

DEFENSIVE LEARNING- AN INTRODUCTION TO A DYNAMIC EPISTEMOLOGY

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ABSTRACT

A model of the psychological defense is outlined in order to specify how it interacts with the problem of knowing by learning from another person. A particular defense is outlined in terms of its psychological, linguistic and logical dimensions. The general relationship of the psychological defense to epistemology is discussed.

How do psychological defenses affect the person's ability to learn by way of the logic of another's argument? How does a psychological defense affect the person's reception of empirical information? The purpose of this paper is to examine the role of the psychological defense in the problem of knowing by learning from another person. In order to do this we will proceed as follows: First, we will outline the place of the psychological defense in the problem of knowing things and knowing how to know things. Second, we will outline the psychological nature of defensive commitment and its relation to the dialectic process. Third, we will indicate how to examine the logical structure within a defense. Fourth, we will consider closely the ontological implications of a defense. Fifth, we will consider closely the implications for teaching, social influence, and epistemology.

1. *Psychological Defense: Effects on Knowing Things and Knowing How to Know Things*

It is not enough to talk about the learner's (¹) development and his training background as factors which determine his cognitive processes. How does the learner form concepts and process information? The position that developmental factors contribute to conceptual style, readiness and ability has been a great contribution toward answering this question. A variety of developmental explanations describe how the learner moves from the concrete to the abstract and how he progresses in his conceptual development so that his concepts become logical and reversible (e.g. Piaget).

I am suggesting here, however, that in order to understand the way the learner reacts to the presentation of information, a cognitive psychology of the learner needs to consider more than a *genetic* epistemology.

It should be possible to trace the changes in logical and psychological structures in teacher-learner (¹) interactions. Certainly logical and linguistic structures change as a function of psychological development; however, knowing the learner's developmental level often does not explain his lack of ability or predisposition to make logical transformations. For example, we have all observed the advanced student who *is* capable of seeing logical relationships and of creating equivalencies, analogies, tautologies, etc., say, in mathematics, but who cannot achieve this flexibility in a course in social studies. Think for an instance of the dogmatic budding political scientist who might see one «ism» as completely unacceptable. Teacher suggestions regarding areas of equivalence between «isms» are seemingly not even intellectually apprehended. Yet analogies, etc., on a similar «developmental level» regarding logical complexity are easy for the same student in Mathematics.

If a logical problem is to create by transposition a statement equivalent to $p \supset q$, then $q' \supset p'$ is one valid possibility. However, consider this in terms of an ontological issue:

If something is moving \supset it is in a place

Proof by transposition:

It is not in a place

∴ The «something» is *not* moving

To reason by equivalence *here* is a dialectical process which creates psychological difficulty *if* one's concepts are committed to an ontological interpretation. That is, if one has an «ontological commitment» (which we will show is always the case in a psychological defense), the statement and its transposition cannot both be seen as true. Under those circumstances logical transformation is difficult for the learner.

From a psychological point of view, a commitment to an ontological position is likely to occur under certain circumstances. One of these is in the case of psychological defenses. Elsewhere I have written about these defenses in more detail (Fisher, 1973) however, since *projection* has been a defense I have most closely examined (Fisher, 1971) we will consider the role of that defense in a learning situation.

II. *The Psychological Nature of Defensive Commitment*

In order to see the relations between logic, dialectic, social exchange, and defense, it is first necessary to consider the psychological aspects of defenses.

The Psychological Aspects of Defenses

There are three general aspects of the psychological defense which affect the linguistic and logical processes we are considering. These are commitment, concept-categories, and consistency.

To expand and explain, in general we will say that a defense involves a psychological commitment to a negation. The purpose of defensive negation is to establish consistency between

concept-categories. For example, a child may «see» fire as attractive to touch. The «seeing» is a perception or an experience on the level of perception. After some experiences in being burnt, the child finds it useful to develop a *concept-category* of fire as dangerous. We may conceive of the *concept-category* as a statement about classes in the form all S is P:

All fires are dangerous

Or we may consider the cognitive adjustment in a defense as a proposition in the form $p \supset q$:

If all fires are dangerous
I have no desire to touch them

The *concept-category* is an effect of psychological commitment. The *concept-category* presumably «helps» to resolve a conflict: The question of touching the fire rests on the conflict between seeing the fire as attractive and touching it, and finding the fire unattractive or repelling. A defense, psychologically, is a guide to a course of action (or more properly, to a course of non-action).

