INCOMPLETENESS OF A FREE ARITHMETIC

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For every natural number n, let \mathbf{n} be the corresponding numeral s ... s(0). The rules of the theory FQ are Modus Ponens and

$$\vdash A(0/x)
\vdash \forall x(A \supset A(s(x)/x)
(R1) ------
\vdash \forall xA$$

The axiom-schemata of FQ are (A0)-(A11) in [1], plus

(A12)
$$(t = \mathbf{i} \lor t < \mathbf{i}) \supset \exists x(x = t)$$

(A13) $t < \mathbf{i} \supset (t = 0 \lor ... \lor t = \mathbf{i} - \mathbf{1})$
(A14) $t < \mathbf{i} \lor t = \mathbf{i} \lor \mathbf{i} < t$

The consistency of FQ is a simple consequence of the following

Lemma 1. Let FQn be the subtheory of FQ which results from eliminating all the axioms of the form (A12), where n < i. FQn is consistent.

The proof of Lemma 1 proceeds as in [1], with the following addition to the definition of the model M:

$$f(<) = \{ < m, n > : m < n \}$$

For the sake of illustration, consider an instance of (A12). Suppose that $V_M^{\vee}(\exists x(x=t)) = F$. Then $W_M^{\vee}(t) \notin D$, and hence = n + 1. It is easy to see that $W_M^{\vee}(\mathbf{i}) = i$ for all i such that it is not the case that n < i, and hence that, for all such i, $W_M^{\vee}(\mathbf{i}) < W_M^{\vee}(t)$. Therefore, $V_M^{\vee}(t=\mathbf{i}) = V_M^{\vee}(t<\mathbf{i}) = F$.

Let an *n*-place arithmetical function f be *representable* in FQ iff there is a formula A of the language of FQ, containing exactly n+1 variables $x_1, ..., x_n, y$ free and such that, whenever $f(i_1, ..., i_n) = j$, $\vdash_{FQ} A(i_1/x_1 ... i_n/x_n t/y) \equiv t = j$.

Lemma 2. All recursive functions are representable in FQ.

Proof. Given the results in [2], we can limit ourselves to proving that all Recursive functions are representable in FQ. There are six parts to this proof.

Part I: All identity functions are representable in FQ. Trivial.

Part II: Addition is representable in FQ, by the formula x + y = z. For suppose that i + j = k. We prove by induction on j that $\vdash_{FQ} \mathbf{i} + \mathbf{j} = \mathbf{k}$. If j = 0 then $\vdash_{FQ} \mathbf{i} + \mathbf{j} = \mathbf{k}$ by (A8). If j = s(m) then k = s(n) and i + m = n. By the induction hypothesis $\vdash_{FQ} \mathbf{i} + \mathbf{m} = \mathbf{n}$, and hence by the logic of identity $\vdash_{FQ} s(\mathbf{i} + \mathbf{m}) = \mathbf{k}$. But by (A9) $\vdash_{FQ} s(\mathbf{i} + \mathbf{m}) = \mathbf{i} + \mathbf{j}$. Thus $\vdash_{FQ} \mathbf{i} + \mathbf{j} = \mathbf{k}$, and by the logic of identity $\vdash_{FQ} \mathbf{i} + \mathbf{j} = t \equiv t = \mathbf{k}$.

Part III: Multiplication is representable in FQ, by the formula $x \cdot y = z$. Proof analogous to Part II.

Part IV: The characteristic function of identity $f_{=}$ is representable in FQ, by the formula $(x = y \& z = 1) \lor (x \neq y \& z = 0)$. First, let $f_{=}(i, j) = 1$. Then i = j, and hence $\vdash_{FQ} \mathbf{i} = \mathbf{j} \& 1 = 1$. Second, let $f_{=}(i, j) = 0$. Then $i \neq j$, and we prove by induction on i (assuming, without loss of generality, that i < j) that $\vdash_{FQ} \mathbf{i} \neq \mathbf{j}$. If i = 0 then, for some m, j = s(m). By (A12), $\vdash_{FQ} \exists x(x = \mathbf{m})$; hence, by (A6), $\vdash_{FQ} \mathbf{j} \neq 0$. If i = s(m) for some m then j = s(n) for some n, and $m \neq n$. By the induction hypothesis $\vdash_{FQ} \mathbf{m} \neq \mathbf{n}$, and hence by (A7) $\vdash_{FQ} \mathbf{i} \neq \mathbf{j}$. Then $\vdash_{FQ} \mathbf{i} \neq \mathbf{j} \& 0 = 0$.

Part V: Let A represent the m-ary function f in FQ, and let B_1 , ..., B_m represent the n-ary functions g_1 , ..., g_m , respectively. Let h be obtained by composition from f, g_1 , ..., g_m . Then $C = \exists y_1 ... \exists y_m (B_1(y_1/y) \& ... \& B_m(y_m/y) \& A(y_1/x_1...y_m/x_m))$ represents h. (Through all this part, we

assume that $x_1, ..., x_n, y_1, ..., y_m$ are pairwise distinct.) For suppose that $h(i_1, ..., i_n) = f(g_1(i_1, ..., i_n), ..., g_m(i_1, ..., i_n)) = j$, and let $g_1(i_1, ..., i_n) = k_1, ..., g_m(i_1, ..., i_n) = k_m$. Then

$$\begin{array}{l} \vdash_{FQ} B_1(\mathbf{i}_1/x_1...\mathbf{i}_n/x_nt/y) \equiv t = \mathbf{k}_1 \\ . \\ . \\ \vdots \\ \vdash_{FQ} B_m(\mathbf{i}_1/x_1...\mathbf{i}_n/x_nt/y) \equiv t = \mathbf{k}_m \\ \vdash_{FQ} A(\mathbf{k}_1/x_1...\mathbf{k}_m/x_mt/y) \equiv t = \mathbf{j} \end{array}$$

