man', and still be successful in samesaying even though Marcia is unaware of the gentleman's affliction. Thus, it at first appears that we ought to have at least two different samesaying relations on hand, one for each of these cases and one of which, that for the former, is stronger than the other. However, this appearance is misleading, especially if we attend to what utterance is being claimed to have the samesaying relation to the original. In the second case, the utterance in question is that of 'he is a thief', in the first it is 'Zeus is the father of her child'. In the first case, more is ventured than in the second, and, accordingly, more is gained in case of success. Remembering that proper names (and definite descriptions) have the dual roles of predication and reference and that pronouns lack the first role, we can see that more is ventured in the first case because the speaker is making a claim about two things the believer believes (not necessarily at the same time) of the

([6]) If we were willing to talk of synonomy as a relation between utterances of people at times, i.e., concrete utterance events, then it would seem that samesaying and synonomy would come to the same thing. I would have no objection to someone following this route, but it seems much less misleading to talk of samesaying, since synonomy is usually taken to hold between sentences regardless of utterance condition, speaker, etc.

entity in question, while in the second he is claiming only one thing the believer believes. What more is gained is that one in uttering the first rather than the second is being much more informative; that is, he is telling his audience more about the believer's beliefs. If we have only one same saying relation on our hands, as we do if I am right, then we are in a rather better position to attempt to spell that relation out than we would have been with two or more.

The samesaying relation seems to me to be an identity-like relation; that is, it seems to be reflexive, symmetrical, and transitive. Unfortunately, there is little else that I am presently prepared to say about samesaying. However, I do believe that my account of indirect discourse and propositional attitudes, dependent though it is on the murky samesaying relation is, if not correct, at least a step in the right direction. Whether this direction will prove ultimately correct will depend at least in part on whether a satisfying account can be given of samesaying. For example, it may be that the samesaying relation must be supplemented by other sentence-like relations, e.g., one that is like that of being a contrary of, in order to account for all the inferences we want. Such an account will come only at the end of a long and difficult road, but it seems to me that the trip is well worth taking.

(7) Although I have not considered direct discourse, i.e., direct quotation, it seems to me that it can be given an account similar to that given above for indirect discourse. There will have of course to be an addition to account for the differences between the two, e.g., the latter is rather more liberal than the former. My suggestion would be to have two «saying» predicates in the metalanguage, one of which comes to what is needed for indirect discourse and one for direct discourse which comes to something like 'says exactly...'. This would have the advantage of not requiring the appearance of needing yet a third samesaying predicate.

AFTERWORD

In the time since this article was written, I have come to see what I was doing here more clearly. It now seems to me that I have presented here an alternative to the Kripke/Kaplan view of how to formalize these sentences. It is an alternative which, I believe, uses symbolic apparatus importantly different from theirs while still accepting their insights about how we use referring expressions. The difference between us is shown in the symbolism: the Kripke/Kaplan symbolism tries to formalize features of language which my symbolism leaves open. Kripke and Kaplan, I think, want to make reference a necessary part of referring *expressions*; I want to say that reference ought not be built into a theory of language (as opposed to a theory of language *use*). I do think there is room for choice here. For example, instead of the sentence (p. 309) starting «However, our language...» I would now say «There are deep philosophical questions about how much knowledge we find it theoretically useful to try to capture here; I think we ought not ascribe this knowledge to our language.» There are important questions about the nature of philosophy and the difference between science and philosophy that are decided by our choice of symbolism here, i.e., what to include in a theory of language. I think Merleau-Ponty's distinction between authentic and sedimented language is crucial here: no adequate theory of language can capture more than sedimented language; and it is a necessary condition of the adequacy of any theory that it leave room for authenticity. My symbolism, I believe, has the advantage of leaving open an area (albeit a small one) of authenticity which the Kripke/Kaplan symbolism closes. But that is the subject of another paper. In any case. I still believe my symbolism, or a variant of it, provides a serious alternative to Kripke and Kaplan.

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