The conflict between experiences or perceptions can be handled easily if one of the perceptions is negated. Linguistically this may be seen as follows:

The individual makes a statement to himself, and the statement contains a negation; the statement may be one of several. For example:

- | | |
|---------------|---|
| Statement 1: | «I do <i>not</i> see the fire as attractive» |
| Statement 2a: | «The fire <i>is not</i> attractive» |
| Statement 2b: | «The fire is ugly» |
| Statement 3: | «Fires may be attractive to others, but <i>not to me</i> » |
| Statement 4: | «It is possible that I was attracted to the fire but I do <i>not</i> remember it» |

It may be seen from these four statements that

1. Some aspect of perception is negated
2. The aspect of experience which is negated depends on the syntactic location of the negation
3. The negative statement affords a consistency between *concept-categories*. In the example, the child learns that «Fire is dangerous.» Any of the four «negating» statements above would provide for consistency with this notion.
4. The problem of effecting future inaction is resolved. The child's choice is to touch or not to touch. It is inaction which is now consistent with the person's commitment to a negation. Maintaining psychological commitment to this negation requires consistent *concept-categories*, as the individual's way of relating to himself and to others, and also requires consistent propositions as the individual's way of dialogue with himself and with others. To maintain psychological *concept-categories* (resolve the action-non-action conflict) the logical laws of thought are applied to «classes.» To maintain a psycho-social consistency (show oneself and others that one is thinking, acting, and feeling consistently) a dialogue applying the laws of thought to a logical proof, is used.

It may be helpful to regard the psychological aspects of a defense as isomorphic to the linguistic and logical dimensions. To illustrate, consider Table 1:

TABLE 1

PARALLEL PROCESSES AND STRUCTURES IN A DEFENSE

Psychological Aspects	Linguistic Processes	Logical Processes
Concept-Categories	Syntactic Coding by Negation	Logic of Classes
Commitment	Semantic Effects	Dialectic Effects on Argument and Dialogue
Consistency	General grammatical Effects (e.g. Sentence formation; sentence complexity)	Logic of Propositions; Statement Calculus

To explain and summarize Table 1,

1. *Concept-categories* are effected by the linguistic use of negation. The development of these psychological structures follows the logic of classes.

2. Commitment involves an investment in a position regarding an ontological event. This position affects the person's accessibility to logical argument and has implications for the dialectic process in a dialogue.

3. Consistency in maintaining the defense results in general grammatical effects on the way the person uses language. To maintain consistency, the logic of propositions is followed.

A defense is a psychological commitment to a concept or concept-category which has ontological significance. To clarify, let us look at one specific defense.

For a moment, assume the following reconstruction of the defense, projection:

	<i>Statement</i>
Person's Real Experience:	1. <i>I am angry</i>
Defensive Alteration:	2. <i>Others are angry; not-me</i>

Projection is a defense in which the individual makes a statement that an experience, perception or event does not occur within the self, but does occur in an other or in a non-self entity. Such a statement is a psychological defense in that the experience, perception, or event in question has occurred, but is negated (Not all negations are defenses). The relation of the defense to the reality to which it refers can be specified linguistically in terms of an alteration in syntax. The negation of experience or perception is best understood as a linguistic act, i.e. a syntactic alteration which has implications for the person's knowledge about some aspect of ontology.

In the case of projection in psychological terms, it is the person as locus of action which is the issue. In syntactical terms it is the subject of the sentence (or statement) to which the negation is applied. There are two points necessary to make here before proceeding. One is that the impact of the negation has semantic implications which can be specified as

a part of the linguistic analysis. And two, that although this linguistic analysis is isomorphic for meaning, self, and ontological events, it is separate from a logical analysis.

III. *How to Examine the Logical Structure Within a Defense*

Having set forth the psychological nature of defense, we may now consider the role of defense and defensive logic in dialectic processes and in social exchange.

The nature of dialectic may be outlined here in terms which are *logical*, that is, after we have noted linguistically the placement of negation. The dialectic method of Zeno is to accept a proposition as *true* and then argue *validly* to show a *false* conclusion. This may be likened to accepting the proposition

$$p \supset q$$

as *true* and then arguing *validly* that

$$\begin{array}{c} \text{not } q \\ \hline \therefore \text{not } p \end{array}$$

The logic of the argument (denial of consequent) is valid since $p \supset q \equiv \text{not } q \supset \text{not } p$. Psychologically, however, if the terms of an implication *and* of its contrapositive are both true, linguistic negations such as those in defenses cannot be maintained.

