DIRECTIVES, OPTATIVES,
AND VALUE STATEMENTS.

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I.

1. This study is an attempt at a comparative analysis of directives, optatives, and value statements from the poin of view of the philosophy of language. The standpoint represented here is that there are certain general features of language independent of those of the particular languages and that there are such general features specific of the area of the statements in question. Our approach to the problem of these features will not be an a priori one, we shall pay strict attention to the facts of natural languages while making resort to some reconstructionist devices (¹). Vital syntactic-semantic problems will be involved here, but nevertheless, an important role has to be ascribed to the pragmatic analysis as a tool indispensable in dealing with statements of these particular kinds.

The view that there is some affinity between directives, optatives, and value statements is, as it seems, commonly accepted: they are said to belong together to the "practical discourse" as opposed to the theoretical (descriptive, indicative) one (²). There are manifold views as to what the similarities and differences between these kinds of statements consist in, attention being mostly paid to directives and value statements. These views, however, frequently lack preciseness or sufficient foundations. On the one hand, considerable differences between directives and value statements are sometimes underlined, on the other hand, there are views according to which these differences are only apparent, or else one is tending to prove that these statements are mutually reducible; in both

instances the demonstration is rather vague. There are also views according to which directives, or directives and value statements jointly, would belong to optatives ([3]). While it seems hardly possible, in the present state of investigations in this field, to deal successfully with all questions of importance emerging here, we shall try to shed light on some of them.

2. D i r e c t i v e s constitute a large group of statements discernible on the basis of their peculiar kind of meaning (the directive meaning) ([4]). To directives belong such statements as norms, commands (imperatives), rules, suggestions, wishes, advices, recommendations, instructions, and the like. We present symbolically their structure as:

(1). D (ut p) ([5]).

As to the content of the directive operator, D, the opinions differ. This is closely connected with the long-lasting discussion on the basic normative concepts, esp. in legal theory. Some authors see in obligation the only basic normative (directive) concept, and so maintain that 0 as positive duty, *0 (ut p)*, and as negative duty, *0 (ut — p)*, is the "(...) only one, irreducible, symbol for the directive element of norms (...)" ([6]). Other authors, however, maintain that "permission" is the second basic normative (directive) concept, especially as far as not the "weak permission" (the simple negation of obligation) but the "strong permission" is concerned "(...) an act is permitted in the strong sense if the authority has considered its normative status and decided to permit it...)" ([7]). This view is criticized, when one says that "strong permission" (right, claim, competence) is a concept serving the description of complex normative situations, definable in terms of obligation ([8]).

There were, in the past, strong tendencies either to stress the importance of the concept of right-permission (esp. in the natural law philosophy of XVII-XVIII centuries) or that of duty-obligation (e.g. in positivistic trends of legal theory), no doubt, under the impact of current ideologies ([9]). The compromise is reached in theories treating obligation and permission on a par (e.g., in Petrażycki's theory on the "imperative-attributive" character of law) ([10]). These various modes of thought

in which rather ambiguous notions of "permission" are involved, seem to be of some influence even nowadays ([11]), while we have, at the same time, a new interesting development in the problem of the basic normative (directive)concepts. An analogy between the notions of "some", "no", and "all" (quantifiers) and those of "possible", "impossible", and "necessary" (modal concepts) on the one side, and the normative (directive) concepts of "permission", "prohibition", and "obligation" (as positive duty) on the other side, was observed, leading up to attempts at building up systems of deontic logic on lines similar to those of modal logic ([12]). There is here a justification for having a triad of the basic normative (directive) concepts, symbolized by P, F, and O as subspecies of D. These concepts are conceived as standing on a par, and being interdefinable.

When examining this conception, however, we shall see considerable complications due to the fact of introducing this triad, with permission as one of the basic normative (directive) concepts. It is easy to see that we are not dealing with one, but with three concepts of permission which can be defined in the following way:

$$P_1 \overset{\text{df.}}{=} -O$$

$$P_2 \overset{\text{df.}}{=} -O-$$

$$P_3 \overset{\text{df.}}{=} -O.-O-$$

Now, the interdefinability of P, O, and F concepts through the respective schemas is by no means unproblematic: depending on the schema applied, we are reaching formulas which, while differing from one another, are awkward in some respects. This matter, however, cannot be dealt with in the present paper ([13]). When dealing only with O and F (O —) concepts ,we surely get rid of the difficulties mentioned above. It seems, however, profitable — for the sake of further considerations — to introduce also P_3.

As to such directive operators as W ("it is wished"), A ("it is advised.."), R ("it is recommended.."), S ("it is suggested.."), and the like, occurring in the respective types of directives,

they can surely be treated in analogy with the O operator ("it
is obligatory.."). W —, A —, R —, S — are corresponding then
to O — (F), and there is here also a possibility of applying P_3
(as — W . — W —, — A . — A —, etc.) as a "neutral". The in-
troducing of the counterparts of P_1 and P_2 would lead here —
apart from the complications mentioned above — to striking
ambiguities and strongly counterintuitive formulas ([14]). One
has to stress that directives called norms, rules and commands
(imperatives) in which the notion of obligation seems to play
a decisive role, are the only ones seriously analyzed in legal
theory, analytical ethics, in a general discipline being in the
stage of its formation — the theory (or philosophy) of norms,
and in the logic of norms, or imperatives. Other kinds of direc-
tives, mentioned above, are still in need of a special analytical
study ([15]).

The operators of the type D are connected with ut-clauses,
formulated in the subjunctive mood. This being our conception
of the structure of directives, it has to be stressed that they
can be reconstructed also in other various ways ([16]). It is rather
widely accepted now that directives are not statements in the
logical sense. A distinction is made between the direcive (most-
ly norm) and the deontic statement, the latter being said to
be, analogously to modal statements, statements in a logical
sense. Deontic statements in systems of their logic are now
prevailingly expressed by O_p, F_p, and P_p formulas, the opera-
tors being connected with that-clauses, formulated in the indi-
cative mood (p being a schematic sentence which expresses a
proposition) ([17]). These formulas will be of great interest to us
in further stages of this study.

3. Considerable attention is paid, mostly in analytical ethics,
to the v a l u e   s t a t e m e n t s. There is no need to
enumerate the manifold views on their semantic properties ([18]).
whereas the scarceness of findings in the field of logic of value
statements in comparison with deontic logic, logic of norms,
and conmmands (imperatives) has to be underlined ([19]). Now,
our interest is in the linguistic structure of value statements.
The kinds of evaluation being different in many respects in
various fields, the evaluative expressions will be conceived

here in a most general way as V_p (the concept of "positive value") and V_n (the concept of "negative value"). We introduce but provisionally the following formulas of value statements:

2a). S is V_p; S is V_n

2b). V_{pp}; V_{np}, to be read: V_p that p, V_n that p.

Evaluative expressions V_p, V_n appear either in the role of predicates, or that of operators. S, subject, expresses a name, and p in the that-clause is a schematic sentence which expresses a proposition. Among value concepts the value neutral, V_o, will be included too, just like P_3 among the D-concepts. One has to stress, however, the limits of the analogy between the V- and D-concepts, the question of the interdefinability of positive and negative value being controversial, which is not the case with their assumed directive counterparts, O and F. We define, then, V_o in the following ways

$$\text{In the type 2a), } V_o \overset{df.}{=} - (S \text{ is } V_p) \, . \, - (S \text{ is } V_n)$$

$$\text{In the type 2b), } V_o \overset{df.}{=} - V_p \, . \, - V_n$$

P_3 and its "evaluative counterpart", V_o, are many a time applied, for similar purposes, in the course of legal disputes, making resort to normative concepts, and in moral, or aesthetic disputes in which evaluative concepts are involved. P_3 is serving the description of a situation of some conduct being not ordered and not forbidden, belonging, then, to the "rechtsfreier Raum". [20]). Some conduct is not infrequently characterized as $- O . - O$ by a counsel, or in the official conclusion of the legal dispute. It is similarly with, e.g., a moral dispute in which, in the course of the exchange of opinions on the value of the object in question, one (or some) of the participants of the dispute would reach the conclusion that this object is "morally neutral", V_o, $- (S \text{ is } V_p) . - (S \text{ is } V_n)$, or $- V_p . V - V_n$ that p.