Consequently

Thus

$$\vdash_{FQ} (B_1(\mathbf{k}_1/y) \& \dots \& B_m(\mathbf{k}_m/y))(\mathbf{i}_1/x_1...\mathbf{i}_n/x_n) \& A(\mathbf{k}_1/x_1...\mathbf{k}_m/x_m\mathbf{j}/y)$$

But

$$\vdash_{FQ} \exists x(x = \mathbf{k}_1)$$
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and hence

(1)
$$\vdash_{FQ} \exists y_1...\exists y_m (B_1(y_1/y) \& ... \& B_m(y_m/y) \& A(y_1/x_1...y_m/x_m))$$

 $(\mathbf{i}_1/x_1...\mathbf{i}_n/x_n\mathbf{j}/y)$

On the other hand, suppose that

$$\exists y_1...\exists y_m (B_1(y_1/y) \& ... \& B_m(y_m/y) \& A(y_1/x_1...y_m/x_m))$$

 $(\mathbf{i}_1/x_1...\mathbf{i}_n/x_nt/y)$

To utilize the free logic equivalent of Existential Instantiation, we assume

From these assumptions and earlier stated theorems of FQ,

$$t = \mathbf{j}$$

clearly follows, and hence, since none of a_1 , ..., a_n occur in $t = \mathbf{j}$,

(2)
$$\vdash_{FQ} \exists y_1...\exists y_m (B_1(y_1/y) \& ... \& B_m(y_m/y) \& A(y_1/x_1...y_m/x_m) (\mathbf{i}_1/x_1...\mathbf{i}_n/x_nt/y)) \supset t = \mathbf{j}.$$

The desired result follows easily from the conjunction of (1) and (2).

Part VI: Let A represent the n+1 regular function f, and let g be obtained by minimization on f. Then $B = A(0/y) \& \forall w(w < x_{n+1} \supset \sim A(w/x_{n+1}0/y))$ represents g. For suppose that $g(i_1, ..., i_n) = \mu x_{n+1} f(i_1, ..., i_n, x_{n+1}) = j$. Then $f(i_1, ..., i_n, j) = 0$ and, for all k < j, $f(i_1, ..., i_n, k) \neq 0$. Since A represents f,

Then, by (A13),

(3)
$$\vdash_{FQ} (A(0/y) \& \forall w(w < x_{n+1} \supset \sim A(w/x_{n+1}0/y))$$

 $(\mathbf{i}_1/x_1...\mathbf{i}_n/x_n\mathbf{j}/x_{n+1})$

Now assume

(4)
$$(A(0/y) \& \forall w(w < t \supset \sim A(w/x_{n+1}0/y)))(\mathbf{i}_1/x_1...\mathbf{i}_n/x_nt/x_{n+1})$$

Since

$$\vdash_{FO} \exists x(x = \mathbf{j})$$

(4) entails $\sim \mathbf{j} < t$. On the other hand, by (A12) $t < \mathbf{j}$ entails $\exists x(x = t)$, and hence (3) and (4) entail $\sim t < \mathbf{j}$. Therefore, by (A14), (4) entails $t = \mathbf{j}$, and in conclusion

(5)
$$\vdash_{FQ} (A(0/y) \& \forall w(w < t \supset \sim A(w/x_{n+1}0/y)))(\mathbf{i}_1/x_1...$$

 $\mathbf{i}_n/x_nt/x_{n+1}) \supset t = \mathbf{j}$

The desired result follows easily from the conjunction of (3) and (5).

If n is the gödel number of A, let A^* be \mathbf{n} . Let the function diag be as in [2], p. 172. Since diag is recursive, it is represented in FQ by a formula B containing exactly two variables free.

Lemma 3. For every formula C, containing exactly the variable y free, there is a sentence G such that

$$\vdash_{FO} G \equiv C(G^*/y)$$

Proof. Let F be $\exists y(B \& C)$. Let n be the gödel number of F. Let $G = \exists x(x = n \& F)$. In view of (A12), G is provably equivalent to $\exists y(B(n/x) \& C)$. Let k be the gödel number of G. Then diag(n) = k and $k = G^*$. So

$$\vdash_{FQ} B(\mathbf{n}/xt/y) \equiv t = \mathbf{k}$$

$$\vdash_{FO} G \equiv \exists y(y = \mathbf{k} \& C)$$

and in view of (A12)

$$\vdash_{FQ} G \equiv C(\mathbf{k}/y)$$
 [that is, $\vdash_{FQ} G \equiv C(G^*/y)$]

Let a set u of natural numbers be *definable* in a theory T if there is a formula A of the language of T, containing exactly the variable x free, and such that, for any number k, $\vdash_T A(\mathbf{k}/x)$ if $k \in u$, and $\vdash_T \sim A(\mathbf{k}/x)$ otherwise.

Lemma 4. If T is a consistent extension of FQ, then the set of gödel numbers of theorems of T is not definable in T. Proof is as in [2], p. 174.

Theorem 2 (Gödel's first incompleteness theorem). There is no consistent, complete, axiomatizable extension of FQ. Proof is as in [2], p. 179.

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REFERENCES

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