The psychological value of the dialectic is as follows: The individual is faced with a choice: either his concept-categories are accepted as abstract and separable from psychological adjustments of the self or he maintains the linguistic negation and finds the logic of his concepts and propositions at variance with his psychological conceptions of reality.

Thus if the logic of projection rests on *not-me* and *me* being mutually exclusive, then logically equivalent statements may be difficult for a learner to accept. For example, a student who is angry feels that:

If others are angry, then I am not angry

$$(p \supset q)$$

The contrapositive

$$(q' \supset p')$$

is logically equivalent, but psychologically disturbing:

If I am angry, others are not angry.

That is, confronting this person with the contrapositive produces an answer like:

Well, I am not angry.

One way to look at this application of dialectical proof is to say that where a defensive psychological commitment is involved, logical flexibility (although not necessarily logical consistency) is inhibited. Thus, for example as long as investment in the defense must be maintained, arguing validly by *denial of the consequent* will either produce obfuscation of the logical thought processes or increased psychological need for negation.

Obfuscation can come about by logical error, by paralogic, or by avoidance of logic. If, on the other hand, the person separates out his psychological investment from a logical extension of his propositions, then he would tend to search for another defense.

With what logical procedure is a defensive commitment congruent? We will say here that the psychological commitment of the defense is to a logical process which can be termed anti-dialectical. That is, a linguistically negated statement is accepted as true, and a valid argument is presented to show that it is true:

$$\begin{array}{rcl}
 \text{Thus} & & p \supset q \\
 & & \underline{p} \\
 & & \therefore q
 \end{array}$$

The would be argument by *affirming the antecedent*. For example, in a defensive projection «If others to this, I do not do this,» a person using the defense would produce as much evidence as possible for «Others do this». This is outlined below in terms of the logic of the concept-categories (classes) of the defense.

Of interest here is the notion that the dialectic form may be applied to the logical contrapositive, whereas the antidialectic form is restricted to a statement of the proposition itself. *Psychological defenses follow consistent logical rules but preclude application to equivalent propositions.*

It will be shown that as the logic of a defense develops, its anti-dialectical nature leads to

1. The support of a thesis
2. The rejection of antithesis
3. Conflict in interpersonal communication
4. Psychological abnegation of ontological areas of meaning.

Logical flexibility, it is assumed, may be retarded by psychological and ontological commitments to negation. Where logical flexibility is retarded or inhibited the results involve

1. Interference with the discovery of logical possibilities
 2. Blocking off of areas of knowledge (comprehension and ontology)
 3. Communication-conflict: inability to learn from another.
- The general outline above specified several assumptions:

1. A defense is a psychological commitment to negation
2. The negation is a linguistic act. The syntactic and semantic effects can be described.

3. A defense extends itself logically. This may be studied in terms of an analysis of propositions the individual uses in a social dialogue. This analysis is undertaken above in terms of the logic within a dialectic process.

We will consider further below in our analysis of the specific defense, projection, the linguistic effects of negation, and the logic of classes or concept-categories within the defense.

IV. *The Ontological Implications of a Defense: Projection*

Table 2 (*) is constructed on the notion that the defense is a negation of an experience or perception. Column 1 indicates the experience; Column 2 indicates the conceptual proposition to which the person commits himself. Column 3 attempts to locate the effect of the negation syntactically, and Column 4 suggests the focus of the negation's effect on the meaning of the experience or perception in question.

To read the table 2, we assume that:

1. The defense is a conceptual structure (proposition) which negates and takes the place of a perception or experience.

2. The proposition is syntactically affected. The impact of the negation is specific to the function of language in point. The person as language-user is using negation then to restrict himself from categorizing and coding certain aspects of his perception or experience. In projection it is the *subject* which is *grammatically* affected. This effect on syntax is restrictive on the coding of *psychologically* isomorphic categories (concerning the *self* and the individual's ability to construct defensive propositions about other *selves*).

3. As already assumed, the propositions become fundamental commitments which are subject to the law of noncontradiction.

4. There is (similar to the notion of psychologically isomorphic areas of restricted knowledge (2)), a semantic effect on the individual's knowledge of and relation to certain onto-

logical issues (col. 4).