One has to mention further that in value statements the evaluative terms can be not only the "value-absolutes" (such as

"good", "bad", etc.) but also the "value-relatives" (such as "better", "worse", etc.). There is, however, perhaps also in this point an analogy to such directive expressions as: "It is suggested (advised, recommended, etc.) ut r a t h e r p_1 than p_2". In any case, we are faced with the problem of the logical relations between these evaluative terms. One can refer here to some proposals of defining "value-absolutes" in terms of "value-relatives", but the problem remains to a large extent unsolved ([21]).

Attention has also to be paid to the diversity of evaluative terms: they can hardly be exhausted by "the language of good" ([22]). (the term "good" itself being very ambiguous). They could be treated, perhaps, as types of V_p, V_n, and V_o, just as the operators of different kinds of directives were proposed to be treated as types of O, F, and P_3. In any case, one has to note that the diversity of evaluative terms is even greater than that of D-operators.

4. The optative statements were analysed but seldom ([23]); they were rather sometimes regarded as some sort of construction with the purpose of throwing light on the logical-semantic properties of directives (norms), and value statements. One has to underline, however, that "the optative" is by no means an artificial creation but a "natural", intuitively easily discernible kind of statements. For the symbolic presentation of optatives we adopt the formula of R. Carnap ([24]).

3). Utinam p.

There seems to be some affinity between this formula and that of the directive, while the formula of the value statement differs widely from these two. On the view of R. Carnap, however, directives and value statements are subspecies of optatives, that is to say, they are statements having the same general kind of optative meaning ([25]). This opinion will need a careful examination.

In the Utinam p formula, p is a sentence in the subjunctive, and not in the indicative mood, as connected with the word "utinam". It does not express, then, a proposition, and cannot be substituted by descriptives statements (with cognitive meaning).

As to the formulations of optatives in the ordinary language one has to stress that a distinct word being a counterpart of "utinam", is available in some languages only (as, e.g., in Polish: "oby"). In many other languages some verbal forms are in use (e.g., in English: "may it..", and the like, and similarly in German). Such directives, as the statements of wish and of command (imperatives) seem to be particularly close to optatives, and the relations of these three kinds of statements are of considerable interest ([26]).

5. Our comparative analysis of directives, value statements and optatives, will start with the question of what can be the theme ([27]) of the respective statements. As to directives, their theme can be human conduct only, as to optatives — human conduct or happenings (the latter term standing for states of affairs not produced by conscious human behaviour) ([28]); as to value statements, their theme can be "everything": human conduct, happening, or thing ([29]). Human conduct and happenings are presented by means of ut-, utinam-, and that-clauses, the first two clauses containing sentences in the subjunctive mood, and the third — sentences expressing propositions. Things are presented by means of names (proper). Ut-clauses are connected with D-operators, that-clauses with V-operators, and names with V-predicates. And so, an example for the directive can be the following:

4). It is obligatory ut the owner would register his car.

The directive is composed of the operator (here O), and the ut-clause, its theme being human conduct.
The examples for optatives will be:

5). May the debtor pay his debt in due time ,transcribed in:
5a). Utinam would the debtor pay his debt in due time.
6). May it be fine weather tomorrow, transcribed in:
6a). Utinam the weather would be fine tomorrow.

The optative has the form of an utinam-clause, its theme being hunman conduct or happening.
The examples for value statements will be:

7). It is good that John takes care of his mother.

8). It is good that you came to visit us.

9). Our teacher is good.

The value statement is composed either of the V-operator and the that-clause which contains a sentence expressing proposition (about human conduct, or happening), or of the name of a thing connected with the V-predicate.

In this way — apart from linguistic-structural differences — some sort of gradation of directives, optatives, and value statements is shown as far as the range of their themes is concerned, this range being the widest in value statements and the narrowest in directives.

6. The next problem is that of the way of presenting objects constituting the themes of directives, optatives, and value statements. Here the similarity of directives and optatives has to be noted.

The sentences contained in ut- and utinam-clauses do not express propositions (about human conduct in the first, about human conduct or happening in the second instance). It is shown by the subjunctive mood of the sentences in question, this mood being syntactically determined by the words ut and utinam. The meaning of the ut- and utinam-clauses can be provisionally characterized as "purposive-prospective" ([30]).

Apart from the affinity of these clauses one has to pay attention to the differences in meaning between *D(ut p)* and *Utinam p* compounds. Here the component preceding ut in directives seems to be of importance.

Value statements, as shown by the examples above, differ from directives and optatives in the aspects considered. In any case, names as means of presenting the objects do not occur in directives and optatives. Claiming it by some authors to be the case in directives seems open to serious doubt ([31]). The sentences contained in that-clauses are in the indicative, and not in the subjunctive mood; they express propositions, and so there is a difference in the way of presentation of human conduct and happenings between value statements on the one side, and directives and optatives on the other side.

The common trait of the way of presenting of all three categories of objects in value statements is that these objects are presented in a way expressing the thought of their reality. The name (proper) presents a thing conceived as real, the propositions consist in thoughts of the given conduct resp. happening being the case ([32]).

7. Value statements considered above seem to form a part of indicative discourse. Those about things can be said to constitute some sort of (categoric) descriptive statements, describing really existing objects in a peculiar way. Those about human conduct and happenings are akin to modal statements, and to the deontic ones ([33]). They differ in many respects from directives and optatives. One has to consider, however, if there exist only value statements of the types characterized above. As to the value statements about things, we certainly cannot find any other kind of them. These value statements have always the form of indicative sentences, the meaning of which seems to be an "evaluative description" of things conceived as real. It is different, however, with value statements about human conduct and happenings. Let us start with examples of value statements about human conduct:

10). Dulce et decorum est pro patria mori.
10a). The dying for one's own country is "sweet and honest" (good).
11). It is good to help the father in his work.
11a). Helping the father in his work is good.

Such statements can be characterized as "maximes", and are ambiguous. They can be (a) interpreted as:

10b). If one dies (people die) for his (their) own country, one behaves (they behave) well.
11b). If one helps (children help) the father in his work, one behaves (they behave) well.

In this interpretation the statements in question do not transcend the scope of the simple indicative discourse.
The statements 10), 10a), 11), 11a) can be however, also interpreted (b) as:

10c). If one would die (people would die) for his (their) own country, one (they) would behave well.

11c). If one (children) would help the father in his work, one (they) would behave well.

Here it is controversial whether the statements in question can be reduced to the simple indicative discourse, that is to say, if they can be substituted by truth-functional statements serving the same purposes ([34]), or else, if in the analysis of 10c) and 11c) one has to introduce modal concepts. We are, however, especially interested in the third possible interpretation (c), which is the following:

10d). It is (would be) good ut one (people) would die for his (their) own country.

11d). It is (would be) good ut one (children) would help the father in his work.
Such formulations of value statements occur quite frequently in ordinary language, e.g.:

12). It would be good that (ut) John would visit his brother in the hospital.

13). It would be good that (ut) you would learn systematically ([35]).

It is rather striking that the formulations 10d) and 11d), and also 12) and 13), very much resemble the formulations of directives, e.g., 4): It is obligatory ut the owner would register his car; and again, 4) is expressible, like 10d) and 11d), in two other forms, corresponding to 10), 10a), 11), and 11a):

4a). It is obligatory (for the owner) to register the car (the "infinitive" form).

4b). The registering of the car by the owner is obligatory (the "adjective-evaluative", predicative form) ([36]).

These analogies seem to be quite interesting, but before we shall try to draw some conclusions about them, we shall consider, in a similar way, the value statements about happenings. The type of value statements about happenings, discussed

above, was illustrated by the example 8). Another type, how-
ever, is also possible:

14). It is good that (ut) George would be healthy.

15). It is good that (ut) the peace in the world would be the
case.

16). It is (would be) good that (ut) A would get the Nobel
prize.

17). It is (would be) good that (ut) it would be not raining
tomorrow.

These ut-value statements, similarly as 10d) and 11d), and un-
like 7) and 8), seem to be syntactically and semantically in
some affinity with directives and/or optatives. For brevity's
sake we do not consider here the alternative formulations
and their ambiguities, parallel to those of value statements
about human conduct.

8. One further aspect of the matter has to be considered
here. Into the category of "happenings" as themes of value
statements are included both such states of affairs as "being
healthy" and such as "the peace in the world being the case",
"not raining being the case", etc. Now, the happenings of the
first type are states of specific (or all) persons (these states
being independent of their conscious actions). The happenings
of the second type do not seem to be the states of specific (or
all) persons, but to be simply some "extrapersonal" states of
affairs. The latter holds true, however, only as far as descrip-
tion is concerned; it is differently in the area of evaluation. In
evaluation the happenings of the second type are also con-
ceived as states of specific (or all) persons, just like hap-
penings of the first type. The formulations in use create only
an illusion that the happenings in question are "extrapersonal"
states of affairs. "It would be good ut it would be not raining
tomorrow" means in fact: "It would be good ut one (we, I, etc.)
would have no rain tomorrow", and "It would be good ut the
peace in the world would be the case" amounts to: "It would
be good ut one (we, people, etc.) would have peace in the
world". The happenings, then, as themes of value statements,

are "subjective happenings", happenings to people, and not "objective happenings" beyond people.