TABLE 2 The Syntactic and Semantic Effects of Defensive Negation in Projection

Prior Experience	The Statement of Negation	Syntax Affected	Semantic Dimension of the Experience
A exists in B «I» feel A -am	A exists in B «Not-Me» - feels A -is	Subject Prepositional Phrases involving place	Consciousness a) locus of causality b) locus of occurrence

A. Linguistic Factors: Syntax

The defense of projection involves the individual's awareness of his experience or of his perception of an event. The negation of awareness is directed at the individual *himself* rather than at the existence of the event (Table 2).

Syntactically, projection involves negation of the subject of the action. When the defense is employed, the person reduces his awareness that *he* has experienced the event without denying its existence. This is accomplished by a «shrinking» of the self as the locus of occurrence and a fixing of the locus of occurrence outside the self.

While the syntax of the defense directs itself at the subject (nominative case) the underlying grammatical logic is directed at the ablative case.⁽³⁾ To see why this is so, we must point out that we are dealing with an existential defense. That is, the concept-categories and propositional systems of these defenses concern the way the individual knows and orders his information about reality. As a way of knowing, the propositional system has to do two things. The first is to provide codability of events, and the second is to provide for consistency through a commitment to noncontradiction.

B. *The Logic*

The logic of projection concerns the locus of an event, in this manner:

If event B exists in A
 event B cannot exist in \bar{A}
 If $B < A$
 then $B \nless \bar{A}$

Or in terms of the calculus of classes

$$(B > A) \equiv (B\bar{A} = 0)$$

For example, if we say that an event of anger exists in you, then the event of that anger cannot be attributed to anyone who is *not* you. Further,

If $B < \bar{A}$
 then $B \nless A$

That is, if someone who is *not* you is seen to have occasioned the existence of a specific anger, then you could not have occasioned the same event.

The existential assumptions in the use of projection are that only one locus of occurrence and only one locus of causality can exist for a given event at one time. The semantic implications of tying this logic to the negation of the *subject* are in terms of a reduction of consciousness of the self. That is, projection involves application of the law of non-contradiction to the proposition: An event either exists within the person or it exists outside the person.

(If $B < A$
 then $B \nless \bar{A}$)

In *psychological* terms the negation differentiates «me» and «not-me.» The defense is flexible in that the event in question

still exists. The proof of the defense in terms of the individual's logical extensions is an a posteriori one; therefore the «not-me» can at various times be different others. For example, «Today it is Harry who is angry, yesterday it was Bill, but in both cases not me.» It should be clear here that, at *any one given time*, the occurrence of the event is highly restricted to a single «other» locus. In this way a person can deeply invest in blaming one other person for causing a given event. And also in the same way, if blame is attributed to several others, *differences between the others is «leveled.»* The others become «others» or «They.» The differences are leveled so that the person's concept-categories become more logical. Me and not-me, self and not-self are logically contradictory. Self and Bill or Self and Harry imply some area of contradiction which has not been logically circumscribed. Thus, overgeneralization and stereotypy may take place. The function of this stereotypy is to allow the underlying logic of the defense (that an event can occur at but one place) to remain intact. We shall say that where «A» is the person as locus of occurrence and « \bar{A} » is not-person, and «Z» is a series of other persons, (Using the notation of calculus of classes).

$$\begin{aligned} A\bar{A} &= 0 \\ Z < \bar{A} \\ (Z < \bar{A}) &\equiv (ZA = 0) \end{aligned}$$

That is, «I» and «not me» contradict each other. If a series of others (Z) are seen as «not me» (\bar{A}) then for locus of occurrence to include A and Z is not possible. Let us take some specific «others,» namely persons W, X, and Y.

If event C is attributed to person W, then where A is «me»,

$$\begin{aligned} C &< W \\ CA &= 0 \end{aligned}$$

And if other events like C are attributed to persons X and Y

$$C_2 < X$$

$$C_3 < Y$$

Then $(C_{2,3}A = 0) \equiv (X + Y < \bar{A})$

That is, W, X, and Y are all included in «not me.» or

$$C_n < Z$$

and

$$C_n A = 0$$

To clarify, if «C» type events are, say, anger and if «Z» people all seem to be, say, blue-collar workers (let us say A is not) then beliefs like the following ensue: *Only blue collar workers have anger.* No instances of anger seen attributable to «me.» That is,

$$(C_n < Z) \equiv C_n A = 0).$$

Social polarities as a logical outcome of this logic are but one more step away. That is, if there are Z types, there are «A» types.