9. In the preceding analysis we have restricted ourselves to statements with V_p operator (in the version of "good"). We did so because our object was not the study of the varieties of evaluative operators but the problem if there is any group of value statements akin to directives ,resp. optatives. The scope of statements subjected to analysis was sufficient for the latter purpose. We have reached the conclusion that value statements about human conduct, and those about happenings, can be not only of the structure V *that p,* but also V *(ut p).*

In the *ut p* clause, we do not deal with a "propositional" p, as it is the case in the *that p* clause. The *ut p* clause, formulated in the subjunctive mood, has a "purposive-prospective" meaning; it is so in V *(ut p)* compounds, just like in D*(ut p)* and *Utinam p* compounds.

In the formulations of value statements about human conduct and those about happenings (which are, as shown, frequently ambiguous), one can discover two kinds of value statements: value statements about objects (human conduct or happenings) thought of as being the case, these value statements being in their syntactic form indicative, and containing a "propositional" p; and value statements about objects (human conduct or happenings) thought of in a "purposive-prospective" way, these value statements being in their syntactic form subjunctive, and semantically close to directives, resp. optatives. The problem of the relations between these value statements and directive and optative statements has to be considered below, II.

10. Failure to distinguish between these two kinds of value statements leads up to the already mentioned (1) rather superficial views on the relation between value statements and directives resp. optatives. It is surely mistaken to say that all value statements are "veiled imperatives" (directives, norms), or that all value statements, together with directives, belong to the statements with optative meaning, or else, that all value statements differ syntactically-semantically to the same extent from directives (resp. optatives).

In the light of the preceding analysis it seems quite unjusti-
fied to say that the value statements of the first group consti-
tute some kind of directives, or optatives, while it certainly is
worth considering as far as the value statements of the second
group are concerned. The value statements of the first group
will be termed v a l u e   s t a t e m e n t s   p r o p e r, and those
of the second group q u a s i - v a l u e   s t a t e m e n t s. It is
easily understood why, without making this distinction, the
authors who principally had in mind quasi-value statements,
could form a general view on value statements as "veiled"
imperatives, directives, or optatives. And again, the authors
who principally had in mind value statements proper, were
inclined to accentuate considerable syntactic and semantic
differences between value statements (in toto), and directi-
ves ([37]).

11. In the literature a difference is made between the
"categoric" value statements, and the "instrumental" ones: in
the "categoric" value statements some object is qualified as
being V "for its own sake", while in the "instrumental" ones
it is qualified so as means to an end ([38]). One could prima facie
adopt the view that our value statements proper ("that-value
statements") coincide with the "categoric" ones, while quasi-
value statements coincide with the "instrumental" ones. The
that- and ut-clauses, however, can only superficially seem to
be decisive of the character of a value statement as either
"categoric", or "instrumental". The latter distinction is based
on the content of V (operator), and not on the content of the
that- resp. ut-clause, while on the content of the latter the dis-
tinction of value statements proper and quasi-value statements
is based.

Let us take, for instance, 10d) which is an example for
quasi-value statement: "It is (would be) good ut one (people)
would die for his (their) own country"; here evidently "good"
amounts to, or at least can amount to, "good for its own sake".
And let us take, e.g., such value statement proper as: "It is
good that the owner of the car registers it"; here evidently
"good" can be "categoric" (the registering of the car is the
right thing to do), but also "instrumental" (the registering of

the car is good as means to avoid negative sanction). And so, both value statements proper and quasi-value statements can either be "categoric", or "instrumental", depending on the content of the V-operator. "Categoric" quasi-value statements are akin to "categoric" directives resp. optatives, while "instrumental" quasi-value statements are akin to teleological directives resp. optatives ([39]).

II

12. As was demonstrated above, quasi-value statements have some syntactic and semantic traits in common with directives and optatives. The affinities of these three kinds of statements have now to be considered more thoroughly. In order to do so it is necessary to make first a comparison of the directive meaning with the optative meaning, this problem being not sufficiently cleared yet in the literature.

While descriptive statements refer to the extralinguistic reality (stating that something is the case), directives and optatives express "purposive-prospective" thoughts of this reality. Descriptives statements, directives and optatives can have common themes (human conduct ,happenings), can pertain to the same objects, but only in the first instance this "pertaining" amounts to "referring" by way of giving an account of a portion of the extralinguistic reality, or, let us say, reproducing it. In the two latter instances this "pertaining" amounts to declaring oneself for something to occur, for some state of affairs to happen, or to be produced. This is sometimes also called "referring", a distinction then being made between "strictly referring" and other ways of referring ([40]). This, however, is a dubious terminology, since directives and optatives are evidently non-extensional statements as far as extralinguistic reality is concerned. The relation of "referring to" (such as between descriptive statements and extralinguistic reality) can, however, be said to occur in the case of directives and optatives, "internally", that is to say, the statements of

this sort refer to verbal acts created by the very formulation of such statements (which can be roughly said to be "self-referring") ([41]). In order to avoid possible misunderstandings we are going to explain briefly what sort of meaning is — in our opinion — the directive and optative one, as contrasted with cognitive meaning.

It seems unjustified to adopt the view that the directive and the optative meaning consist in some relation of the statement to (extralinguistic) reality which is quite different from the relation called "cognitive meaning". One cannot say, then, that while the cognitive meaning consists in something (in the extralinguistic reality) being conceived as being the case, the directive and the optative meaning consist in something (in the said reality) being conceived as "obligatory", "wished", and the like. There is only one meaning-relation of language to reality (as the model of language), and this relation consists (as far as statements are concerned) in something being conceived as being the case. When adopting the different view, outlined above, one speaks, in fact, about "meaning" in various meanings. In other words, any meaning is "cognitive", and it would be proper to speak rather about "meaning" in short, and not about "cognitive meaning" which already suggests that there are other kinds of meaning. The kinds of meaning cannot be discerned on the basis of the ways of "reference" of various sorts of statements to reality but only with respect to what sort of reality they refer to ("strictly", "cognitively"). It has to be stressed that both directive and optative meaning, if the quality of meaning is seriously attributed to them, consist in the same sort of relation of the statement to reality as in the so-called cognitive meaning, the difference being only in the sort of reality "meant". In the case discussed here it is the reality of verbal acts. These acts can be differentiated into some types ([42]) having distinct traits which would constitute the basis for distinguishing the respective kinds of meaning.

13. Already prima facie one can say that the directive and optative verbal acts have some affinity. This affinity can be roughly said to consist in acts of both these categories being acts of desiring that (ut) something would happen (be the case).

There is, however, a difference between these acts. Directives are verbal acts of aiming at influencing human conduct, while optatives are verbal acts of "wishing" that (ut) something would happen (be the case). A necessary element of the acts of the first type is the determining of the relation: the directivegiver — the addressee ([43]). The state of affairs the former is aiming at attaining is to be attained by the conduct of the latter according to the directivegiver's will (intention), expressed in the directive act. The optative act does not determine the directive relation between the speaker and the hearer; it is an act without an addresse, an act expressing simply the wish that (ut) something would happen (be the case). This act does not contain, as an element, the determining of the way of attaining the wished state of affairs: the expressed desire that (ut) some state of affairs would be the case is not directed volitionally on the conduct of a person (some persons) which would contribute to the attaining of this state of affairs according to the will of the speaker. This can explain that while the theme of directive can only be human behaviour (as apt to be directed), the theme of the optative can be both human conduct (which can be aimed at directing, but which can also be wished without aiming at directing it), and happenings (which cannot be directed at all, but can only be wished).

14. Just in the cases in which the themes of optatives are happenings, the boundaries between the optative and directive acts are distinct and clear. When, however, the themes of optatives are ways of human conduct, there can be many instances in which it is not easy to distinguish the optative from the directive acts. When, e.g., the mother being ill speaks about her absent son William: "May he come home today!", in this optative form a directive can be contained — not for William, but for somebody else (if somebody is present) — that (ut) he would contribute to William's coming home today (if, e.g., there is still enough time to arrange for it). It is plain that in the instances of this sort the discerning of the acts in question is possible only when taking into account the situational context of the utterance.