The effects on social perceptions and behavior may be extended from this analysis. We will consider these effects closely in the next section; however, there is one more point to be made regarding the ontological significance of this defense:

When the projective defense is on a personal rather than social stereotyped level, as was pointed out, the investment in a particular other person is deep. Thus for example, if a learner has an investment in a teacher's being the «non-self,» the learner may feel deeply

«It is because of Miss X, that I failed Geometry and that I have all my school difficulties.»

As long as the defense remains on this personal level, there are two assumptions which cause contradiction: One assumption in the defense is that there is specificity of locus of occurrence. That is, in the above example «power to fail» exists in either the self or the non-self, but not in both. The second assumption is specificity of locus of causality. The cause of

failure is either self or non-self. Thus, if locus of occurrence is generalized to a series of others, the only way to hold onto the defense is to assume self as cause. To explain, if the student realizes that he failed Geometry with Miss X, French with Mr. Y, and History with Dr. Z, then he either realizes that he has the problem, or goes further to reason that «all teachers are alike».

V. *Implication for Teaching and Social Influence*

A. *Defensive Learning*

A defense is a psychological commitment which produces a mistaken association between the purpose and the effects of the use of logic. That is, the purpose of logic is to establish valid procedures for the examination of propositions. If the individual learner or teacher has a defensive investment then the effects of logical use are directed toward establishing the «truth» of the proposition rather than the question of the valid ways of knowing about the issue. Consider the following example: In a class in Educational Psychology, students present the position that intelligence is unmeasurable, but that they can regard themselves as intelligent. If the instructor enters into a dialogue to try to show the ways in which intelligence may be measurable, several results ensue: One, compliance (student note-taking). Two, statements that the instructor's points are not relevant. Three, an abandonment of logical argument, and an emphasis on «feeling.» These effects are clear if we conceptualize the student's defensive commitment:

If I say I am intelligent
other cannot say that I am not
($p \supset q$)

For the instructor to deny the consequent, that is to show how intelligence is measurable, is to attempt dialectic reasoning when the learner has an investment in an ontological posi-

tion. In the example above, the students enter into affirming the antecedent, by arguing about the truth value of their own experiences. While this approach is just as valid as the former argument, the logical inflexibility in making transformations to the contrapositive form suggests an antidialectic process.

Further, the issue of intelligence is often an emotionally charged one. And the logical extension of the defense resembles the advance of projection from

$$\begin{array}{rcl} & & A\bar{A} = 0 \\ \text{to} & & Z_n A = 0 \\ \text{to} & & Z_n Y_n = 0 \end{array}$$

Where A = self

\bar{A} = non-self

Z_n = others who are not like the self

Y_n = all those *like the self*

From this logic, it is easy to see that the following position might arise:

If Y-type people say they are intelligent

Z-types cannot say that they are not.

(For Y and Z the reader may substitute: teachers and students; males or females; or under 30's and over 30's; or racial classes; or ethnic classes; etc...)

This position that someone «else» (Z) cannot make a judgment about a particular group's characteristics implies a cultural relativism. Notice that our demonstration here that this position may arise out of defensiveness is *not* to imply that the position of cultural relativism is incorrect. Nor is it to imply that that position can only be derived through an extension of a projective defense. It *is* to imply that when the defense is a commitment, the propositions become impervious to argument by *denial of the consequent*. In order for change of defensive commitment or social attitude to take place, the ontological contradiction in the defense needs to be made manifest: As has been stated, the ontological issue in projection is locus of occurrence and locus of causality:

Z's can make serious errors
Y's cannot (*)

The method of change would be for the teacher or influencing agent to accept these concept-categories and then proceed to explore them. If it's true that all Z's are the source of error, then there are Z_n people. The problem in the case of stereotypy is that different loci of occurrence (Z-types) are compatible with specificity of locus of causality. This is so because the different loci are «all the same»; they're all a «type.» The intervention available is to show one of two things:

1. that Z_n people, taken as individuals have Y characteristics
2. That Y people have Z characteristics

The latter would be easier to do. The point is that influencing a social stereotype is in two steps: One, talking about *self-related* people (that is people about whom the central negation is made) until their differences are seen. Two, turning then to the characteristics of others. If the second step does *not* work, then it is necessary to return to the self-involvement level (projection) of the defense. Once it is clear that Y's can make errors, then if many Z's, including those who have Y-characteristics can make errors, the negation of self as error-maker should begin to be changed.

At this point, the learner should become more free *not only* to consider logical transformations of a proposition about the measurability of intelligence, but he should be more accessible to learning concepts of reliability, correlation, etc., which would free him to assess empirical evidence. Similarly, if one were free to accept the counterposing arguments of one of Zeno's paradoxes of motion and location, one would be free to develop, say, on one hand a dynamic model and on the other a mechanical one. Within each, empirical data may be assessed.

B. *Defensive Teaching*

This analysis of defensive learning has to be unidimensional, since we are considering the nature of one defense, only. Another limitation of this paper is the concentration on defensive learning as an analysis of the learner's processes. There are, however, two ways in which to think about *defensive teaching*. One way is to subsume it under the considerations of the section on learning. That is, as well as the learner may assume «Y»-type and «Z»-type people, the teacher may also. The reason this is not spelled out in detail, is, that this conception of the teacher is of the teacher as learner. That is, with a defensive commitment the teacher becomes inaccessible to learning from student logic and data. Consider the teacher who has the defensive commitment:

If I know how intelligence is measurable
you (students) do not know.

(Let's refer to this as $p_t \supset q_t$ to differentiate it from the student's commitment $p \supset q$).

As on page 45 the student's commitment is

If I say (know) that I am intelligent (p)
others (teacher) cannot say I am not. (q)
($p \supset q$)

If students then argue with the teacher's statement by *denial of consequent*, (We (students) might know (q'_t)) the defensive teacher would find the contrapositive ($q'_t \supset p'_t$) hard to discuss.

The second way of looking at the defensive teacher is as someone who is committed to an antidialectic process in the teaching dialogue. That is, the teacher seeks to affirm p_t . P_t of course is the negative of $q^{(s)}$ (student's formulation) therefore operates from the student's point of view as *denial of the consequent*. The teacher is following his own defensive commitment and may be very puzzled at the class's inability to

grasp a logical transformation.

The purpose of this paper is to show that these processes can be specified formally. Further work with a symbolic notation so that it represents the *interaction* of the teacher and learner, would need to be done, and is beyond the scope of this paper.

V. Conclusion: Dynamic Epistemology

The ways of knowing are of course affected by developmental considerations. Pre-logical forms suggest that memory and language functions proceed by way of certain relationships between dependence on sensory input and types of conceptualization.

A complete psychological approach to epistemology, however, must take into account the motivational questions: How does the individual see himself relative to his wishes to know and not know about different aspects of his environment? Language and logic are structures wherein the rules of operation are specific and the behaviors predictable. An analysis of the language and logic of psychological defenses will show

1. the inner and outer experiences coded for knowledge and exploration
2. the accessibility of logical transformations and equivalencies to which the individual can bring his thinking
3. Areas of knowledge where dialectical thinking is likely to confuse *objects* and *schema*. That is, defenses are central psychological processes affecting the person's ability to separate meaning from logic. Access to logical transformations and to areas of meaning are therefore importantly affected to psychologically defensive commitments.

In summary, these effects may be known specifically in terms of the linguistic effects. Analysis of syntactic adjustments by the learner will indicate areas of knowledge in which meaning involves conflict and consequently inhibition of logical flexibility. Analysis of the dialectic process in a learner's thinking and teacher thinking yield knowable patterns which may be subject to symbolic notation. Such specification may produce

formally derived and testable ways of producing dynamic change in logical flexibility and accessibility to meaningful learning and knowing.

FOOTNOTES

(¹) Teacher-learner relations may be conceptualized more broadly as Source-Receiver relations. Social Psychologists have provided a variety of terms. The implications of this paper extend to theories of influence, information, and social interaction. From the point of view of clinical psychology, Therapist-Patient would be another set.

(²) A more complete «Table» describing other defensive mechanisms is described elsewhere (Fisher, 1973).

(³) Objects of prepositional phrases of place, e.g., «at his house,» «by his side,» «from her,» etc...

(⁴) In terms of an analysis of the defense in linguistic terms, this statement contains the psychologically central negation.

(⁵) That is the negative of a generalized version of q.

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