The boundaries between the directive and optative acts are particularly indistinct in the case of commands (imperatives), and wishes (⁴⁴). In the first instance it is to a great extent so because of the syntactic form of the imperative mood occurring both in optatives, and in directives called commands (imperatives). In the second instance one can surely discern, many a time, wishes which establish the relation: directive-giver — addressee, from wishes which do not determine such relation, but the ambiguity of the expression: "I wish...", or "It is wished..." plays here a considerable role. The utterance: "Let there be no war!" will be normally an optative act, but even this utterance, in the mouth of a powerful ruler, addressing it to his generals waging the war, can be a directive act. It is similarly with the wish: "I wish that he would break his neck", which would be normally an optative act, but can be a directive act when uttered by the boss of a gang to the subordinates.

15. In the face of these difficulties the distinguishing of optatives from directives can be accomplished only by means of elaborating standard models (or idealizations) of the directive and optative acts.

We remind that the formula of the optative is: *Utinam p,* and the formula of the directive: *D(ut p). In* the optative, p can be either h (when the theme of the optative is a happening), or c (when the theme of the optative is some human conduct). There are, then, two kinds of optatives: *Utinam h,* and *Utinam c.* As to h, it has to be interpreted as "happening to somebody", as the state of the determined person (s), analogously as in the case of value statements about happenings (comp. 1.8). The happening is here again not an "objective", but a "subjective" one, as desired for somebody. That is why the optative formula: *Utinam h,* has to be developed into: *Utinam h would happen to S.* Let us introduce some examples:

6). May it be fine weather tomorrow (Utinam tomorrow the weather would be fine), transcribed into:

6b) May we have fine weather tomorrow (Utinam we would have fine weather tomorrow), transcribed into:

6c). May tomorrow fine weather happen to us (Utinam to-
morrow fine weather would happen to us).

18). May Harry win the bet (Utinam would Harry win the
bet), transcribed into:

18a). May the winning of the bet happen to Harry (Utinam
the winning of the bet would happen to Harry).

As to the formula: *Utinam c*, c has to be made precise, evi-
dently, as the conduct of some determined person (s), and so
the respective optative will be formulated as: *Utinam S would
do c*. The example could be:

5). May the debtor pay his debt in due time (Utinam would
the debtor pay his debt in due time).

In the case of the directive we have one formula only: *D (ut
c)*. It stands in a close affinity with the optative: *Utinam S
would do c*, and one has to consider what the difference be-
tween these two consists in; c in the directive is also the con-
duct of the determined person (s), but, while the optative: *Uti-
nam S would do c*, is not addressed to the determined person
(s) that (ut) they would behave in a certain way, the directive
D (ut c) is addressed so. The addressing is determined in the
directive by its component D, the operator. This component
specifies the person (s) S as the addressee (s), A. A is an S
obliged (forbidden, advised, etc.) to behave c. Various kinds
of D-operators determine the types of addressing S, of mak-
ing him an A (of manifold types) (45). Hence the directive has
to be formulated as: *It is directed (D) ut A would do c*, e.g:

4). It is obligatory that (ut) the owner would register his car.

There is, however, a possibility of the directive act being for-
mulated as an apparent optative. The Utinam-clause by itself
is not an addressing one, but, when an element of explicitly
addressing some person (s) is additionally contained in it, then
the optative is in fact a (veiled) directive, *Utinam A_e (person)
(s) (explicitly addressed) would do c*. This is the case, in the
ordinary language with "personal optatives", amounting most-
ly to personal, concrete — individual commands (imperatives),
requests, and wishes, e.g:

19). May you go with me to the cinema (Utinam you would go with me to the cinema).

We repeat the formulas:

O p t a t i v e s :	Utinam h would happen to S.
	Utinam S would do c.
D i r e c t i v e s :	Utinam A_e would do c.
	It is directed (D) ut A would do c.

Optatives and directives are, then, two different **kinds of** verbal acts, the first of them expressing a simple desire that something would happen (to somebody), or be done (by some-body), and the second of them expressing the directive giver's will that something would be done by the person (s) addressed by him. This difference between the optative and directive was made clear by way of elaborating models of the respective acts. These models seem to pay due respect to the intuitions of ordinary language while attempting at its reconstruction. The optative and directive acts have also something in com-mon. Their common feature is that the acts of both kinds are those of expressing wish (desire) that a given state of affairs would be the case. Both kinds of acts are, then, with **respect** to the given states of affairs, "purposive-prospective", **this** finding its expression in the *ut p*, and *Utinam p* clauses being applied in these verbal acts. Directive and optative statements, as referring to verbal acts ("self-referring"), differ in meaning from statements referring to extralinguistic reality.

16. Now the relation of quasi-value statements to directives and optatives has to be considered. For quasi-value statements we have adopted the formula: *V (ut p)*. The theme of the quasi-value statement can be, just as in the case of optatives, a happening, or human conduct. In the first instance we **make** *V (ut p)* precise, formulating it as: *V ut h would happen to S.* The examples (using V_p, V_n and V_o will be introduced below) can be:

16a). It is (would be) good (V_p) that (ut) getting of the Nobel prize would happen to A.

17a). It is (would be) good (V_p) that (ut) not raining tomor-
row would happen to us.

In the case of quasi-value statements about happenings there
is hardly any difference between them, and the optatives. In
16a) and 17a), V_p can be substituted by Utinam:

16b). Utinam getting of the Nobel prize would happen to A.
17b). Utinam the not raining tomorrow would happen to us.

Quasi-value statements of this sort are veiled optatives, veiled,
as formulated in terms of values.
In the second instance, that of quasi-value statements about
human conduct, the matter is not so simple. V *(ut c)* by itself
is not an addressing expression, just like *Utinam c*. V *(ut p)*
developed into: V *ut S would do c*, amounts to a veiled opta-
tive:

20). It is (would be) good (V_p) that (ut) people would behave
kindly to each other.
20a). Utinam people would behave kindly to each other.

V *(ut c)* can, however, contain also an additional element of
explicitly addressing, and then, developed into: V *ut A_e would
do c*, will amount to a veiled directive *(D ut A would do c,
Utinam A_e would do c)*. In the ordinary language, this element
of explicitly addressing is — analogously as in the case of
optatives — most easily found in personal, concrete-individual
quasi-value statements about human conduct, and those
amounting mostly to such "weaker" kinds of directives, as
advice, suggestions, and the like:

21). It is (would be) good (V_p) that (ut) you would do the
shopping for your mother.
21a). Utinam you would do the shopping for your mother.
21b). It is suggested ut you would do the shopping for your
mother.

We have, then, the following relations between quasi-value
statements on the one, and directives and optatives on the
other side:

a). *V ut h would happen to S* corresponds, as a veiled optative, to: *Utinam h would happen to S.*

b). *V ut S would do c* corresponds, as a veiled optative, to: *Utinam S would do c.*

c). *V ut A$_e$ would do c* corresponds, as a veiled directive, to: *Utinam A$_e$ would do c,* and to *D ut A would do c.*

Our analysis can be supplemented now by introducing the V_n-concept. Quasi-value statement about happening would be, then: *V_n ut h would happen to S,* e.g:

22). It is (would be) bad (V_n) that (ut) Peter's father would die.

22a). Utinam Peter's father would not die.

And so, V_n quasi-value statements about happenings are veiled *Utinam not* optatives *(Utinam h would not happen to S).*
V_n quasi-value statements about human conduct can be a): *V_n ut S would do c,* and so veiled optatives, *Utinam S would not do c,* e.g:

23). It is (would be) bad (V_n) that (ut) Martin would drink too much.

23a). Utinam Martin would not drink too much.

V_n quasi-value statements about human conduct can also be b): *V_n ut A$_e$ would do c,* and so veiled directives, *Utinam A$_e$ would not do c, F ut A would do c.* As mentioned already, we deal here as a rule with the "weaker" kinds of directives, e.g:

24). It is (would be) bad (V_n) that (ut) you would neglect your secretarial work in my office.

24a). Utinam you would not neglect your secretarial work in my office.

24b). It is advised that (ut) you would not neglect your secretarial work in my office.

18). Let us now try to introduce also the V_o-concept, defined as: — V_p . — V_n.
V_o quasi-value statement about happening would be, then: — V_p *and* — V_n *ut h would happen to S,* e.g:

25). It is (would be) not good ($-V_p$) and it is (would be) not bad ($-V_n$) that (ut) I would not get the invitation.

$-V_p$. $-V_n$ corresponds here to: $-$ Utinam . $-$ Utinam $-$.

25a). Not utinam and not utinam not I would get the invitation.

$-$ Utinam . $-$ Utinam is an "optative point zero" (indifference), and so $-V_p$. $-V_n$ quasi-value statements about happenings are veiled "optative point zero" statements.
V_o quasi-value statements about human conduct would be, then, a). $-V_p$. $-V_n$ ut S *would do c*, and so again "optative point zero" statements, e.g:

26). It is (would be) not good ($-V_p$) and it is (would be) not bad ($-V_n$) that (ut) he would read this book.
26a). Not utinam and not utinam not he would read this book.

V_p quasi-value statements about human conduct can also be b): $-V_p$. $-V_n$ ut A_e *would do c*, e.g.:

27). It is (would be) not good ($-V_p$) and it is (would be) not bad ($-V_n$) that (ut) you would do this extra work in my office.

The statements of this type are veiled P_3 D-statements ("directives point zero"), those of directive indifference, *Not utinam and not utinam not A_e would do c*, $-O$. $-F$ *ut A would do c* (with "weaker" counterparts of O and F):

27a). Not utinam and not utinam not you would to this extra work in my office.
27b). It is not suggested that (ut) you would, and it is not suggested that (ut) you would not do this extra work in my office.

An important difference between optatives and directives "point zero" is to be noted here: in the latter we are dealing, namely, with the establishing of the relation: directive giver-addressee, which in the former is lacking. Because of this rela-

tion, by his verbal act of the type — O . — F the directive giver puts himself under the obligation to qualify the conduct c of the addressee, if this conduct is the case ,neither as fulfilling of duty, nor as not-fulfilling of it, and, correspondingly, not to draw the consequences attached (sometimes) to the fulfilment resp. not-fulfilment of duty (this being very essential, e.g., in law) ([46]).

19. The preceding analysis shows, then, that the expressions of the general kind V *(ut p)* are either veiled optatives, or veiled directives. Hence our proposal to call them quasi-**value** statements as opposed to value statements proper of the type V *that p*. Now one has to realize that the directive operator, D, just like the value operator ,V, can be connected not only with an ut-clause but also with a that-clause (its theme being human conduct). One can refer here, firstly, to such statements formulated in the ordinary language as:

4a). It is obligatory that (it is the case that) the owner registers his car.

28). It is forbidden that (it is the case that) one kills a man.

29). It is permitted (P₃) that (it is the case that) one gets married.

One can refer here, secondly, to the formula of the deontic statement. D *that p,* nowadays pretty commonly accepted in deontic logic.

In that-clauses, "the registering of the car by its owner", "the killing of a man", and "getting married", are conceived as being the case, while in ut-clauses they are conceived in a manner of "ut would be the case". While in the statements of the type D *(ut p)* one is stating that it is obligatory (forbidden, permitted) ut something would be done, in the statements of the type D *that p* one is stating that what is actually done is obligatory, forbidden, or permitted. One can say that the structure D *that p* does not render a proper analysis of the directive, or even of the deontic statement ([47]). The directive act is not one of directing conduct which is actually the case, and the statement (deontic) does not give an account of the conduct being actually the case being directed. One can say that sta-

tements of the type *D that p* are "directively inconsistent". One can find, however, such an interpretation of *D that p* statements according to which they are consistent (though neither directive, nor deontic) statements:

4b). The owner registers his car, this being such a conduct as it is obligatory ut it would be.

28a). One kills a man, this being such a conduct as it is forbidden ut it would be.

29a). One gets married, this being such a conduct as it is permitted ut it would be.

28a) can be formulated as:

28b). One kills a man, this being such a conduct as it is obligatory ut it would not be.

29a) can be formulated as:

29b). One gets married, this being such a conduct as it is not obligatory ut it would be and it is not obligatory ut it would not be.

One can reconstruct the above statements in the following way:

4c). It is in accordance with the obligation of the owner ut he would register his car that he registers his car.

28c). It is in disaccordance with his obligation ut he would not kill a man that one kills a man.

29c). It is in accordance with his being not obliged ut he would get married and being not obliged ut he would not get married that one gets married.

On this analysis, we do not deal here with statements directing the conduct, or with those giving an account of a conduct being directed, but with those stating that a conduct taking place is in accordance with duty, in disaccordance with duty, or in accordance with P_3, resp. with those stating that a conduct taking place is in accordance with what is stated about a duty, in disaccordance with what is stated about a duty, or in accordance with what is stated about a P_3. It turns out that we

do not deal in the respective statements with D-operators, but with some different ones. Before making an attempt at explaining the character of these operators, let us consider the optatives along the same lines. The *Utinam p* formula can be also interpreted as *Utinam that p*, p being here a schematic sentence expressing proposition, e.g:

18b). Utinam (it is the case that) the winning of the bet happens to Harry.

5b). Utinam (it is the case that) the debtor pays his debt in due time.

23b). Not utinam (it is the case that) Martin drinks too much.

25b). Not utinam and not utinam not (it is the case that) I get the invitation.

These statements are "optatively inconsistent". The optative act is not one of expressing wish that it would be the case what is actually the case. The "prospective" aversion, resp. indifference, cannot also be identified with a "retrospective" one. We can, however, adopt the following interpretation of 18b), 5b), 23b) and 25b):

18c). The winning of the bet happens to Harry this being such a happening as utinam it would be.

5c). The debtor pays his debt in due time this being such a conduct as utinam it would be.

23c). Martin drinks too much this being such a conduct as utinam it would not be.

25c). I get the invitation this being such a happening as not utinam it would be and not utinam it would not be.

One can reconstruct the above statements in the following way:

18d). It is in accordance with utinam the winning of the bet would happen to Harry that the winning of the bet happens to Harry.

5d). It is in accordance with utinam the debtor would pay his debt in due time that the debtor pays his debt in due time.

23d). It is in disaccordance with utinam Martin would not drink too much that Martin drinks too much.

25d). It is in accordance with not utinam I would get the invitation and not utinam I would not get the invitation that I get the invitation.

Again, we do not deal here with the optatives proper. To sum up, the statements discussed above are some "quasi-directive" and "quasi-optative" ones. It is worth to note that, while statements of the type $V \, ut \, p$ turned out to be quasi-value statements (and, in fact, optatives resp. directives in a veiled form), statements of the types D *that p*, and *Utinam that p* turned out not to be genuine directives, and optatives. They somehow resemble V *that p* statements (value statements proper), but it would be premature — in this stage of our considerations — to say something more definite about it.

20). The statements discussed in 19 above are those stating the accordance or disaccordance of a conduct resp. a happening with a directive resp. an optative (directives and optatives "point zero" included). In other terms, these statements are those stating that some conduct resp. happening "fulfils" a directive resp. an optative, or not ([48]).

Directives and optatives are themselves statements of some particular kinds. One could say, then, that the statements characterized above are those about the fulfilment non-fulfilment relation between directive resp. optative statements and some empiric facts (conduct, happening) ([49]). Now, the problem of fulfilment/non-fulfilment of the descriptive statements by empiric facts is one well known in semantics as the problem of the truth/falsity relation between the statement and the state of affairs the former is referring to. But there is surely no such relation (semantic relation of fulfilment, SF, and that of non-fulfilment, S-F) between the directive and optative statements and the conduct resp. happening being actually the case. Directives and optatives do not state that such states of affairs are the case, but that they ut (utinam) would be the case. SF/S-F of directive and optative statements by the said states of affairs (conduct, happening) could be established only if there would exist "ut would be" (directive) and "utinam would be" (optative) states of affairs, apt to S-fulfil the state-

ments in question. However, the existence of such states of affairs, besides the empiric ones, can hardly be accepted ([50]).

One has now to refer to what was said in II, 12 above about the directive and optative meaning. It surely cannot be claimed that the directive and optative statements refer to conduct and happening as empiric facts, that is to say, to extralinguistic reality. We can find, however, an SF-relation between the directive, resp. optative statement, and the directive, resp. optative verbal act to which the former is referring, this act coming into existence by the very formulation of the directive, resp. optative statement ([51]). The formulation of a directive, resp. en optative statement, amounts to the creation of a directive, resp. an optative act. That is why we were speaking roughly about "self-reference" in the case of directives and optatives. Putting it more precisely, there is an SF-relation between statement and act here, this act being expressed by the statement by virtue of the latter being formulated in such and such way.

But surely, there is common sense in saying that a given conduct resp. happening, actually taking place, "fulfils" (or does not "fulfil") a directive resp. an optative. We deal here evidently, however, with quite another sort of "fulfilment"/ "non-fulfilment" than SF/S-F. One is not speaking, in this instance, about the relation between the statement as a syntactic-semantic entity, and an empiric fact. One is speaking here about the relation of two empiric facts: directive verbal act-conduct, or optative verbal act-conduct, resp. happening.

It is by no means necessarily a "strong", causal relation, definable, e.g., in the stimulus-response terms. With this "strong" relation we can deal only, but we do not deal always, between directive act and conduct. We mean by that both the instances of the "positive responses", motivated by directive acts, and the instances of those "negative responses" in which the directive acts were factors — though not "successful" ones in the motivational processes of the addressees. But surely, there are also instances in which the conduct "fulfilling" or "not-fulfilling" the directive act is by no means motivated by the latter ([52]). In the case of the optative act, we do not deal

with this "strong" relation at all: that what "fulfils" or "does
not fulfil" the optative act occurs independently of it. What-
ever the motives of the addressee would be, his conduct can
be said either one "fulfilling", or one "not-fulfilling" the direc-
tive act. And also, by simply confronting the optative act and
a given conduct, resp. happening, one can say that the latter
"fulfils" the former, or not.

21. The relation of "fulfilling"/"not-fulfilling" of the said
verbal acts by other empiric facts (conduct, happening) is not
the SF/S-F relation as characterized above, but the PF/P-F
relation, that of pragmatic fulfilment/non-fulfilment.

One has to note some interesting differences between SF/S-F
and PF/P-F relations. Leaving out of account the complex pro-
blems of verifiability of empiric statements ([53]), one can say
that their SF/S-F is a «total» one: such statement is either
S-fulfilled (true) or not (false). The PF/P-F can be surely a
"total" one, in the case of concrete-individual directives and
optatives ,but it is only a "partial" one in the case of abstract-
general directives and optatives which are always open to
further, unforseen as to their number, possibilities of their
being P-fulfilled or not. The PF/P-F is always treated as one
in concrete instance. While it is evident with concrete-indivi-
dual directives and optatives, it holds also true for the abstract-
general ones. As far as the latter are concerned, one is always
considering some concrete conduct, or happening, as being
in accordance resp. disaccordance with one (or some) of them.
It is quite another matter that ex post, for different purposes,
the number of the cases of PF and P-F is being counted (as,
e.g., in criminal statistics) ([54]). The SF/S-F of empiric statements
(and statements in a logical sense in general) amounts simply to
their being true or false statements; in the latter case they will
be surely abandoned for cognitive reasons, while it would be
surely unjustified to claim that they do not fulfil the condi-
tions of being accepted as statements in a logical sense ([55]).
The PF/P-F does not alter anything in the semantic features of
the directive and optative statements: whether P-fulfilled or
not, they retain their character of statements having directive

resp. optative meaning, as fulfilling the conditions of being accepted as directive and optative statements.

Pragmatically, however, both PF and P-F directive and optative acts amounts to their being "abandoned" (to their "extinguishing") as far as the concrete cases of their PF and P-F are concerned. And so, both PF and P-F of a concrete-individual directive resp. optative act amounts to its total pragmatic "extinguishing". When we are dealing, however, with an abstract-general directive resp. optative act, both its PF and P-F in a concrete case does not amount to such directive or optative act being pragmatically "abandoned" (or, in other words, to its "extinguishing") as far as their potentialities to be P-fulfilled, or not, in other cases possible to occur are concerned.

22. The statements of the types *D that p* and *Utinam that p* are, then, on our interpretation, PF/P-F relational statements. Such statements, especially those on relation of norm and conduct ,are quite often said to be statements in a logical sense ([56]). It is, in our opinion, hardly acceptable. The PF/P-F relation is a peculiar one; it is not, as already said, a semantic relation, it is also not a logical one, as relation between two facts: directive resp. optative verbal act — conduct resp. happening. Saying that a given conduct resp. happening P-fulfils (or not) an optative act surely does not amount to claiming that there is a factual relation of the latter being "successful" (or not) in influencing the former, that there is any question of influence or effectiveness at all. But the same exactly applies to PF/P-F of a directive act by a conduct: the factual relation of the directive act being "successful" (or not) in influencing or motivating the given conduct, can coincide with the PF/P-F relation, but has to be distinguished from the latter. The PF/P-F relational statements do not imply (contain as components) the statements about influencing, motivating conduct by directive acts, about the effectiveness of the latter, and the like ([57]).

Now let us make the statements of the types *D that p* and *Utinam that p* more precise in formulating them as:

26). PF D (ut p) that p
27). PF Utinam p that p

It is unnecessary to present here all varieties of such statements (O, F, P_3 statements, and their optative counterparts).

It seems important to note that the conduct resp. happening referred to by p as being the case (and said to P-fulfil the directive resp. optative act) does not have empirically any characteristics in common with the directive resp. optative act referred to by D (ut p) resp. Utinam p; and vice versa, the directive resp. optative act referred to by D (ut p) resp. Utinam p does not have any empiric properties of the conduct resp. happening referred to by p as being the case (and said to P-fulfil the directive resp. optative act). At the same time, it is peculiar about the directive resp. optative act on the one hand, and the conduct resp. happening being the case on the other, that they are mutually excluding themselves. The statements of the types:

28). D (ut p) . p
29). Utinam p . p

are untenable. The directive resp. optative acts referred to by D (ut p) and Utinam p formulas can be the case as far as it is not yet the case that p. The former are excluding the situation referred to by p, and the situation referred to by D (ut p) resp. Utinam p ceases to exist when it is the case that p. Exactly the same can be said about statements of the types:

30). D (ut p) . — p
31). Utinam p . — p ([58]).

The PF/P-F relational statements are neither "pure" directive resp. optative ones, nor "pure" factual p resp. — p statements, nor conjunctions of the former and the latter. They are sui generis statements formed on the basis of some practical comparison of the given directive resp. optative acts and the given conduct resp. happening. As already explained, it would be mistaken to assume that here an S-relation (between directive resp. optative s t a t e m e n t and conduct resp. happening as

f a c t s) comes into play, such semantic links being out of question. There is here only the pragmatic link between direc- tive resp. optative acts and a given conduct resp. happening, these acts having primarily the pragmatic function of directing resp. wishing some determined conduct resp. happening to take place (and secondarily the informative function), and being "understood" as P-fulfilled (or not) when such a con- duct resp. happening is (or is not) the case. By "understanding" we mean here that there exist among people learnt ways of forming directive and optative acts, and of grasping the re- quirements of them (^{59}).

The PF/P-F relational statements constitute another peculiar sort of statements-acts, that is to say, statements referring to verbal acts of evaluating the conduct resp. happening being the case from the point of view of the directive resp. optative act "given". We deal here, then, with pragmatic links between three kinds of facts: directive resp. optative act — conduct resp. happening — evaluative act. As the given conduct resp. happening taking place is understood as P-fulfilling (or not) the respective directive, or optative act, this creates a new situa- tion of the pragmatic extinguishing of the latter and their being substituted by acts of satisfaction (or dissatisfaction), "laudatory" (or of reproof) with respect to the conduct, or hap- pening in question (^{60}). In the latter acts, a qualification of the conduct resp. happening is given by way of "projecting" the directive resp. optative act on what actually took place, the conduct resp. happening being recognized as «such (or not) as D ut it were", or "such (or not) as Utinam it were".

The PF/P-F relational statements are, then, in the light of this analysis, value statements proper, V *that p* statements. Their quasi-directive form, D *that p,* resp. *Utinam that p,* many a time in use, can be explained as a "retrospective" one, lay- ing stress on the initial directive, resp. optative situation. On the other hand ,the quasi-evaluating form of directives resp. optatives, V *(ut p),* can be explained as that of "anticipation" of the P-fulfilment situation. According to the view represent- ed here the V-operator is standing for a complex *PF D (ut p)*

resp. *PF Utinam p* operator (the kinds of V-operator need not be considered here).

Some authors would not agree with our view on the PF/P-F relational statements, claiming that there is a marked difference between "genuine" value statements and the "genuine" relational ones; according to these authors, we would deal with valuation only in the former statements, while the latter would be said to give only an "objective account" of accordance resp. disaccordance of a conduct with a directive (norm). This can be extended on the analogous statements about accordance resp. disaccordance of a conduct resp. happening with an optative (this problem is not raised in the litterature). As to the relational statements, claimed "genuine", we can refer to the examples given above, in 19. Let us discuss in brief this objection. As already shown, the difference between these categories of statements could hardly consist in the latter being statements in a logical sense, and the former being sui generis value statements. The fact that some of the statements in question are "emotionally loaded", while the others not, can be explained by the difference between the instances of PF/P-F of the "own" (internalized) directives, resp. optatives, and the instances of PF/P-F of "external" (heteronomous) directives, resp. optatives ([61]). In both instances we deal, nevertheless, with value statements proper.

Two conclusions of importance have to be drawn from what was said above. Firstly, the intellectual activities consisting in qualifying a given conduct from the point of view of a directive (norm), or in qualifying a given conduct resp. happening from the point of view of an optative, are surely not logical reasonings, but have a practical-pragmatic character. The most vital is here evidently the problem of directive (normative) qualifications, especially in law ([62]). Secondly, directives and optatives are primary in relation to value statements. It is not meant in this sense that the latter would imply (contain as components) the directive resp. optative statements, but in the sense of the directive resp. optative acts being pragmatically presupposed by the evaluative acts. In this sense the directive and optative world is prior to that of valuation ([63]).

23. Value statements about things, of the structure S is V, were not discussed above. They are in need of a separate study as far as their relations to value statements of the structure V that p — those about happenings and conduct — are concerned. The problem of the characteristics of the "general" evaluative predicates (in value statements such as: "The man M is good", "The knife K is good"), as opposed to the "specific" ones (in value statements such as: "The judge J is just", "The food F is tasty") is also of considerable interest. There is only one question we want to examine here in brief, that of the sort of acts which are pragmatically presupposed by the evaluative acts the value statements about things are referring to. Every value statement of this type has an ought-counterpart, of the structure S ought to be V (for brevity's sake, we shall not consider here in detail the instances of V_p, V_n, and V_o), e.g., "The man ought to be good", "The knife ought to be good", "The knife ought to be good", "The judge ought to be just", "The food ought to be tasty". Such ought-statements will be termed, following G.H. von Wright, the "ideal rules". This author characterizes the ideal rules as norms (directives) of some specific sort, which do not regulate conduct but determine what like a person (e.g., soldier, judge, etc.) ought to be ([64]). In our opinion, it is expedient to include into the range of the ideal rules not only those pertaining to persons (as a subspecies of things), but also those pertaining to other things. There are no important differences between these two sorts of rules as far as the present considerations are concerned, and our extended concept of ideal rules serves well the purpose of shedding light on our problem.

One can say that the evaluative acts the value statements about things are referring to presuppose pragmatically the acts the ideal rules are referring to. The latter acts determine "patterns" of things such as we would desire them to have (or not) with respect to their properties ,conceived in a somewhat nebulous-synthetic way. These "patterns", although vague, are differentiated, which is testified to by the fact that in S is V, and S ought to be V, the V-predicates are of great diversity. The value statements now under discussion, and the ideal

rules, appear in the "synthetic" forms *S is V* and *S ought to be V*, because it is hardly possible to make precise the properties which the thing should have to be qualified as V. People evaluating things have mostly in mind some "intuitively" comprehended, unprecisely and summarily conceived sets of properties decisive of such qualification. That is also the reason why the ideal rules constituting the basis of evaluation, are not, in most instances, made explicit, but can be only reconstructed as implicitly assumed.

NOTES

(¹) Comp. the approach to the philosophy of language outlined by J. R. SEARLE, *"Speech acts. An essay in the philosophy of language"*, Cambridge 1969, ch. 1.

(²) Comp. A. Ross, *"Directives and norms"*, London 1968, p. 1 ff.

(³) R. CARNAP, "A. Kaplan on value judgments", in *"The philosophy of Rudolf Carnap"*, ed. by P. A. SCHILPP, La Salle-London 1963, p. 999 f.

(⁴) K. OPAŁEK, "The problem of "directive meaning", in *"Festskrift til Professor, Dr. Jur. et Phil. Alf Ross"*, København 1969, p. 405 f.

(⁵) K. OPAŁEK, "On the logical-semantic structure of directives", *"Logique et Analyse"* XIII, 49-50, 1970, p. 188 ff.

(⁶) A. Ross, *o.c.*, p. 120.

(⁷) G. H. VON WRIGHT, *"Norm and action. A logical enquiry"*, London 1963, p. 86.

(⁸) A. Ross, *o.c.*, p. 123 f.

(⁹) K. OPAŁEK, *"Prawo podmiotowe"* ("The subjective law"), Warszawa 1957, ch. III.

(¹⁰) L. PETRAŻYCKI, *"Teoria prawa i państwa w związku z teorią moralności"* ("Theory of law and State in connection with theory of morals"), v. I, Warszawa 1959, p. 70 ff.

(¹¹) Comp. S. WRONKOWSKA, "O znaczeniu i socjotechnicznej roli terminu "czyjeś prawo" ("On the meaning and sociotechnical role of the term "somebody's right"), *"Państwo i Prawo"* ("State and Law"), 6, 1969, p. 1079 ff.

(¹²) Comp. G. H. VON WRIGHT, *"An essay in deontic logic and the general theory of action"*, Amsterdam 1968, p. 13 f.

(¹³) On some of the difficulties involved here comp. G. H. VON WRIGHT, "Deontic logic and the theory of conditions", *"Critica. Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofia"* II, 6, 1968, p. 4 f.

(¹⁴) It would seem hardly acceptable to regard, e.g., -W or -W-, as concepts analogous to permission.

([15]) They are discussed, to some extent, by A. Ross, *o.c.*, pp. 38-60, this being rather exceptional.

([16]) Comp. O. WEINBERGER, "Die Sollsatzproblematik in der modernen Logik", "*Rozpravy Československe Ákademie Věd*", 68, 9, 1958; N. RESCHER, "*The logic of commands*", London-New York 1966, ch. III; A. ROSS, *o.c.*, p. 71 ff.

([17]) Comp., e.g., A. N. PRIOR, "*Formal logic*", Oxford 1955; A. R. ANDERSON, "*The formal analysis of normative systems*", "Techn. Rep. N° 2, Contract N° SAR/Nour - 609 / 16 /, Office of Naval Research, Group Psychology Branch, New Haven 1956; G. H. VON WRIGHT, "An essay...", cit. above; E. STENIUS, "The principles of a logic of normative systems", "*Acta Philos. Fennica*" XVI, 1963, p. 248 f.

([18]) Comp. e.g., C. WELLMAN, "*The language of ethics*", Cambridge Mass. 1961, ch. II-V.

([19]) Comp. G. H. VON WRIGHT, "The logic of practical discourse", in "*Contemporary philosophy. A survey*", ed. by R. KLIBANSKY, Firenze 1968, p. 143 f.

([20]) Comp., e.g., F. SCHREIER, "*Grundbgriffe und Grundformen des Rechts. Entwurf einer phänomenologisch begründeten Rechts- und Staatslehre*", Leipzig 1924, p. 102 f; K. OPAŁEK, "Prawo podmiotowe", *cit. above*, p. 284 ff.

([21]) Comp. A. P. BROGAN, "The fundamental values universal", "*Jour. of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Method*", XVI, 1919; S. HALLDÉN, "On the logic of "better"", Uppsala 1957; R. M. CHISHOLM — E. SOSA, "On the logic of "intrinsically better", "*Amer. Philosophical Quarterly*" III, 1-6, 1966; G. H. VON WRIGHT, "The logic of practical discourse", cit. above, p. 144 f.

([22]) Comp. J. LANDE, "*Studia z filozofii prawa*" ("Studies in legal philosophy"), Warszawa 1959, p. 765 ff.

([23]) The first attempt seems to be that of K. MENGER, "A logic of the doubtful. On optative and imperative logic", "*Ergebnisse eines mathematischen Kolloquiums*", S. II, 1, 1939.

([24]) R. CARNAP, *o.c.*, p. 1005.

([25]) R. CARNAP, *o.c.*, p. 1001 f., 1011 f.

([26]) This matter is discussed below, II, 14.

([27]) The term "theme" adopted from A. Ross, *o.c.*, p. 107.

([28]) On the term "happening" comp. T. KOTARBIŃSKI, "*Elementy teorii poznania, logiki formalnej i metodologii nauk*" Lwów 1929, p. 61 f. In the sense accepted by us it is in common use in the doctrinal study of law.

([29]) The last term will be left undefined.

([30]) Comp. K. OPAŁEK, "On the logical-semantic structure of directives", cit. above, p. 191 f.

([31]) Comp. G. H. VON WRIGHT, "*An essay...*", cit. above, p. 16 (in comparison with the first construction of a system of deontic logic by this author, "Deontic logic", "*Mind*" LX, 1951; comp. R. Ross's concept of the "idea of topic", *o.c.*, p. 9 ff., and discussion by K. OPAŁEK, "On the logical-semantic structure of directives", cit. above, p. 178 ff.

(³²) In order to simplify matters we shall not discuss in this connection the problem of the "fabulating discourse" (comp. A. Ross, o.c., p. 29 ff) which could enter here.

(³³) According to T. Czeżowski, *"Filozofia na rozdrożu"* ("Philosophy on crossroads"), Warszawa 1965, p. 119 f. value statements are modal statements of some particular sort.

(³⁴) Comp. W. van Orman Quine, *"Elementary logic"*, rev. ed., Cambridge Mass. 1966, par. 8, 9.

(³⁵) On the ut, and that (German "dass", French "que") connectives, comp. K. Opałek, "On the logical-semantic structure of directives", cit. above, p. 188.

(³⁶) *ibidem*, p. 189 f.

(³⁷) Comp. — on the one hand — R. Carnap's view in *"Philosophy and logical syntax"*, London 1935, p. 24, that of Ch. L. Stevenson in *"Facts and values*. Studies in ethical analysis", New Haven and London 1963, ch. II, and that of A. Ross, o.c., p. 37 f; comp. — on the other hand — C. Wellman's analyses of the evaluative, directive and critical meaning (o.c., ch. VIII-X).

(³⁸) Comp., e.g., J. Lande, o.c., p. 786 f; on the concept of instrumental goodness — G. H. von Wright, *"The varieties of goodness"*, ed. II, London 1964, ch. II.

(³⁹) Teleological directives (rules, norms) were frequently discussed, while teleological optatives were never mentioned. An example of the optative statement of this kind can be: "May we have fine weather tomorrow in order to make the trip we are planning".

(⁴⁰) Comp. the remarks of J. Woleński, "Spór o znaczenie normatywne" ("Contention on the subject of "normative meaning"), in *"Naturalistyczne i antynaturalistyczne interpretacje humanistyki"* ("The naturalistic and antinaturalistic interpretation of humanities"), Poznań 1966, and those of J. Wróblewski, "The problem of the meaning of the legal norm", *"Österr. Zeitschr. f. öff. Recht"* XIV, 3-4, 1964, p. 254 ff; comp. also the discussion of Ch. L. Stevenson, o.c., ch. IX, and M. Black, "Some questions about emotive meaning", *"The Philosophical Rev."* 57, 1948, on "strictly evoking", "strictly designating", "suggesting a thought". Comp. also W. Alston, *"Philosophy of language"*, Englewood Cliffs 1964, p. 10 ff.

(⁴¹) K. Opałek, "The problem of "directive meaning", cit. above, p. 420.

(⁴²) Here the contributions of the ordinary language philosophy have to be stressed. Comp. J. Austin, *"How to do things with words"*, London 1962, lect. VIII ff.

(⁴³) This holds true also in the case when a person establishes a directive for himself, and in the instance of conditional directives determining a "proper" (valid, etc.) way of conduct as means of attaining an end in case a person decides to pursue this end (e.g., the norms determining the way of contracting marriage, or of carrying out a sale — and purchase deed).

(⁴⁴) On the concept of "wish" comp. G. H. von Wright, "On the logic

of some axiological and epistemological concepts", in *"Ajatus"*, XVII, 1952, p. 213 ff.

(⁴⁵) The "types of addressing" were analysed by S. Frydman, "Dogmatyka prawa w świetle socjologii" ("Doctrinal study of law in the light of sociology"), "Ogólna nauka o prawie" ("General science of law"), ed. B. Wróblewski, v. I, Wilno 1936, p. 146 ff.

(⁴⁶) Comp. in this connection A. Ross, o.c., p. 123 f; K. Opałek — J. Wróblewski, *"Zagadnienia teorii prawa"* ("Problems of legal theory"), Warszawa 1969, p. 107 f.

(⁴⁷) K. Opałek, "On the logical-semantic structure of directives", cit. above, p. 187 f.

(⁴⁸) "Fulfilment" ("satisfaction") in this sense in A. Hofstadter — J. C.C. McKinsey, "On the logic of imperatives", *"Philosophy of science"*, Oct. 1939, p. 446 ff; J. Wróblewski, l.c.

(⁴⁹) Such statements are termed "relational statements" — comp. J. Wróblewski, "Zwroty stosunkowe — wypowiedzi o zgodności z normą" ("Relational statements — statements on conformity with norm"), *"Zeszyty Naukowe Uniw. Łódzkiego"* ("The Łódź Univ. Review") 62, 1969.

(⁵⁰) F. Stunicki, "Traffic signs", *"Semiotica"* II, 2, 1970, p. 164 ff., introduces the concept of "normative states of affairs" fulfilling normative statements. Criticism by K. Opałek, "The problem of directive meaning", cit. above, p. 414, same author, "The problem of the existence of the norm", *"Festschrift für Adolf J. Merkl"*, München 1970, p. 293 f.

(⁵¹) Attention has to be paid in this connection to the remarks of M. Black, "Analysis of rules" in *"Models and metaphors. Studies in language and philosophy"*, Ithaca 1962, p. 100.

(⁵²) Comp. K. Opałek, "The complexity of law and of the methods of its study", *"Scientia. Revue Internationale de Synthèse Scientifique"*, CIV, 5-6, 1969, p. 287; same author, "Law as social phenomenon", *"Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie"*, 1, 1971, p. 47 f.

(⁵³) R. Carnap, *"Philosophy and logical syntax"*, cit. above, par. 1.

(⁵⁴) Comp. F. Studnicki, «Przepływ informacji o normach prawa" ("The flow of information on legal norms"), Kraków 1965, in connection with the problem of the effectiveness of the legal norms, p. 35 ff.

(⁵⁵) Comp. A. Ross, o.c., par. 37.

(⁵⁶) Comp. J. Nowacki, "O rodzajach ocen ze wzgędu na normę" "On the kinds of value statements based on norms"), *"Zeszyty Naukowe Uniw. Łódzkiego"* ("The Łódź Univ. Review") 14, 1959, p. 19 ff., and the literature cited there.

(⁵⁷) Such relational statements, however, appear in the role of components of the statements of the latter kind, comp. J. Wróblewski, "Statements on the relation of conduct and norm", *"Logique et Analyse"*, XIII, 49-50, 1970, p. 157 f.

(⁵⁸) It is rather striking that the value statements are quite often reconstructed as conjunctions of descriptive and some sui generis (directive, optative, etc.) statements. When adopting such a course, it would seem

inviting to try, e.g., to define the statement that something is good as a hypothetical or disjunctive optative, so that:

$$V_p p = -p \rightarrow \text{Utinam } p, \text{ perhaps with the addition of -Utinam -p.}$$

Perhaps thus:

$$V_p p = p \ \& \ (\text{-Utinam -p v Utinam p}).$$

Analogously it could be attempted also with directive statements. It is not easy to see, however, how such expressions could be interpreted, for lack of a satisfactory theoretical basis.

(^{59}) "Understanding" is surely a pragmatic concept, and not a semantic one. Our opinion differs here from that of J. WRÓBLEWSKI, "The problem of the meaning of the legal norm", o.c., p. 262 ff.

(^{60}) Comp. Cⁱⁱ. L. STEVENSON, o.c., p. 21 f. ("laudatory" — "derogatory").

(^{61}) Comp. K. OPAŁEK, "Some problems of the theory of norms", "Logique et Analyse" XII, 1969, p. 91 ff.

(^{62}) On the character of legal reasonings comp. "Le raisonnement juridique et la logique déontique", Actes du Colloque de Bruxelles (23-25 Dec. 1969), esp. the paper by G. KALINOWSKI, "Le raisonnement juridique et la logique juridique", and the standpoint represented by Ch. PERELMAN, "Logique et Analyse" XIII, 49-50, p. 3 ff., 25 ff., ¹52 ff., and passim.

(^{63}) This problem is widely discussed, and at least some directives (axiological norms) are said to be in some sense secondary to value statements. G. H. VON WRIGHT, "An essay...", cit. above, p. 12, inclines "(...) towards a position according to which value are basic and primary, norms derivative and secondary. Norms, according to this view, are often said to be instrumental towards realization of some values". Our analysis leads to different results.

(^{64}) Comp. G. H. VON WRIGHT, "Norm and action", cit. above, p. 14 f.